

Analysis of the Narrative Bases of the Opponents of Revolution and Formation of Islamic Government in the Period of Occultation

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(Received: 18 January 2019- Accepted: 10 February 2020)

Abstract

Socio-political aspect is one of the dimensions of human life. An important issue is the view of Islam towards the formation of government at the age of occultation. Concerning the certain traditions, any kind of uprising and revolution before the emergence of Hazrat Qaem (a.j.) will be unlawful and add, "Any flag which raised before the emergence of the Imam of the Age (a.j.), its leader will be Taqut." The present study aimed at criticizing the narrative bases of the revolution opponents and the formation of government from the viewpoints of documents and contexts. Based on the results, only one, and with tolerance, two traditions ban the uprising and describe the rebels as Taqut, legends from Malek Jahani, and Abi basir. Both narratives have some flaws from the viewpoint of documents and rejected contextually. They are not in agreement with the Quran, necessities of religion, the Shia idea of fighting against oppression, and the practical life of the religious leaders. These traditions, in the event of the correctness of their reference to infallible Imams (a.s.), provide for uprisings whose leaders instead of Sovereignty of Allah and Ahl al- Bayt [The household of the Prophet (P.B.U.H)] introduce themselves as the promised Mahdi (a.j.).

Keywords: The Hojjatieh Society, Taqut Flag, Islamic Government, Age of Occultation, the Uprising of Mahdi (a.j.).

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Introduction

The need of the society for government is one of the essential elements of the human being's social life. The Messenger of God (P.B.U.H) as a good model formed a government after migration to Yathrib. This event is confirmed both by the Shi'ites and the Sunnis. Still, the Sunnis consider governance as a social issue and believe in the theory of caliphate that continued in three phases, the Umayyad dynasty up to 132 A.H., the Abbasid to 656 A.H. and then the Ottoman caliphate up to 1924.

The Shias' view is the theory of Imamate, whose first stage (intrinsic Imamate) continued up to 260 A.H., and the Shia Imams claimed the right to govern. The next phase is Imamate by succession. A significant part of the Islamic rules is political and social programs, which cannot be performed but only through the formation of an Islamic government. These divine decrees and regulations are constant and do not belong to the time of the presence of innocent Imam. Instead, the performance of orders at the time of occultation is necessary as well.

However, at the age of the Pahlavi dynasty, a viewpoint posed that considered uprising and formation of government at the time of occultation as something unlawful and a Taghuti action [i.e., focus of worship other than Allah].

The present study assumes that this view of the formation of government at the age of occultation is subject to criticism and is not in agreement with the Quranic and narrative doctrines.

A few traditions have a lack of legitimacy for the Islamic government formation at the age of occultation and prohibit any kind of uprising before the appearance of Imam Mahdi (a.j.). The acceptance of these traditions context caused to rejection of the riots, revolutions, and governments before the presentation. Above traditions Critique and justification as a basis for the formation of the government based on Velâyat-e Faqih.

One of the most prominent groups believe in the lack of permission to do an uprising and revolution at the age of occultation is known as "Anjoman-e Hojjatieh [The Hojjatieh Society]." The founder of this group is Sheikh Mahmoud Zakerzadeh Tavalayea, known as Halabi (17/06/1279-26/Day/1376). Mr. Halabi was one of the political figures in Mashhad at Reza Khan age, a severe supporter to the nationalization of the oil industry and a candidate for the Seventeenth Majlis (Parliament) (Olianasab, 2011: 15) that after the August 28 coup, left the political scene and directed

towards anti-Bahá'í religious activities. In 1951, he moved into Tehran, and in 1957, he registered the Hojvatieh Society formally (Ibid: 16).

This thought is based on nullify and consider the revolutions and uprisings before the appearance of Imam Zaman (a.j.). From the viewpoint of the advocates of Hojvatieh, Jihad, at the age of occultation, it has no meaning. So they accept the separation of religion from politics and do not believe in the Islamic government formation at the occultation age.

Therefore, the Second Note of the Constitution of Hojvatieh Society states, "The society will not interfere in political affairs in any way and will not assume any responsibility for any interference in political matters by the individuals attributed to the society".

The present study aimed to answer the following questions: Do the narrative documents validate the prohibition of the uprising and the formation of government in the era of absence? Concerning the content, are these traditions in agreement with the Holy Quran and religious and rational certainties? If an uprising provides the preliminaries of a movement to defend Islam, the Quran, and to struggle against tyranny and hegemony, then will it be a Taghuti and a false action?

Another aim of this research is the documental analysis of the above traditions because any negligence in understanding the religion will cause misunderstanding, and spiritual distortion, incorrect beliefs, and consequently, the emergence of new religious sects and behaviors in conflict with the underlying message of the religion.

Moreover, resorting to these traditions, a group will disagree with the Islamic government and consider it Taghuti (Taghut-like action).

Numerous books and articles have compiled on the Hojjatiyyah community and their thoughts and opinions. Including the ontology of the Hojvatieh Association of Olyanasab, which has a stream-based approach to its research. *Velayaties non-Velayat* by Mohammad Reza Akhgari And in the knowledge of the Ghaedin group of the time (called the Hojjatiyya Association) of Imad al-Din Baghi. Some of these writings are in the form of newspapers or interviews with political and revolutionary figures. Since there is no scientific research article on the rhetoric of counting the flags of pre-emergence, the present study examines the documentary and content of such narrations.

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1. Review of the Traditions on Considering the Flags before the Uprising of Mahdi (a.j.) as Taghuti Movements

The focal point of these traditions is such a phrase:

«كل راية ترفع قبل رايه القائم (عليه السلام) فصاحبها طاغوت»

"Any flag which raised before the uprising of Qaem (a.j.), its holder is Taghut."

Mohammad Ebrahim Noamani (360) in the book "Al-Qaibah" which is the oldest and independent Shia tradition books on topics of Mahdaviah, has narrated three traditions with this issue (Noamani, 1404: 114-115). Before him, his teacher, Kollini (d. 329) has described one narration (Al-Kafi, vol. 8, p. 295). And all other books have adopted these traditions from them. In the Kollini narrative at Al-Kafi, like the third tradition in Noamani, there is "before the uprising of Qaem" expression. While in the first and second versions of Noamani is "before seeing the Qaem." In one phrase of Noamani, the word "تُرْفَع" has replaced with "تُخْرَج" Also, the critical point is at the end of Kollini tradition in Kafi has "يعبد من دون الله" that there is no such expression at Noamani narratives. However, these four narratives seem to be just one, and finally, in the narration of these hadiths in the book of Noamani from Imam Baqir (a.s.) and Roza al-Kafi of Imam Sadiq (a.s.) are regarded as two narratives. As sheikh Hore-amoli has considered, all three of the Noamani hadiths to be one. (Hore Amoli, 1425: vol. 5, 154). Acknowledging this confirms the anxiety in these narratives. Anxiety is one of the weaknesses reasons in the narration of the hadith (Mamaghani, 1411: vol. 1, 386-391). In the following, examine the document and transcript of these narratives.

1.1. Document Review

The validity of each narrative evaluates by the analysis of the document and its content. First, we will determine the documentation of the narrations by referring to the Rajali sources.

1.1.1. The Tradition of Abi Basir

Kollini tradition is:

"عن احمد بن محمد بن الحسين بن سعيد عن حماد بن عيسى عن الحسين بن المختار عن ابي بصير عن ابي عبدالله (ع) قال: كل رايه ترفع قبل قيام القائم فصاحبها طاغوت يعبد من دون الله عز وجل."

"Any flag which raised before the uprising of Qaem (a.j.), its holder is Taghut, who worshipped against God." (Kollini, 2007: vol. 8, 296)

The document of this narration is Mualaq¹ by the pronoun "عنه" in the earlier hadith. According to the previous narrative document, the pronoun source in the phrase "عنه" is Muhammad ibn Yahya Attar Qomi. All the narrators in this document, except Hussein bin Mukhtar, are authentic and Shia. Among the early rejalies, Ibn Oghdah -Zaydi- believe in his authenticity (Helly, 1417: 338).² Sheikh Tusi, in his book al-Rejal, mentions the name of Hussein bin Mukhtar Qalanasi among the students of Imam Sadiq and Kazim (a.s.) and describes him as "Waqifi"³ (Tusi, 1415: 183, 334). Mohagheq Helly, in the book of al-Mutbar, quoting a narration from Hossein ibn Mokhtar from Imam Sadiq (as), described it as weak because of Hossein ibn Mokhtar. His reason is that he is Waqifi (Mohaghegh Heli, 1364: vol. 1, 281; see also: Ibid, 289-290). Allameh Heli has a similar encounter with the narrations of Hussein bin Mukhtar (Helli, 1413: vol. 2, 151). He also quotes the name of Hussein bin Mukhtar in his rejali book-Kholasah-Al-Aghval in the second part of the book devoted to the weak narrators (Heli, 1417: 337; cf. Ibid, 232). Ibn Davud Heli has also called him "unknown" and "Waqifi" (Ibn Davud Heli, 1392: 127, 446). Another, like Sheikh Baha'i, described him as weak and said in the narration: "This narrative cannot argue to prove sanctity because its document contains Hossein ibn Mokhtar and he is Waqifi"⁴ (Baha'i, 1993: 171). Allameh Majlesi also considers this document to be authentic⁵ because he believes Hussein ibn Mokhtar is Waqifi (Majlesi, 1983: vol. 26, 325).

The late Khoei, after challenging the minor premise that he does not recognize Hussein ibn Mukhtar as a follower of Vaqefi faith, he has another

1. Mualaq is a news that at one time narrates coate it with the whole document, and elsewhere removes all or part of the beginning of the document and in fact suspends the document at the previous quotation. This method of documenting is a way of summarizing it.

2. Although Allameh Hely quoted this statement from Ibn Oqdah, he disagreed with it and believed in Hussein ibn Mukhtar's weakness.

3. During the imprisonment of Imam Musa al-Kadhim (AS), his two lawyers collected thirty thousand dinars in Kufa for the Imam's share of the Shias and bought the house and other things while he was in prison. And when they heard the news of Imam's death in order not to return the money, they with great reluctance denied the death of Imam Musa Kadhim (AS) and paused about him so they called their followers "Waqifi" (Mohammad Javad Meshkour, Islamic Culture, p. 455).

4. و اشتغال سند ثابتهما على الحسين بن المختار و هو واقفي. و استناد العائمة في المختلف الى توثيق ابن عقدة له، ضعيف لنقل ابن عقدة ذلك عن علي بن الحسن بن فضال، و توثيق واقفي بما ينقله زبدي عن فطحي لا يخفى ضعفه» (Bahaei, 1372: 171).

5. Is a news containing a complete document which all narrators introduced authentic in rejali book, although some of the people in the hadith chain are non-Imamate?

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view in the macro premise of it. He does not believe that being Vaqefi prevents from practicing the tradition of an authentic person, but without any fault, he considers Hussein ibn Mukhtar among the authentic persons and says, Allameh Hilli in the second part of his book (the part of the weak), has put his name and does not practice his traditions since he is follower of Vagefi faith. The document for this attribution is the very witness of Shaykh Tusi in the book of Rijal, rather some rejects that he is a follower of Vaqefi faith.

Firstly, when it was proved that the narrator is Hussein ibn Mukhtar Saqafi, being Vaqefi does not prevent to practice his tradition.

Secondly, it has not been proved that this person is a follower of Vaqefi faith, because Sheikh Mufid has testified that he is among the pious people of Shia. Koleini, in Kafi, book of Hojat on the entry of The Exact Text on the Imamate of Imam Reza (a.s.) has quoted a tradition with proper document from Hussein ibn Mukhtar which implies the will of Imam Kazem (a.s.) to Imam Reza (a.s.). This tradition was mentioned by Sheikh Saduq with two correct documents in Uyun Akhbar al-Reza (a.s.) and this tradition is not associated with the fact that Hussein ibn Mukhtar is a follower of Vaqefi faith. In addition, the silence of Najashi and Shaykh Tusi in the list and lack of talking about the religion of Hussein ibn Mukhtar and making any fault with him is itself a witness that he was not a Vaqefi follower. Anyway, this person, without any fault is considered to be an authentic person. (Khoei, 1413: vol. 6, 100). However, it is not possible to bypass the view of Mohaqeq and Allameh Hilli on [weakness of the tradition] simply and ignore them. In response to these reasons, two points mentioned:

A) If the narrator is an authentic person but a Vaqefi follower, in some cases, this will not prevent to accept his tradition. But here being a follower of Vaqefi prevents accepting his tradition, because being a Vaqefi, is a kind of corruption in the belief of Imamate and the theme of this tradition (كل رایه) is related to the topic of Mahdavia and Imamate and can be resulting from the corrupted belief of the narrator. Because the corruption of belief will not prevent accepting the tradition, if the subject of the tradition is not related to his ideological topic. Evidence of this is the response of Imam Hassan Askari (a.s.) to the question of the validity and books of the narrative of the narrators of the Banufazzal dynasty who said: "Whatever they have narrated

from other narrators, act and abandon what they believe”⁶ (Tusi, 1411: 289-390).

B) In ideological discussions, it is not possible to talk based on the news of every stratum of the society. Since the issue of Guardianship of Islam Jurist and formation of government at the age of occultation, despite the fact that they are reviewed in jurisprudence, they have theological roots and the theological problems cannot be proved by single news. (Marefat, 1998: 61).

Consequently, this tradition has been narrated from an individual who in the viewpoint of some people is an authentic person and some considers him a weak and in the view of some others, he is a Vaqefi follower. So, in an ideological topic, it is not possible to adhere to it and built a theological foundation on which to base it.

1.2. Tradition of Malik ibn A'yan

This tradition reads:

”عن عبدالواحد بن عبدالله قال حدثنا احمد بن محمد بن رباح الزهري قال حدثنا محمد بن العباس عن عيسى الحسيني عن الحسن بن علي بن ابي حمزه عن ابيه عن مالك بن اعين اجهني عن ابي جعفر (ع) انه قال كل رايه ترفع قبل رايه القائم (ع) فصاحبها طاغوت.“ (Namani, 1404: 115)

In the document of the first tradition, there is Ali ibn Abi Hamzeh Bataeni who himself is one of the founders of the deviant religion of Vaqefiyah. Ibn Qazaeri said, “May God curses Ibn Abi Hamzah. He is the founder of Vaqefiyah religion. He is the most revengeful person towards Ali ibn Musa al Reza (a.s.)” (Ibn al-ghazaeri, 1422: 83). According to Abu Amr Kashi, he is a liar, a cursed and Wagifi (Kashi, Bi, vol. 2, pp. 705-707). Sheikh Tusi have also stated that he is a Waqifi (Tusi, 1415: 339).

Allameh Hilli says, “He is very weak to have reliance upon him. Ali ibn Abi Hamzeh, as quoted by Ali ibn Hassan Fazzal is a liar and is accused” (Hilli, 1417: 362).

Ayatollah Khoei, after detailed discussion on Ali ibn Hamzeh Bataeni says, “It is impossible for us to consider him trustworthy, consequently he is treated as a weak narrator” (Khoei, 1413: vol. 11, 226).

In the document of the second way, there is Mohammad Bin Hesani Razi. Ibn al-Ghazaeri regarded him as weak (Ibn al-Ghazaeri, 1422: 95), and Najashi emphasized the existence of false traditions in his narrations (Najashi, 1416: 338). Ibn Davud also made him extremely weak (Ibn Davud Hellí, 2013: 502) and Allameh Halli also quoted him as a weak narrator in

٦. «خُدُوا بِمَا رَوَوْا وَ دَرُّوا مَا رَأَوْا».

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the narration of Ibn al-Ghazaeri and Najashi (Helli, 1417: 401). Mr. Khoei says, “The trustworthy position of this person has not been proved, though his weakness has not been proved yet. His weakness by Ibn Qazaeri, in our viewpoint is not trustable, because the attribution of the book to him has not been proved” (Khoei, 1413: vol. 1, 5, 2). Thus, this way is also weak or is associated with fault and observes brevity; we avoid reviewing other individuals in this document.

In the document of the third way, there is the name of another individual, namely Ali ibn Ahmad Bandniji. He is a weak and conflict-talking person, and his words are not noticed. Allameh Hilli has also mentioned his name in the second part of his book of Rijal and has enumerated him as a weak and conflict-talking person and has added, "لا يلتفت اليه" “No one pays attention to him” (Hilli, 1417: 123). Therefore, all ways of this tradition has a document failure and is never trustable.

1.2.1. Reviewing the Implication of the Tradition

In order to clarify the meaning and concept of these traditions, it is worth considering certain points:

1) The topic of considering the uprisings prior to the appearance as something being Taghuti is not among the practical obligations. Moreover, in particular, the formation of a government after the demise of the holy prophet (pbuh) and the age of occultation in the viewpoint of Shia is a theological-jurisprudential discussion, since government, is one of the dignities of Shia Imamate, whereas the Sunnis consider the formation of government as an obligatory jurisprudential matter (Mamduh, 1988: 53).

By the way, those who believed on the lack of formation of government and ban of fighting against Taghut in the contemporary age, were not the Mujtahid with authority to issue the Fatwa, but they are a group with specific ideological and political thoughts which have reiterated in their Constitution that they will not interfere in political issues until the emergence of Imam Mahdi (a.j.).

On this basis, if this topic in a period of time was a jurisprudential discussion, but today it is a theological and ideological discussion.

2) The concept of Taghut in religious terminology means uprising and infringement a limit (Raqib Isfahani, 1404: 50), Satan, druid and leaders of misleading and darkness (Ibn Manzur, 1405: vol. 15, 9). Those who worship the Satan or whatsoever which is apart from the real deity, or it is whatever prevents a servant in worshipping the Truth- the Almighty God.

A translator says, it should be known that some applies Taghut to druid, idols and one who blocks the worship of the Allah. It is also applied to the head and the great person of the deviant. God knows everything (Sheikh Baha'i, 2005: 155).

In the Quran, Taghut means despotic ruler and governments (Baqara, 256) and avoiding Taghut has been the duty of all prophets (Nahl, 36). Taghut in traditions means any kind of aggressors who has trespassed the divine limit and it is any person being obeyed apart from the divine rulers. So, in the traditions, the enemies of innocent Imams have been called Taghut. (Majlesi, 1983: vol. 24, 83).

Therefore, Taghut is someone who has moved outside his limit and has violated the divine boundary and intend to call people to him. Because in these traditions, in addition to the term "Taghut," there is the phrase: " يعبد من دون الله " which clearly states that by flags being raised prior to the uprising of Qaem, it means a flag which is raised against God and Ahl al-Bayt (The Household of Prophet) [A.S.] and intends to establish a position for himself and pursues to achieve his own objectives.

So, if a religious and purified individual takes action to make uprising and call for the establishment of divine religion government, definitely, he is not addressed by these traditions. The formation of Islamic government to perform the decrees of Islam and the Quran is outside the addressee of this tradition. If the application of Taghut in other traditions to be reviewed, it becomes clear that the term Taghut has been applied to the flags that are deviant from the path of Ahl al -Bayt (a.s.) and those who are usurpers of the truth. For example:

" و من رفع رايه ضلاله فصاحبها طاغوت "

(Koleini, 1990, vol. 8, 297; Feiz Kashani, 1406: vol. 2, 197; Majlesi, 1990: vol. 26, 347; Majlesi, 1983: vol. 254, 28).

Taghut in the Shia traditions is applied to the rulers who stand against the Ahl al-Bayt (a.s.) and governance of justice. For example:

" قَالَ: مَنْ تَحَاكَمَ إِلَيْهِمْ فِي حَقٍّ أَوْ بَاطِلٍ فَإِنَّمَا تَحَاكَمَ إِلَى الطَّاعُوتِ وَ مَا يَحْكُمُ لَهُ فَإِنَّمَا يَأْخُذُ سِحْتًا وَ إِن كَانَ حَقًّا نَابِتًا لِأَنَّهُ أَخَذَهُ بِحُكْمِ الطَّاعُوتِ وَ قَدْ أَمَرَ اللَّهُ أَنْ يُكْفَرَ بِهِ. قَالَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى: يَرِيدُونَ أَنْ يُتَحَاكَمُوا إِلَى الطَّاعُوتِ وَ قَدْ أُمِرُوا أَنْ يُكْفَرُوا بِهِ "

(Nisa, 60, Hur Ameli, Alef, 1414: vol. 27, 13; Hur Ameli, 1414: vol. 8, 360).

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"كل حاكم يحكم بغير قولنا اهل البيت فهوطاغوت و قرا قول الله تعالى يريدون ان يتحاكموا الى الطاغوت و قد امروا ان يكفروا به و يريد الشيطان ان يضلهم ضلالا بعيدا ثم قال قد والله فعلوا تحاكموا الى الطاغوت و اضلهم الشيطان ضلالا بعيدا فلم ينج من هذه الآية الا نحن و شيعتنا و قد هلك غيرهم فمن لم يعرف حقهم فعليه لعنة الله" (Qazi Naman Maqrebi, 2004: vol. 2, 530)

Allameh Majlesi has also introduced the murderers of the innocent Imams (a.s.) as the examples of Taghuts (Majlesi, 1983: vol. 25, 118).

3) The formation of government by non-innocents is not only legitimate in the verses and traditions,⁷ also the standards of a legitimate government have been introduced in the Islamic text and all governments that are established far from the religious standards and divine values have been introduced as Taghuti governments. On this basis, the political and social systems are divided into two types:

A) Systems which have positive values and standards of Islamic governance and receive authority from the wise God;

B) Systems which are in lack of religious and Islamic values and are considered to be against values. They have been introduced in the Quran as Taghuti systems. On this basis, the call is also of two types:

Call to the Truth: It is a call which summons the people towards the Almighty God and ruling of the Ahl al-Bayt (a.s.). Thus, the call for annihilation of false and disintegration of their glory and performing the truth and delivering it to its real people definitely is confirmed by the innocent Imams such as the uprising of Zeid ibn Ali.

Call to the False: It is a call to pose oneself and a person and its vanguards invite the addresses to themselves and certainly, these traditions include this call such as Mohammad ibn Abdullah's uprising known as "Nafs-e- Zakiyah."

The confirmation of this division and elaboration is the tradition of Imam Sadiq (a.s.) in confirming the uprising of Zeid. (Hurr Ameli, 1414, 1964; Koleini, 1990: 264; Majlesi, 1983: 302) in which Imam (A.S. (confirms the uprising of Zeid and as likes who call for the truth and condemns the uprising of persons such as Mohammad ibn Abdullah (Abi al Faraj Esfahani, 2008: 157-165) which call people to them.

7. Refer to Imam Khomeini's Islamic State Book for these verses and hadiths.

Another confirmations for this fact, is the statement of Imam Muhammad Bagher (a.s.) which has used the limit of "deviation" on these types of movements, calls and flags.

"من رفع رايه ضلاله فصاحبها طاغوت"

(Koleini, 1990: vol. 8, 296; Majlesi, 1990: vol. 26, 347; Majlesi, 1983: vol. 28, 254).

Therefore, the uprisings which pave the ground for the government of Ahl al-Bayt (a.s.) and calling people towards them especially are outside the prohibition of this tradition and these uprisings and government cannot be enumerated among the samples of Taghut.

4) Most possibly, this tradition provides for specific cases and so called is a truth proposition. That is to say, in that age, special flags and with specific features under the title of Imamate or Mahdavia were raised to conflict with the then government and the nature of them was doubtful to people. They in fact did not know what is their duties vis-à-vis the special conditions. Thus, in order to clarify their duties with regard to the time and place positions, Imam (a.s.) used to state these traditions, and it is very unlikely that Imam (a.s.) had expressed these words without any background and abruptly and primarily.

5) The interesting point is that the title of chapter in the book "Alqeibah" by Noamani means the chapter on what has been narrated about the one who claims Imamate and assumes that he is Imam, whereas he is not Imam and that the holder of any flag to be raised before the uprising of Qaem is Taghut. The title of the chapter itself expresses the concept of the tradition. It is likely that Noamani has put these traditions beside each other, since he believes that flag is the flag of Taghut whose holder claims for Imamate.

Other traditions of Noamani on this very chapter and prior to these traditions confirm this idea. In fact, according to the style and concept of the traditions in this chapter, that flag is the Taghut flag whose holder calls people towards himself under the title of Imamte and each flag which is like that before the uprising of Qaem (a.j.) is definitely Taghut. Sheikh Horre Amoli has also quoted these narrations in his Jurisprudential Book, in the book of Jihad which reads as follows: "The sentence of jihad with the sword before the uprising of al-Qa'im". This title denies the issuance of a fatwa and opinion by Sheikh Horre Amoli because, if he had a comment, he would interpret it with the words "The necessity of jihad" or "sanctuary of jihad," as he has commented in other matters (for Examples: Horre Amoli, 1414: vol.

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1, pp. 13, 46, 59: Bob Vojub ...; vol. 1, pp. 49, 80: Bob Mustahab, vol. 1, p. 98. Bob Tahrim ...).

Alameh Majlesi has narrated that three traditions of this chapter and his scholarly and precise explanation in Bihar al Anvar in the chapter on:

"عقاب من ادعى الامامه بغير حق او رفع رايه جورا و اطاع اماما جائرا" is clear. In this chapter, he has narrated eighteen traditions that all of the traditions are in depreciation of the false claimants of Imamate. Also the fifteenth and seventh traditions are these two traditions (Majlesi, 1983: vol. 28, 254). That is to say this tradition is exclusively for the one who makes a false claim for Imamate and poses himself as an Imam (Majlesi, 1983: vol. 25, 110).

6) If we consider this tradition absolutely for all times, it will be in conflict with some of the traditions which confirm the uprisings like "راية اليماني" "His flag is the flag of guidance, since he calls people towards your owner. No Muslim is authorized to disagree with him" (Namani, 2018: 361; Majlesi, 1983: vol. 25, 110).

There is also a tradition which calls the killed people in some of the uprisings before the appearance of Imam Zaman as martyrs (Namani, 2008: 273) which in one way or another is a full confirmation to these uprisings.

7) This belief is in disagreement with the spirit of the Quran which constantly calls the free humans to fight against the tyranny and Taghut, like the verse which instructs to avoid the Taghut (Nahl, 36), the commandment of God to Moses to call the Pharaoh (Taha, 24).

The most important religious sources of the Shia are The Four Books, whereas such a belief exists neither in The Four Books nor in Nahj al Balaqa and as likes. At the same time, the whole Alavi and Husseini traditions are full of fighting against tyranny and Taghut. The whole course of the red history of Shia is struggle against tyranny and oppression and against the despotic governments. This belief is against the one thousand and four hundred year bloody history of Shia and does not have a historical backup.⁸

There are thousands historical traditions and quotations against the silence-oriented viewpoints. The life of the messenger of God (p.b.u.h.) is full of political movements against despotism and oppression. The Imam Ali's (a.s.) life is full of political struggle. The Imam Hassan's (a.s.) life, Imam Hussein's (a.s.) life, Hazrat Zeinab's (S) life, Hazrat Abulfazl's (a.s.)

8. See: Jahad al Shia Fel Asr Al Abbasi al Aval, by Dr. Samireh Mukhtar Al-laysi.

life and all Imams are like that and righteous humans and followers of the school of thought of Hussein (a.s.) have been on gallows.⁹

8) Founder of this view (not permitting uprising and forming a government before the rise of Imam Zaman) is also a political figure and has spent some of his life as a candidate for parliament. It is important to note that That is, if one behaves in a manner based on non-interference in politics, it will, in turn, turn out to be a political one.

9) If we accept this viewpoint and do not interfere in politics, then who should plan for the Muslims' fate? Has Islam accepted the dominancy of the infidels at the age of occultation? Doesn't Islam have any program for the Muslims' social life and public interest?

Is the government of the wicked, unjust and of that indifference towards the religious questions and with the characteristic of Taghut and in disagreement with the Quran and Ahl al-Bayt (a.s.) on the earth, better than the just jurists and those with qualifications imparted by the innocent Imams (a.s.)?

Consequently, it is not possible to know Islam with a divisional view and taking one or many traditions, but it should be considered as a standard through a macro view, the holy Quran and all chapters of religion and the life conduct of the innocent Imams.

The measures adopted by the Messenger of God in formation of the government, political accords and dispatching military caravans, and attempt made by innocent Imams to form a government and to perform all chapters of religion, the period of governance of Imam Ali (a.s.), the six-month governance of Imam Hassan (a.s.), the history-building struggles of Imam Hussein (a.s.) to overthrow the Taghut government and the behaviors of Shia Imams and the thoughts of the awaken Islamic leaders should be placed beside each other and through a rational deep analysis, we must make a theorizing in religion, otherwise faith in a part and leaving another part of religion is not authorized and will lead to the creation of new sects.

Conclusion

In response to this question, what is the Shia point of view on the formation of government and the conduct of political activities and the raising of the

9. In this regard, the study of the "Virtue Path Martyrs" by Allameh Amini illuminates the path.

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uprising flag at the age of occultation?, referring to some traditions, some consider any kind of revolt before the appearance of Hazrat Mahdi (a.j.) as an unfavorable and illegal action and state, “any flag that is raised before the appearance of Imam Zaman (a.s.), its leader would be a Taghut”.

Referring to these traditions, their followers to remain seated in their homes and not to conform the uprisings, so that the signs of appearance could be fulfilled by God. In line with this idea, they avoid any kind of uprising against tyranny and arrogance.

Making a documentary and contextual review of the traditions that consider the raise of flag and uprisings before the uprising of Imam Mahdi (a.j.) as an action of Taghuti, this study has come to this conclusion that these traditions provide for uprisings whose leaders have placed egotism and sensuality instead of the rule of Allah and Ahl al-Bayt and those who present themselves as the promised Mahdi.

Thus, some of the great religious people have placed these traditions on the chapter of pretenders of Imamate and Mahdaviat.

Studying these traditions closely, we learn that the traditions that forbid the revolt and define the uprisings for Taghut seem to be a tradition that due to the merit of the narration of two Imams, Hazrat Bagher (a.s.) and Hazrat Sadiq (a.s.) were considered like two traditions. Finally, there are only two traditions of Malik Jahani and Abu Basir and both of these two traditions are imperfect and contextually cancelled.

They are neither in agreement with the verses of the Quran (verses of Jihad) nor with the needs of religion (enjoining good) and nor with the Shia ideas (the need to fight against tyranny and traditions on confrontation with a despotic Sultan) and nor with other speeches of the innocent Imams (a.s.) who gave news of those who prepares the ground for the emergence of Imam Mahdi (a.j.) and neither with the life conduct of religious leaders and nor with the spirit of the Quran.

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