

## A Comparative Inquiry Regarding the Party's Activity and Performance in Iran and Turkey (The Study Case: Participation, Justice and Development Party)

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### Abstract

Many social sciences researchers call the presence of democratic parties and systems as two faces of a coin; they regard the development and survival of democratic parties and procedures related to each other. In Iran's cultural and political domain, the participation party presented itself as a significant movement in its socio-political sphere. This party has introduced itself as the defender of Islam in the region and the world. This research emphasizes two categories of structure and performance than the two flows of Iran's participation party and turkey's Justice and development party using an analytical – descriptive method. In response to the research question ‘what are the similarities and differences of the participation party and the Justice and development party in terms of structure and performance?’ presented this hypothesis that the participation party and the Justice and development party lacked a similar party structure. The difference between them is that the participation party has less coherence and antiquity than the justice and development party. Both parties have an Islamic approach; with the difference, the participation party has a variation in trend (national and Islamic) with a no secular system. The Justice and development party enjoy a single direction (Islamic direction) with a secularist approach.

**Keywords:** Structure, Agent, Construction, Participation Party, Justice, Development Party.

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## A Comparative Inquiry Regarding the Party's Activity and Performance in Iran and Turkey (The Study Case: Participation, Justice and development Party)

### Introduction

The term party refers to a group of people who struggle and compete with other groups according to common ideology; therefore, the term party consists of three main elements: difference, similarity, and struggle (fighting) (Ayoobi, 2000: 38). Edmund, park, and Bon claim that parties have a special place in Almond and levels sociological studies. They also claim that the parties should prioritize specific issues and find new topics to gain their candidates' support, arouse the indifference (Almond and Powel, 2002: 69).

What is certain is that the institutionalization of parties in today's governments is one of the main manifestations of democracy's existence. In relating to society's function and structure, these parties can enhance their members' cultural, social, and political knowledge through different sociability ways. In contrast, these parties can cause instability and anxiety in society. Although parties' existence can have positive aspects, they can cause anarchy and chaos (Damyar, 2016: 26-35).

To institutionalize a party in any society, the structure of that society should have the capacity to accept the party system. The party should perform and do activity in this institutionalized structure; therefore, explaining the parties' structural and functional factors is necessary. In this research, the agent- structure theory describes both the justice and development parties' function structural aspects and participation. These parties are led by people who have had the highest executive authority in their country as agents in their own time. Finlay, we try to explain the structural and functional similarities and differences between these two parties in two Islamic countries of Iran and turkey.

The theoretical framework (construction theory) of such periods, the relation between structure and agent, has been a fundamental issue governing the methodological, discussions, ontology, and epistemology. The root of the system must seek an agent issue in thoughts and ideas of Karl Marx (Bashiriyeh, 2007: 125), this his famous sentence: Humans make history, but not in the frame of condition, selected by themselves, this is an indication of mark attention to the structure and agent issue in sociology (Fay, 2006: 125); but recently we witness a sort (re) exploration and returning to the structure and agency issue in the sphere of political analysis. This transformation has accompanied an entirely a formative and coordinated attempt to go beyond the much known limitation of indulgence in structural and operational explanation; it seems that social and political theories of the decade of 1900 have continuously involved that indulgence (Hay, 2010: 17).

Before the presentation of the Giddiness theory of construction, there were two groups of theorists. One group (such as multiplicity believers and elitist theorists) emphasizes decision-makers' ability to inform events' flow (Marsh and stokes, 2011: 190-187).

In contrast, the theorists' group of Baverter structure (such as many institutionalism (and Neomarksist) emphasize the state agents' freedom of action and the amount of limitation for which the form, performance, and structure of the state is shaped (Hay, 2010: 151). Giddiness started his work to go beyond dualism of design and agency in existing social theory and understand the logic in the process of this work to which he can attribute his current fame. From a Giddiness point of view, structure and agency have an internal relationship or ontological entanglement. They involve a sort of dualism, and this implies that design and agent are two faces of a coin and this similarity id because the relationship between structure and agent is on internal one but not an external; this means that both are interdependent and they form each other (Hay, 2010: 197).

This theory focuses on adjusting the structure of interactions between beliefs, intentions, goals and choices, and individual and collective actions from one hand and structural conditions of thought and action. From Gidden's point of view, structures are not independently existed; but are covered in the action coverage. They are only in activities and existed by actions and existed by steps that produce and reproduce them (Haghighat, 2009: 13).


In summary, Giddiness's structural theory investigates the question that 'Are people the ones who shape the social reality, or social forces?' He avoids taking extreme positions and believes that although they are not entirely free to choose their activities and their knowledge is limited, they are agents who reproduce the social structure and create social changes (Hay, 2010: 198). Giddiness's main argument in constriction is as follows; people build society but, at the same time, are constrained by society. They cannot analyze action and structures separately, so define the systems as a combination of rules and sources which involve human activity (Agha Mohammadi, 2011: 14).

### **1. Process and Cognitive Discourse of the Participation Party**

With the emergence of the Islamic revolution in Iran and the rule of religion-political structure manifested this ideology in the constitution. The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran was designed and drafted to have the capacity of readings by combining democratic aspects, on the one hand, and Shiite-religious elements, on the other hand. Among these,

### A Comparative Inquiry Regarding the Party's Activity and Performance in Iran and Turkey (The Study Case: Participation, Justice and development Party)

one of the significant Islamic parties after the Islamic revolution victory in Iran has been the participation party that could declare its existence in the Iranian political system's structure. After the revolution, this party claiming to benefit from the teachings of the Islamic course (Islamic republic and ideology) and the use of achievements of western civilization and modernity, raised in the sphere of Iranian politics. This party received a license in Tehran on December 5, 1998. Yet, the beginning of its activity dates back to the before presidential election in 1997. At that time, the party's leader Seyed Mohamad Khatami became the president of Iran until 2005. This party was declared illegal and dissolved by the security and political officials of the country. The general components considered by this faction are shown in the figure below:



Formed The discourse of the participation party around the central sign of the republic (people) and democracy by articulating other floating discourse elements like freedom, political development, Civil society law, a responsible government, minimal government, minimal liberal relegation, parties, private ownership, selection right, press freedom, and de-escalation, in international sphere (Bashiriyeh, 2007: 134). Although their conception was unreliable and also rested in Iran and Islamic and socio-cultural environment because of knotting with secularism and modern democracy liberal discourse in two decades revolution, again the participation party came out of the traditional left speech on a change which has been occurred within the Islamic revolution discourse (Darabi, 2009: 140). Based on this framework, the participation party discourse

presented itself as an Islamic reformist organization in the modern form and content in the structure of the time's political system. It caused a rift between the processes and fraction claiming to be reformists in Iran. Among radical reformers, more emphasis is placed on elements of modern discourse. The conflict within them with the moderate reformists is that the reform discourse wanted both Islamic and republicanism based on Iran Khomeini (Islamic republic not more than other or less words. yet, formed the republicanism dominated in the later participation party discourse and was categorized as the identity of central signifier and other discourse elements around it (Akhavan Kazemi, 2009: 355). This process had a unique and exclusive power regarding the status and recognition of the participation party's performance in Iran's socio-political sphere. It did not allow others to take control except its members, and in the government, parliament, councils, and other institutions had appointed only their party agent (Akhavan Kazemi, 2009: 356). The plants proposed in the parliament and the bills put forward by the government's party members were mainly challenging and controversial.

On the other hand, the members of a party often have clear and coherent goals and plans for and political development in religious democracy, a practice to which the reformist movements like the participation party considered themselves committed it. Still, the reformist body's different tendencies had their basic concepts: democracy, national sovereignty, human rights, civil society, freedoms, civil law, and various parties' competition (Abbasi, Sarmadi, Mehrnoosh, 2010: 270). In such a situation, the forces that formed June's event (Second of Khordad) did not follow any single and clear purpose or any coherent political, social, and economic plan (Moshirzadeh, 2002: 109). The groups referred to as the Khordad groups (Khordad in Persian is the equivalent for June in English) also morally and ideologically formed a contradictory and disharmonic spectrum. There were groups of believers to the Islamic secularism and west liberalism of believers and opponents of Velayat-e Faqih system from one hand. There were critical values and some of Imam's close companions. On the other hand.

Heroism and cult of personality have been among the most critical features of Iran's political and social history. This issue, like other processes, was at its highest rank in the participation party. The political parties in general and the participation party (precisely) in Iran have been dependent on the person or individual personality or derive their identity primarily from the founding person, not from legal, group, or party personality. Therefore this party could not enjoy an essential feature of

## **A Comparative Inquiry Regarding the Party's Activity and Performance in Iran and Turkey (The Study Case: Participation, Justice and development Party)**

parties, namely the public support (Sardarnia, 2011: 115). The participation party discourse presented some issues about the rule of law, tolerance, and livelihood of citizens ambitiously that they could not cope with them, which caused the citizens to become frustrated and bored with the parties. This feature led to the party's low output showing negative feedback and a loss of public trust in the party and finally faced with the widespread crisis of legitimacy and the problem of making a general motivation.

But the central issue of the party's failure in all parts of the world like the participation party, the exclusive claim of power and removal party, the entire claim power and removal of various seals, even from the member of its parties in the spheres of decision making. In the moments of the political open space like the Mashroteh period, the early year after the Islamic revolution victory in June 1997, the country witnessed narrow-minded rivalries of political parties and groups demanding more political power has been an essential driver of such an atmosphere. The participation party got into trouble in the first round councils and sixth parliament and faced many contradictory views due to its totalitarianism and monopoly (Akhavan Kazemi, 2009: 354, Damyar, 2016: 130).

This world is black or white; we want "All" or "Nothing" the party or group work requires cooperation with others. If we don't look at people as absolutely good or bad, absolutely friend or absolutely enemy. We will maintain this cooperation.

### **2. Discourse and Cognitive Process of Justice and Development Party**

One of the essential processes (flows) in Turkey's counterparty history is the development and justice party that presented itself as a fundamental process (flow) in the socio-political after the 2002 election. Before the 2002 election, many Western media described the development and justice party as a "Fundamentalist" party. After the elections, the same media gave the adjective "Islamic" When the party started joining the (Copenhagen criteria for membership in the European Union; they regarded this party as having "Islamic Roots."

Following the approval of several major reform packages in parliament, the development and justice party formed the Islamic party. Then, in the process of recent legal debate on adultery in parliament, the utopian media again used the adjective "Islamism" or "Islamic." After the 2007 election, the economist magazine called the Justice and development party a "Relatively Islamic" party (Chavez, 2010: 22). The heads of the Justice and development party are Islamic in training and education, political

activity, and the party's history. Still, it formed the thought of establishing a Justice and Development Party. The party's founder sought a contemporary discourse to get out of the massive pressures on Turkey's Islamic movements, which was not separated from their Islamic root. Simultaneously, do not clash with the ruling system and do not make excuses for the coup of February 28, 1997, to be repeated, and Islam is under pressure. Erdogan describes his change of mind in the same context: I object to what we called the Islamic movement. I am a Muslim, and any Muslim can have his/ her particular political viewpoint. I think adding the adjective political to Islamic reduces the greatness and importance of this religion. So Islamic is a religion, and every citizen has the right to live with his/ her belief in a way he/ she wants. This right is also reserved for Jews and Christians. When we decided to form the justice and development party, we proclaim that this party is not an Islamic one based on religious principles or created from a religious viewpoint. Our audiences are the Turkish 65 million population (Jancis. 2005: 138).

After establishing the justice and development party, Abdullah Gol proclaims that: our party is not religious, and we try to represent a religious party meaning everyone among the establishers, their women with hijab and without hijab (Islamic wearing) and hijab, men having a beard or beardless; the political party is not a means a tool for advertisement but active and work for providing a new concept in the policy (Salamati, 2008: 102).

Based on internal socio-political developments and extensive communication with the western world and, most importantly, attempting to join the ideological union, conservatism has become the Turkish political system's dominant culture. Recep Tayyip Erdogan to gain the trust of the majority of the Turkish people and western politicians says :“Justice and development, instead of conservatism built on stagnation and immobility, are built on modern conservatism that embraces modernism. The party's conservatism has to do with its traditional roots” (Jansis, 2005, Yavez, 2010: 24). Despite its Islamic roots, this party knows itself as a conservative democratic party and rejects its Islamic plan. The Islamists and some secularists argue that this rejection is nothing except a cover. Because the party cannot legally describe itself as Islamic, there is no escaping for it pretending to be conservative (Yavez, 2010: 22).

The essential principles of this party's ideology are as follows: Nostalgic attitude toward the culture and civilization of the past, acceptance of cultural and religious diversity, exploitation of all religions and various discourses to provide Turkey's goals, gradual reforms in the

## **A Comparative Inquiry Regarding the Party's Activity and Performance in Iran and Turkey (The Study Case: Participation, Justice and development Party)**

country's other spheres, limiting the government's authorities and emphasizing on the civil power and majority rule, extensive communication with the western world, the Islamic world, and so far (Yavez, 2010: 135-150).

### **3. Matching the Function and Structure of the Two Parties, Partnership, Justice, and Development**

After the above preparations, we try to address the research's main problem: the similarities and differences between these two parties in Iran and Turkey.

The table below briefly provide these cases:

Similarities and Differences between the two parties: Participation, Justice, and Development	
Similarities	Differences
The Central Role Personality in bout Parties	Kind of their Attitude Towards an Ideology
Islamic Ideology	Coherence and Function
Opposition to the Status Quo	How to form
Adjusting Member's Attitudes towards their initial ones	Government- made and State-Building
Lack of attention of the two Parties to the Parties Hidden Function	Establishers and their Combination

#### **3.1. Structural and functional similarities**

Given the table's contents, we should say that while bout parties claim to try to institutionalize democratic processes and political open space, their administrative formed structure and attitude through exclusive power and individualism. In bout parties, a boss is at the top that this is parties in Iran and a clear example is this the participation party which lost its high primary face with the end of the presidency of Seyed Mohammad Khatami so that it was removed entirely from the scene (Akhavan Kazemi, 2009: 350).

One of the Justice and Development Party characteristics emphasized by liberal, Islamic, radical, and fundamentalist movements is to gain reputation and importance in Islamic societies. The bases the Islamic principles; it presents itself as the claimants of revival and recreation of Islamic thoughts at various company levels. Because of the secular constitutional structure and other groups' (Sentence fragment) existence, this party rejects its Islamic history. It claims that it is created from the completely Islamic parties such as Refah and Fazilat, which were



dissolved on the charge of begin anti-secularism. The leaders of the Justice and development party often have conservative religious training.

The leaders of this party perform religious duties. Their wives often wear Chador (a wearing for women), and also the women who were the establishment members of the party have hijab (wearing Chador). Some of them were ministers in the Refah party government in 1996 and 1997, including Abdullah Gol, the minister of state for foreign affairs (Ahmadi Hatamabadi Farahani, 1390: 25). About the participation party, we should also say that a group of people who introduced themselves as followers of Dr. Shariati believed in Islamic without clergy (Rohaniat).

Some of Dr. Soroush's students and Halgheh Kian's group believed in revisionist and reforming ideas in some Islamic teachings; some of the traditional lefts who were remorseful of their past; and finally, the modernist thinkers who considered a secular ideology. Some also believed in the original ideals and values of the Islamic Republic derived from the line of Imam Khomeini, that to the prevailing atmosphere in the party and lack of listening to their views, they preferred to gradually distance themselves from the party and withdraw completely (Jalali, Gholizadeh, 2013: 132). (Hard-to-read Sentence) In general, in this movement, the people under Dr. Soroush's teaching tried to advance secularism principles, believing in Islamic teachings. They emphasized strengthening the Islamic Republic's foundation and considered themselves believers and adherents to the Islamic norms. The complete caused them to use attitude opposition towards the status quo.

By representing a moderate and transformational figure which take advantage of the differences between other groups, the Justice and development party was able to establish a close relationship with the general public, Islamic intellectual groups and even secular and ethnic groups and other involved influential sections of Turkish society and with accurate knowledge of the realities and development of society to become a comprehensive discourse and able to end the eleven years of the formation of a coalition government in this country (Matlabi, Zamani, 1393: 141).

The participation party introduced itself as a symbol of opposition to the status quo and, explicitly and seriously criticizing the past, presented itself as Iran's future savior. The construction report card party questioned the government before itself. The participation party members criticized the past performance of the left and strongly governmentalization of affairs (Akhavan Kazemi, 2009: 350).

### **A Comparative Inquiry Regarding the Party's Activity and Performance in Iran and Turkey (The Study Case: Participation, Justice and development Party)**

Another critical issue of the similarity between the two parties is a deviation from its primary and stated goals; thus, the emphasis is placed on peaceful behavior and denial of violence in official statements and statements by members of the central councils. Like a letter on the second anniversary of Jane (Khordad) to Seyed Mohammad Khatami, a part of which says: The participation front which knowing itself as your partner in your concerns and all sympathizers of the country has to defend the Islamic Republic whether on territorial or identity borders by appropriate tools and a weapon of tact logic and a calm manner against what threatens these borders (Shamsi, and salami, 2012: 21): But with a look to the party's performance and some of the members in intensifying the incidences like the university dormitory accident on July 9, 1999, khoramabad scandal, 2009 sedition, and stimulating student's emotions, observed an amount of violence in their behavior, and also an emotional stimulation and violent orientations were observed in some of the leader's activities and arrested speeches and many of the leaders because of taking part in the students' riots (Yavez, 2010: 22).

Regarding the justice and development party, we can say that its members didn't follow what they know as their goals and followed new plans using the same conservative policy. One of the cases faced them with was a state of ups and downs in regulating Islam and the foreign political sphere. Before gaining power, they wanted an Islamic government, but they ruled the country with a secular structure after gaining control. Also, the stated party though emphasizing de-escalation in regional affairs and foreign policy, have recently faced charges in the region, including financial support for Isis (Daesh).

#### **3.2. Differences Between the Two Parties**

Perhaps the most important, most prominent, and most significant areas of competition and conflict in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey are introduced in the impact of an ideological element in policy marking and targeting the two countries. After the Islamic revolution in Iran, the system presented the religious democratic based on Islamic teachings at different levels (social, cultural, economic, and political, and security). It indicates a new model for society and policy management from the revolution theorist. The pillars of this Islamic system are the combination of the two dimensions of Republic and Islamic. Most of the parties in Iran have accepted this principle and base their action on it. Still, in Turkey, with the ruling secular political system's history, Islam's electric ideology is considered. Each country's constitution is regarded as a law approval document in any political system in Turkey.

Recap Type Erdogan, the president and leader of the justice and development party, and also Abdullah Gol have emphasized over and over again that they do not have any plan to establish an Islamic government in Turkey and they adhere to the constitution of their country (Naghdinejad, 2008: 225).

But formed the participation party with an utterly Islamic approach; though some of the party's members disagreed on various issues, this party did not deny Islam and teaching in general; their deviations were because of their political confrontations. However, a combining ideology has been used in the participation party. It's evident that if we accept that this feature has also existed in some members. Still, it was incapable of being implemented in society, but it must not interfere in religion's government affairs.

Regarding the difference between the two parties' incoherence and function spheres, we should say that after its establishment, the participation party could not gain an internal coherence or at least could not keep the primary unity achieved at the beginning of its establishment. After a while, their organizations got a superficial aspect, and every one of the members went their way. In contrast, the justice and development party has more internal coherence than the participation party. Although this party has not been able to keep primary popularity, it has a level of coherence and function to win the elections.

Another difference between the two parties is the way of their establishment. Regarding the history of attempting to establish Islamist parties in Turkey, its first Islamic party on the date 1960 was established by the name "Nation a System" and ten years after the coup (coup date), another party named "National Health" was formed. After the coup (coup debate) on September 12, 1980, this party was closed. After four years and the freedom of parties, "Professor Arbakan" established the "Refah" party, the third Islamist party in Turkey. This party was closed by generals and politicians in a post-modern coup on February 28, 1997, and politically banned my Arabian. After the dissolution of the "Refah" party, the "Fazilat" Islamist party headed by "Rajayi Kottan" was formed, but branched Erdogan and Abdullah Gol and about 20 people of his companions out of this party. They claimed that Arbakan, the representative of "Rajayi Kottan," has been targeted by the United States and cannot form an Islamic party in Turkey. Thus, the Fazilat party was divided into two parts: the "Saadat Party" headed by Rajayi Kottan, who was representative of Erdogan, and the "Justice and Development Party" established by Erdogan and his companions. Arrested Erdogan later

### **A Comparative Inquiry Regarding the Party's Activity and Performance in Iran and Turkey (The Study Case: Participation, Justice and development Party)**

because of composing some Islamic poems, and of course, some members of his party criticized Ataturk. Erdogan Was jailed for about three months and then left for the United States; he met the US's political circles. After returning, Erdogan participated in elections and won, and now it is 15 years that Erdogan and Justice and development party are in power in Turkey. Regarding the participation party, we can say that this party was a post-event and was formed after June 2 (second of Khordad). It means that this party is not created from a dissolved party or existed before Junes 2 (second of Khordad), 1997. Therefore, the participation party is different from the justice and development party in the context of formation. After gaining power, its members decided to form the party.

Regarding the participation party, as we talked about its establishment, we concluded that formed this party from those governmental parties formed with the coming to power government (Khatami's government). We immediately began its decline with the expiration of its legal period, and then after the end of life, the mentioned government could not take part in any election. Branched the justice and development party out of its previous parties could win in three following polls in Turkey and form a government. The justice and development party won the November 2002 election, with 22% of the vote against the secular People's Republic party. The later party comes in second place with 19 percent of the vote. Nearly 203 seats of the national assembly became those of the Justice and development party representatives. They could form the new government by themselves (Etezad-Asaltaneh, 2010: 144).

Thus, unlike the participation party, the justice and development party started government by itself and existed before the election after them. The number of the participation party's establishment was about 110 people composed of other groups that were the cause of the split between them. But the members of the Justice and development party were from a single class and the society intellectuals. People like Erdogan and Abdullah Gol, who were the main establishers of this party, have tried to keep their moral cases to the lowest possible level.

### **Conclusion**

Once the various political parties come into power, they must meet their supporters' demands in the frame of their legal duties and authorities, and their proper performance will continue their political life. A political party must know when its purpose is and know what strategies to achieve that purpose. When this party designs its slogans and promises, it must fulfill

them. If we want to consider the researchers' two understudy parties based on this feature, we should say that the Justice all development party has done this better.

Unlike its previous parties, the justice and development party has been able to leave a good record and keep people satisfied. The breakdown of the 2016 coup and Turkish people's support for the mentioned president at the top shows that the government's party performance has caused people's welfare; otherwise, an unsuccessful coup would succeed the coups happened before. Despite the primary slogans that deprived people's satisfaction and pulled them towards it, the participation party could not adequately perform. After the formation of the current government, the members of this party each had different demands and goals and even could not come to an agreement on other issues within themselves and among the prominent members of the party establishers.

In general, regarding the research problem that was trying to reach differences and similarities between the two parties, we should say that a type of personality is seen in both Islamic countries. Naturally, their considered ideology was Islamic; of course, with the difference in their attitudes toward Islamic, both parties and their heads entered into the policy with the slogan of making change and development in their own country. Regarding this standard feature, the two parties indicated the same was turning away from the most critical goals: their policy of change. Another familiar part of these two parties was that they could not pay more attention to other parties' hidden performances, unlike the actual parties. Regarding that what elements and characteristics caused what features and characteristics caused the difference and separation of these two parties from each other, we should say that some of these differences are natural because of the way of their formation, as well as the kind of their attitudes toward ideology, depend on the type of macro. Structure and organization in their own countries, and naturally, this element will cause their differences.

The participation party started the government after establishing the current government in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Still, the justice and development party started the government after its establishment and selected its head as its president. The prominent members of the Justice and development party follow a single purpose and have done their best to coordinate, cooperate, and contribute to various issues, which was the opposite in the participation party.

**A Comparative Inquiry Regarding the Party's Activity and Performance in Iran and Turkey (The Study Case: Participation, Justice and development Party)**

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**A Comparative Inquiry Regarding the Party's Activity and Performance in Iran and Turkey (The Study Case: Participation, Justice and development Party)**

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