The Quarterly Journal of Iranian Islamic Period History, Volume 11, Issue 23, Summer 99/20, Pages 21-44

Received Date: 1398/06/11(02/09/2019)
Accepted Date: 1399/06/01(23/08/2020)

Third Power Policy and its Role in the Creation of US-Iran Relations in the Early Rule of Naser al-Din Shah (1850 – 1857 AD)

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Abstract

Iran in the 19th century was different in foreign policy perspective. The catastrophic failures in Russo-Persian wars, the partition of Caucuses form Iran and the Tsars' plans for accessing southern seas of Iran, British rule over India and Southern Indian Ocean waterways, all revived the importance of Iran as a buffer country in the Eastern policy of London politicians; events which transformed Iran into a center for Russian-British Bipolar Paradigm rivalry. The Iranian politicians acknowledging the dangers of such dual external rule were seeking a third power to decrease the pressure of their Northern-Southern neighbors. Qajar politicians believed that a third power would be a better balancer against Russia and Britain and would be assisting in the protecting national independence and territorial integrity. On the other side, America as a developed country, which set aside civil wars successfully, with the slogan of friendship and trade, was eager to establish political relations with countries like Iran and sign amity and trade agreements. This was the circumstances in which diplomatic relations between Iran and the US was established in the 19th century (AD).

Keywords: Iran, Qajar, America, Diplomatic Relations, Third Power Policy.

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Introduction

The Russo-Persian wars were the starting point of Great Powers, i.e. Russian and British intervention in the Iranian internal affairs in the first decades of the 19th century. Expanding influence of Russian in Iran and protecting Asian colonies of Britain created a security belt around India to support Afghan rebellion and subsequently separate Afghanistan from Iran. Thus, throughout the nineteenth century, Britain and Russia penetrated and dominated Iran. Not only receiving various bonuses, they also exerted domination on Iranian foreign policy eliminating the possibility of acting independently with other governments in the foreign policy and international milieu for Iran.

Iranians in this period were aware of the dangers and consequences of the bipolar paradigm, viewing it as a tool for the partition and division of Iran, resulting in loss of independence and sovereignty in the agreement forged between Russia and Britain in the beginning of the 20th century.

Understanding the threats and dangers of the Russian-British Bipolar Paradigm, Iranian politicians acted upon a policy, which was applying a third power decreasing pressure between the two powers. Implementing the third power policy was in fact a policy in which Iranian geopolitics and colonial power rivalry imposed on Iran, which fundamentally got a realistic and ingenious policy. Choosing France as a third power in the Russian and Persian wars was unsuccessful after the signing the Tilsit Treaty. After such a try, Iranian politicians especially Amir Kabir were attracted to the US as the third power.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed and documented investigation of the motivations and reasons for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Iran and the US. To this end, we would like to answer these questions: What were the characteristics of the third power from the perspectives of Iranian rulers and why did Iranians view the US as a good example for their third power policy? In addition, why did the US model, as a third power, fail?

The probable hypothesis here is that Iranian politicians considered the third power country characteristics as geographical far distance and having no interest and direct colonial greed. So, the United States of America was considered as more qualified than any other country.

However, the lack of knowledge of Iranian rulers and politicians about the complexities of the nineteenth-century colonial paradigm and the dominance of the two northern and southern neighbors, i.e. Russia and Britain over Iran's foreign policy and destiny, as well as the unwritten agreement of the two powers caused disintegration against the third power. This prevented the US government from expanding into Iranian politics and economics. In addition, US policy of active isolationism at the time, did not want or could not conflict with the Russian and British governments over Iran.

The purpose of this paper is to study why the relationship between Iran and the United States began in the mid-nineteenth century in the form of the emergence of a third power policy and the reasons for the failure of this policy. In the process of hypothesis testing and answering research questions, we will use the theoretical framework of the third power policy.

In terms of Iranian-American relations, many books have been written in English and Persian regarding the United States - Persian diplomatic relations. The most notable one is written by Abraham Yeselson (Yeselson, 1956). Today, it is a classic book about the history of political relations between Iran and the United States and the other book by Yonah Alexander and Allan Nanes; The United States and Iran: a documentary history, which has tried to examine a narrative history of relations between Iran and the United States (Yonah, et al. 1980).

In Persian, there are also books about the history of relations between Iran and the United States (Rezâzâdeh Malek, 1971), the history of Iran-US relations in the period of Qajar and Pahlavi (Deldam, 1989) and cultural relations between Iran and the United States: from the beginning to the victory of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 (Mohammadi, 2009). The book entitled "Iran-US relations from the beginning to The Coup d'état of 1953 August 19" by Afshâri (2014) which has described and narrated in details the relationship between Iran and the United States throughout the history.

The current article is a case study about the third force policy researched and conducted using data belonging to the archive office of the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran known as

the center for Documents and History of Diplomacy. Some of these documents are applied for the first time.

According to the documentary style of the present paper, the research method we have chosen is a qualitative research method in which the method of data analysis is based on description and explanation.

Theoretical Framework

Third power Policy was as a strategy for an under-dominant country, which is controlled by the two colonial governments.

In the Third power Policy; the under-dominant country tries to reduce the political-economic pressure of the two dominant poles by leading a third power into the game, to gain the possibility of acting in the international arena. International coalitions fluctuate according to the conditions and requirements of the time.

This oscillates between keeping the country's survival and independence, gaining national interests and participating in the international coalitions. Third power Policy can be considered as a policy between the policy of negative balance and positive balance, which tends to balance. On the one hand, it does not want to surrender the policy of positive balance and successive concessions to the two colonial poles and on the other hand, it is not strong enough to refuse to concede concessions to any of the power poles. Therefore, it is practically moves towards the using of third power policy (Sheehan, 2000, p. 35).

The characteristics of the third power and its policy-making require its own components and conditions in order to be successful. Otherwise, it will come to harm the under-dominant country. These components and features include:

- The Third Power country should not have a colonial, interventionist or dis-honorary background in the host country and their presence in different parts of the country should not be dangerous.
- The Third Power country must have the power and ability to stand against dominant powers, reduce the pressure and aggression of those powers.

- The Third Power country should be far from the geographical boundaries of the host country so as not to find territorial greed.
- The Third Power country should not be in a position to become the next hegemonic power.
- The presence of The Third Power country should be limited and managed, or it should be in the areas in which temporarily assisted the most and has the lowest cost and harm.
- The Third Power country policy must be implemented by experienced politicians, and in a distinct process according to strategic planning and a scheduled program.

The absence or inefficiency in any of the components, or even a computational error in the choice of the third power and the time of its use, can have the opposite effect and it will increase the pressure of the two poles and crush the under-dominated country among the millstones of economic-political domination of the two more dominating powers. What justifies the use of the third power policy is more than the result of obligation and despair. Because the country in trouble has instinctively learned to overcome the two powers; so the third power is more an urgent action than a choice. Of course, another point that makes the use of the third power hopeful for the politicians of the under-dominated country is to take the advantages of the conflict of interests and sometimes the gap between the two dominating powers and using them to maintain and survive, which is the most pragmatic and objective aspect of third power policy. This approach disrupts the equation to the detriment of the under-dominated country when the two powers decide to resolve or reduce conflicts and tensions, so it cannot be considered as a permanent and reliable lever (Ali Sufi, 2010, p.369).

Therefore, choosing the third power policy, along with its possible outcome and benefits also has risks. In order to have successful implementation, it needs informed and prudent politicians.

Iran and Third Power Policy

Iran which was located on the east and west of the world found geopolitical superiority since the 18th century. In addition, the industrial revolution of Europe, having raw materials, the market for consumption and the privileged geopolitical position in the region were the contributing factors to this situation.

Geographical location of Iran had practically made Britain the southern neighbor of Iran. The position of Iran placed it as the protective wall of India. Britain penetrated into the Qajar court. Therefore, weakening of Iran could have prevented the invasion of any other country on the periphery of England. On the other hand, Russia as the northern neighbor of Iran sought to develop its own boundaries to govern the global trade, extended it from the south of Iran to India. They had a greedy eye on the eastern British realm. Obviously, the competitive conditions of the Russian and British countries created uncontrollable explosive social and political conditions for the Iranian (Ibid, p.43).

In this way, the Qajar government in the early nineteenth century was largely reluctant to enter into imperialist games, and therefore did not have a specific strategy for advancing its foreign policy toward the two great powers, Russia and Britain. Therefore, they tried to compensate their diplomatic weakness in the face of British and Russian colonial policies (Modir Shanechi, 1996, p.148).

In fact, the third power was a third-party state that Iran would use according to its political situation. For the first time, Mostashâr al-Dowleh referred to the policy of the Qajar under the term "political doctrine of the Iranian government" (Mostashâr al-Duleh, 1982, vol. 2, p.53). This policy was gradually the basis of Iran's foreign policy until World War II (Farmân Farmâeiân, 1976, p.12).

The history of third-party policy dates back to the wars of Persian-Russian Wars, during the reign of Fath Ali-Shah Qajar. The Iranian government entered into negotiations with the French government but cooperation with Iran was abandoned before the policy could be implemented due to the Tilsit Treaty (1807), between France and Russia.

Subsequently, England took the place of France in this equation. Iran found itself encircled by two powerful neighbors. Iran sometimes thought about using France as a third power and measured the use of the United States for this purpose. This policy reached its pinnacle in the unification of Iran's national forces with Germany and Ottomans during World War I (Hooshang Mahdavi, 1996, p.343).

After the signing of the Turkmenchay Treaty, Russian and British policy got closer. During the reign of Nasser al-Din Shah, by the proffer of Mirza Taqi Khan known as Amir Kabir, the dominant and prestigious chancellor of Iran predicted that the America would be one of the world powers in the future. The United States did not have a negative and colonial background among the Western countries at the time (Zoqi, 1989, pp.28 & 290). This made Iran more and more aware of the intention of the third power alliance, to get rid of the balance of the two powers. Of course, Iran's accession to the Third power gradually made the Russian and British powers more determined and united to confront Iran, so that they agreed to expel the Third Force from their bipolar axis, and the policy of the Third power practically failed, like the Morgan Schuster American case. Thus, the Iranian government despairingly referred to the policy of the third power until the nationalization of the oil industry, which was replaced by the policy of negative balance instead of the policy of positive balance (Kazemzadeh, 1975, p.46). Meanwhile, Amir Kabir, Prime Minister of Nasser al-Din Shah, was an exceptional figure in the history of Iran's foreign policy during the Qajar period. His thought was based on the protection of national interests and the knowledge and mastery of international custom; hence, he believed in a policy of balance and non-interference in Iran's affairs (Kaveh Jebeli, 1992, p.93).

Amir Kabir tried to increase the country's diplomatic maneuvering power by increasing the number of foreign actors in Iran's political and economic spheres. Nevertheless, the traditional and authoritarian structure of the Qajar government did not provide an opportunity for the Amir's policies to succeed (Ibid, p. 95).

The Beginning of Diplomatic Relations between Iran and the United States

The isolation policy of US was the principle of Monroe's Doctrine since 1823 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, 1991, p.75). Due to the United States' advantages such as being far from the threats of European states and the existence of huge resources in the America allowed American politicians not to participate in the political engagement of the European scene (Maldwyn, 1974, pp.171-178).

The American politicians were considering filling the gaps and unlike the colonial states of Europe, they wanted a good deal of free trade in the world and principles such as non-intervention and non-engagement and political indifference with Asian nations, including Iran.

Amir Kabir's preliminary assessment of establishing relations with the United States was due to the possibility of co-operation for the formation of marine forces. However, the main problem was the stabilization of Iran sovereignty over the Iranian Naval authority in the Persian Gulf. Amir Kabir should be regarded as the first person who ordered political relationship with the US government (Adamiyat, 1975, pp.573-581).

Treaty of Amity and Shipping

In 1849, Amir Kabir issued a command to Mirza Mohammad Khan Iran chargé d'affaires in Istanbul to discuss with Gorge Marsh, the American political representative, to prepare a treaty. At the same time, the US president, Zachary Taylor, signed a commission for signing a contract with Iran on June 28, 1850 (Rezâzâdeh Malek, 1971, p.89). These long and confidential negotiations lasted more than 500 days. The reason for prolonging these negotiations was the fear of negotiations revelation to the Britain. Finally, the Iran-American Amity and shipping treaty signed between Mirza Mohammad Khan and George Marsh in eight articles, on October19th, 1851 (The Fourth Political Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, 1972, p.3). The most tangible impression of this agreement for Iran was sending a book about geography for Amir Kabir, which even Nasser al-Din Shah was eager to study (Op cit).

The Amity included an introduction and eight articles, written in both Persian and French. Article 1 of this treaty: The permanent amity between the two governments and the two nations of Iran and the United States announced. Article 2: considering the principle of the freedom of trade between the two countries is to be respected. Article 3: The customs' duty of the imported and exported goods applies to the agreed law. Article 4: the merchant ships freed the two governments to go to ports and harbors with their own flag. The right to sail in rivers on both sides was also free. Article 5: Establishment of three US consulates in

Tehran, Tabriz and Bushehr alongside with three Iranian consulates in Washington D.C., Boston and New Orleans. Article 6: consular rights to both parties. Article 7: emphasized the irreversibility of the two countries' relations in the event of a war with a third country, and article 8 referred to the approval and implementation of the treaty over the course of the next year (Sepehr, 1998, p.114).

Amir Kabir died one month after signing the treaty. The treaty did not ratify due to the intervention and influence of Britain. The new minister resident in Turkey, Carroll Spence condemned Britain's influence to invalidate the treaty (Rezazadeh Malek, 1971, p.91). It was interesting to note that Iran did not grant a concession without mutual rights; but thought of it from the viewpoint that Iran had no chance for shipping in its own rivers at that time, let alone in the rivers of distant lands such as the United States. Later, Mirza Ali Asghar Khan, Amin al-Sultan, passed the right to the Britain (Teymoori, 1984, p.77).

Treaty of Amity and Trade

There was no relations between Iran and US After the abandonment of the amity and Shipping for several years until the rise of the dispute between Iran and Britain about the issue of Herat in 1857, Farrokh Khan Aminulmulk Ghaffari, Iran's ambassador in the Ottoman Empire, met with British Ambassador Cyril Radcliffe to hold peace talks.

Britain imposed a hardship condition on Iran, Nasser al-Din Shah ordered Farrokh Khan to take part in negotiating with the US Minister in Istanbul (Amin-al-Dowleh, 1967, p.10). In parallel with this action, the Ambassador of Iran to St. Petersburg, Mirza Qasim Vali was ordered by the King to begin negotiations with the US ambassador.

Mirza Qasim Khan in a letter to the Iranian Foreign Ministry in 13 January 1856, referred to this issue:

> Although, we have an amity treaty with Britain, but they are not pleased with the American government's amity toward the Iranian government. Utterly, the US government is not good with the British government. They will interfere and cause tribulation. The British government managed all of its affairs with plot. It's also famous in this country that

> although the United State of America and the United Kingdom of Britain have signed bilateral treaty, but both are opposed with each other (Ibid, p.96).

In addition, Mirza Qasim Khan in another letter to the Iranian Foreign Ministry in 12 January 1856 emphasized the necessity for a political relationship and the importance of signing a treaty with the US government. He wrote "The US government has an amity treaty with most of the countries, unless with the Iran government and they are very eager to have relationship and friendship, Seymour, the ambassador of America has repeatedly talked with me about this regard" (Magazine of Foreign Ministry of Iran, 1976, p.5).

Mirza Qasim Khan Vali and US Ambassador to Russia, Thomas M. Seymour initiated negotiations under the observation of the Russian government. The political documents of both sides confirm that Americans had believed: "... It does not seem that the Russian Tsar makes objection to the ratification of treaty between Iran and the United States, and it is possible that the Russian Minister in Tehran would assist in the improvement of talks" (Rezazadeh Malek, 1971, p.100).

Iran clearly agreed with Russia's participation in the negotiations, because the Iranian Minister, Mirza Agha Khan Nouri, wrote a letter to Iran's Ambassador to Russia. Qasim Khan Vali: "The reason I write the letters frankly to the Russian government embassy is the fact that the Russian Chargé d' Affaires is between two countries to confirm the treaty and he has received a letter from the authorities of his own government to make good efforts in this regard."(Center for Documentation and The History of Diplomacy (CDHD), Report transcript, 1992, pp.24-25) Starting talks between Ambassadors of Iran and the United States in St. Petersburg, the Foreign Minister of Iran, in an official order, called his Ambassador to Russia in 19 February 1857.

> ... in different ways, he explained to the ambassador of the United States about Iran's position to the controversial events between Iran and Britain, especially the issue of Herat, and ultimately in order to end the relations between the two governments and gain the advocacy of the US government and inspire the ambassador. The cause of the

> hostility and frustration of the relations between Iran and Britain was not a common excuses which the British excuses about, but the amity and friendship of Iran-US relations ... (Center for Documentation and The History of Diplomacy (CDHD, Case 5, File 13, Sheets 4-5, February 19,1857)

Then subsequently quoting that:

> The Iranian government sent a packet of letters, a power of attorney and instructions for the Iran's Ambassador to Istanbul signing an agreement about the friendship and business in the Istanbul. The envelope was lost, British agents opened the letter, and the Iranian objectives were discovered, which were against Britain wishes. It would have revealed that the Iranian government was in favor of the friendship with a state that wages war with England. It is unclear where it will lead. Whenever that brother is able to produce the material which has been explained to the Ambassador of United States and compels him to write to his government, it would be very good (Op cit).

Both countries agreed to pursue a negotiation process in Istanbul. Once again, Iran appointed Farrokh Khan Amin al-Dawleh as the head for talks with the US ambassador to Istanbul (Amin-al-Dowleh, 1967, pp. 138 &114).

Mirza Malekum Khan was trying to provide convincing evidence for Spence, the ambassador to Istanbul, and emphasized the differences between the United States and the United Kingdom (Ibid, p.116). Iran urged the United States in a way that, "since the Iranian government does not have a navy in the Persian Gulf, the US Navy will engage Iran's merchant ships under its protection, and the United States promised to protect the islands and ports of Iran from the domination of the British government and the invasion of Muscat Imam" (Khormoji, 1984, pp. 221-225). He told: "Tell them if the government of the United States wanting to make a small part in these seasons, the Iranian government does not see fit to confirm a treaty." (Center for Documentation and The History of Diplomacy (CDHD), Report transcript, 1992, p. 25).

Iran conditions made it strict for the United States, because they did not recapture the islands of the Persian Gulf, including Bahrain, from Britain. In addition, the Iranian ships had the right to raise the flag of the United States and the United States committed to use the navy in the Persian Gulf and support Iranian ships (Navaei, 1986, p.604). The American ambassador Carroll Spence clearly stated to Molkem Khan "if Iran does not leave such demands, there will be no hope to confirm the treaty". Meanwhile, he pointed out that the fate of the United States is that "we will take the future of the world and its friendship will be beneficial for the Iranian nation and government" (Yeselson, 1956, p.186) and among the conditions of Iran, only political representation in Bushehr was established which was in accordance with article 7 of the treaty (Afshari, 2014, p. 102).

However, the United States followed the Monroe Doctrine, isolationist policy. Finally, Farrokh Khan's actions failed for the intercession of the United States (Amin al-Dawleh, 1967, pp. 221-225).

The treaty finally concluded in December 13, 1856 in eight articles, the Contracts of Amity and Trade, in two languages and Farrokh Khan Amin-al-Dawlah and Carroll Spence signed. The original versions of the treaty exchanged after the signing by President Franklin Pierce and Nasser al-Din Shah in June 13, 1857 (Vaqaye Etefaqiyeh, 1272, Jamadi Al-Awal, 15, No.238).

According to the treaty, diplomatic and friendly relations were established between two countries basing on diplomatic, commercial, and citizenship matters. In addition to the establishing an embassy in Washington, the government allowed to establish a consulate in three cities as New York, Washington, and New Orleans. The US government could have consulates in the cities of Tabriz, Bushehr and Tehran, for the protection of American citizens in Iran. (Center for Documentation and The History of Diplomacy (CDHD), Case 8, File 9, Sheets 1.1 &1-2, June 13, 1857) In addition, under article 5 of the treaty, Iran recognized the legal protection of us citizens in by capitulations (Ibid).

The contract was limited to consular and commercial affairs, and did not have the value of the plan signed in 1851 under the supervision of Amir Kabir. Even they eliminated freedom of shipping and the lack of

influence of the state of war with the third country. Nevertheless, the conditions for the most favorable nation continued for both countries (Khormoji, 1984, p.221).

Iran and the United States ordered their representatives to negotiate with the representatives of the other party. Mirza Qasim Khan pointed out an important point to foreign minister in 21st of January 1856: "Now in the United States, they want to establish a shipping line which is reaching India; as soon as this route is completed, it will be very close to the United States for Iran around Bushehr" (Mojani, 2005, p.118).

The treaty signed when Iran was on the margin of political bankruptcy. Britain wanted to separate Herat from Iran, aimed at preserving India and Iran did not want to come under the pressure from Britain. The letters about the Prime Minister to Amin al-Dawlah indicated a kind of gullibility and sense of high flying of the Iranian state against the British. The Prime Minister insisted that the treaty should not sign without a security warranty and provision of the United States Navy (Deldam, 1989, p.39). The remonstrance of Spence and the United States government rejected Iran's requests, and Iran ignored requests and signed the treaty.

Finally, France mediated Iran-British relations with Napoleon III. The French emperor considered himself as a friend (Amanat, 2014, p.464). He promised to Iran that when the sick man of Europe, Ottoman Empire dies, Iran could dominate Iraq and control the vital British way to the Persian Gulf. These imaginative words, instead of the loss of Herat, raised the possibility of attack of Ottoman rule in the mind of Shah. As a result, Farrokh Khan and Amin al-Dawlah went to Paris to sign the Paris treaty between Britain and Iran in March 1857 with the mediation Napoleon III, thus Herat and Afghanistan separated from Iran (Amin-al-Dowleh, 1967, p.27).

So after the conclusion of the Iran-US agreement, a new recipe was issued to Farrokh Khan Amin al-Dawlah, which allowed the establishment relations with other governments, and in particular the conclusion of similar contracts with Austria and Belgium (Ibid, pp. 114 &171).

The Beginning of Iran-US Diplomatic Relations: A Strategy with Two Intentions

After the independence of the United States from Britain, the Americans engaged in domestic affairs and the development of their civilizational infrastructure for a century, rejecting European colonialism in the Eastern countries according to the values of the American founders, while the Monroe Doctrine led American leaders. He warned against any adventure in the East. Unlike the European colonial powers such as Portugal, Spain, England and France, which directly colonized the eastern lands, the United States entered the trade competition with the European colonial powers under the slogan of free trade in the seas, but this competition, according to Monroe's doctrine, should never have led to a political-military confrontation (Al-Dawood, 2016, p. 87). Accordingly, the United States began concluding trade and maritime treaties with various countries in the early nineteenth century in order to compensate for its backwardness in the field of colonialism and, unlike the European states, to show a peaceful and non-colonial face. On the other hand, Iran, with its terrible defeats against Russia in the early nineteenth century and the loss of parts of its territory, has slowly entered a new world that was not like the intellectual world of the Qajar kings. A world they did not know the rules of the game, so the acting of the European powers stunned it. Iran's failed alliance with France to counter Britain and Russia was an example of Iranian government officials' ignorance of the requirements of the new world, a coalition that led to the dissolution of Iran and the country's subsequent domination of Russian and British colonial policies as two poles. He placed rivals and confined his foreign policy to the rivalries of the two northern and southern powers. In this way, the possibility of any sustainable action in the international arena was taken away from the Iranian government. This strait in foreign policy prompted Iranian diplomats and politicians instinctively seek a third power to counter and reduce the pressure of Russia and Britain. In addition to benefiting from the political and economic support of the third power, they will be able to gradually score points from the two poles of power, maintain, and secure the country's independence and interests in this political game (Terensio, 1984, p.126). The policy of the third power from Fath Ali Shah to the Mossadegh was a traditional and fixed policy of the Iranian kings and political leaders.

Whenever the Iranian government invited a third power, Russia and Britain increased their efforts to cooperate with Iran. By reducing their contradictions under the guise of countering the influence of the new power, they were challenging Iran's foreign policy, which was largely a reaction to this new power. During Amir Kabir prime ministry, the United States pursued its trade efforts under the guise of concluding trade and shipping treaties with various countries around the world. Amir Kabir cleverly decided to establish relations with the Americans following the proliferation of Iranian political actors. It was also favorable to the Americans, and for a long time the US foreign policy apparatus sought to open relations with Iran. During the eight years since the beginning of diplomatic relations between the two countries, two valuable trade-moderation and shipping treaties were signed between the two governments (Kazemzadeh, 1975, p.231). However, this opening of the relationship and the conclusion of the treaty had two different intentions. The United States wanted trade relations expansion without any political interference and, more importantly, to hand over political obligations to the Contracting Parties, because the official US policy at the time was not based on political interference and entering into the colonial conflicts of the European colonial powers. Of course, even if they wanted to intervene, they were not so strong in the political and international arena at the time that they could compete with the British government, and the United States still did not see the strategic importance of Iran because. It took decades for oil to be discovered in Iran so that Iran could find a strategic position in US foreign policy (Ibid, p.128). On the other hand, Iran wanted and intended to establish a relationship with the United States. Iranian politicians, who were somewhat unaware of the priorities of US foreign policy and global equations, expected the United States actively enter Iran's political arena and conclude trade agreements and open the doors to US-Iranian trade. If they had got involved in Iranian issues, they would face the Russian and British governments, whether they would like it or not. However, as mentioned, Iran was not a priority for US strategic policies, and the US focus was on Central and Latin American countries. The Iranians even tried to take advantage of the differences between Britain and the United States and persuade the country to enter the Iranian political scene so that they could receive security guarantees from the United States, but

the Americans explicitly refused to accept it (Amin al-Dawla, 1988, p.29).

Along with the two different intentions of Iran and the United States to open diplomatic relations, the lack of a self-consistent structure in Iran's foreign policy and the consequent lack of long-term strategies in country's public interest, were another reasons for Iran's failure about the third power policy.

Amir Kabir's achievements in opening relations with the United States and concluding a treaty and consequently protecting the interests of the Country; was based on Amir's personal adequacy and sense of patriotism, because the things were different after the death of Amir Kabir and the appointment of Mirza Aqa Khan Nouri as the Prime Minister. Prior to his appointment to the presidency, he was a British citizen (Raeen, 1994, pp.256 -257) who with the assistance of the United Kingdom and all the resources proclaimed his Anglophile attitude and considered as the executor of British policies in Iran (Etemad Al-Saltaneh, 1970, p. 237).

Therefore, it could not cooperate with the policy of the Third power, which was to the detriment of British interests, in a way that the concessions and benefits that Amir Kabir had made to Iran in the Treaty of Amity and Shipping in 1850 with the United States were revised in a new version and all the Amir's achievements vanished in the treaty which was signed by the order of Mirza Agha Khan Nouri in 1857.

As a result, Mirza Aqa Khan Nouri's first measure after the prime minister was to abandon the policy of the third power and turn to a policy of positive balance in order to protect British interests, which its peak was in Iran's withdrawal from Herat and its annexation to Afghanistan.

In this way, Iran failed to achieve its main goal of establishing relations with the United States, but they concluded two important agreements based on the principle of complete integrity, which later became the basis of political and legal relations between Iran and the United States.

Conclusion

Iranians, after the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828, gave many political economic privileges to Russia; the United Kingdom also received the same concessions. There was a major competition between Russia and England in scoring from Iran. The United Kingdom wanted to protect India's colony and Russians wanted to reach the southern warm waters.

This caused the foreign states control the foreign affairs and even the domestic policy of Iran desirably. The Iranian authorities considered such a bipolar structure dangerous for the independence and sovereignty of the country. Therefore, Iran focused on attracting a third power to reduce the pressure of Russia and Britain.

During the nineteenth century France, the United States and Germany were the governments that Iran was trying to use as a third power. The United States of America had a special position because was a young and powerful state and among the nations, it was famous for liberation and was not a colonial siege. Geographically, it was far from the borders of Iran and could not be a serious threat for the country's territorial integrity. Therefore, all the characteristics of the third power were in the United States nature. On the other hand, the United States had passed the civil war, and did not want to be colonial and so, they were trying to develop free trade and have treaties with other nations. Having economic struggle with Britain, it was seeking to capture the world's trade markets, and Iran attracted the United States to open up trade and politics. In addition, the fate of Christian minorities who were living in Iran was also highly important for American religious authorities. Iran needed a third power and expected the United States to intervene directly on Iranian issues and protect Iran's independence.

According to the research hypothesis that was tested and proven during the discussions, the United States of America was more qualified than any other government in terms of politicians and government officials, but the complexity of international politics in the nineteenth century and the priority of national and long-term interests of countries in foreign policy was something that was hidden from the eyes of the Iranian rulers or at least did not have a proper understanding of it.

So they insisted on protecting Iran's independence from both Russia and Britain, in other words, they wanted a comprehensive US intervention in the country's politics, unaware of the active isolation policy of the United States, which only desired to cooperate and contract in the field of free trade and maritime, which was not compatible with Iranian tendencies. At the same time, until the WWII, Europe was the center of world politics, and the United States, despite its political and economic power, still did not observed itself as an old-fashioned government to resist against professional European powers such as Russia, Britain, and Austria. In addition, Iran at that time, Unlike the Ottoman Empire, did not have the multifaceted appeal for great powers to make them interested in playing a role in their internal affairs; it still took decades for oil mines to be discovered in Iran and Iran changes to a strategic position for US foreign policy.

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

Naser al-Din Shah's Decree prohibiting the propaganda and invitations of Protestant and Catholic Missionaries among Iranian Armenians by the foreign states (Center for Documentation and Diplomatic History of the Foreign Ministry of Iran)