



## A Study of Frege's Influence on A. J. Ayer's Theory of Emotivism

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### Abstract

Original Research



No doubt, Gottlob Frege and A. J. Ayer are considered to be among the most prominent contemporary philosophers. Insofar as one of them has revolutionized the linguistic domain while the other has influenced the domain of ethics in a diametrical fashion. Ayer's theory of emotivism is regarded as one of the most controversial moral theories in the past century. We believe that Frege, as a linguistic philosopher, has influenced emotivism in the methodological, logical, semantic, and epistemological domains. The emphasis on two fundamental principles of "compositionality" and "contextuality"; "the existence of mathematical concepts independent from mind"; "empiricism and verificationism" are all variables upon which emotivism is clearly dependent. The latter claim can be substantiated via analysis of the works of Ayer and particularly his "Language, Truth, and Logic" as well as his assertion in the introduction to this book concerning his debt to Frege. Among the most significant results of this essay, one can refer to the demonstration of the point that what constitutes the identity of the theory of emotivism is influenced by the "general line of linguistic analysis" in the aforementioned four domains.

### Keywords

Frege, Ayer, Ethics, Emotivism.

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## 1. Introduction

Emotivism is a non-cognitive meta-ethical theory, according to which moral judgments are chiefly an expression of the “individual perspective and requirements” that leads to the change in perspective and action of others (Garner and Rosen, 1967, p. 13).

The main claim of emotivism is that moral judgements are nothing but an expression of individual feelings or perspectives of approval or disapproval. For example, “murder is bad” is merely an expression of the disapproval of murder by an individual. In *Language, Truth, and Logic*, Ayer presents the verification principle as the only valid basis for philosophy. Unless logical or empirical verification is possible, statements like “God exists” or “charity is good” are not true or untrue but meaningless, and may thus be excluded or ignored. Religious language in particular was unverifiable and as such literally nonsense. It is needless to say that this type of encounter with ethics is nothing but emotive ethics and, in other words, subjectivization of ethics. Ethical language is emotive. This philosophical school emerged following the development of analytic philosophy and logical positivism in the twentieth-century clearly in A. J. Ayer’s *Language, Truth, and Logic* and later it relatively evolved in various directions; of course in the same context of emotivism. Ayer’s key principle is that a “statement” is meaningful only if it is either “analytic” or “empirically verifiable”. A “statement” is analytic if it is true or false and it is also verifiable by means of meaningfulness of vocabularies. An empirical proposition should be necessarily verifiable insofar as this is endorsed by empirical evidence. Therefore, the epistemic structure of emotivism is secured on the epistemological foundation of logical positivism. In general, it should be said that Ayer’s version of emotivism divides “the ordinary system of ethics” into four classes:

1. “Propositions that express definitions of ethical terms or judgments about the legitimacy or possibility of certain definitions”
2. “Propositions describing the phenomena of moral experience and their causes”
3. “Exhortations to moral virtue”
4. “Actual ethical judgments” (Ayer, 1945, p. 103).

He focuses on propositions of the first-class — moral judgments — saying that those of the second class belong to science, those of the third are mere commands, and those of the fourth (which are considered in normative ethics as opposed to meta-ethics) are too concrete for ethical philosophy. Ayer adds that ethical terms like ‘wrong’ not only express feelings, ‘They are also calculated to arouse feeling and to stimulate action’ (LTL, 108). Some, for instance, like the term ‘duty’ as it occurs in ‘It is your duty to tell the truth’, may be regarded both

as the expression of a certain sort of feeling about truthfulness and as the expression of a command, 'Tell the truth' (Wiggins, 2010, p. 182).

We believe that emotivism is the child of radical empiricism that has emerged within the Vienna Circle and before it in the intellectual system of analytic philosophers like Frege. In this essay, we intend to study the influence of Frege as one of the empiricist analytic philosophers on emotivism. There is no doubt that emotivism has taken form under the influence of philosophers of the Vienna Circle as well as great philosophers who have been influential on this circle like Frege; this fact is endorsed by Ayer in his famous work. The present study aims at answering the following two questions:

1. To what extent has Frege been influential on Ayer's moral philosophy as one of the pioneers of analytic philosophy?
2. Could we evaluate Ayer to have been successful in his benchmarking?

No research has yet been written to examine Ayer's theory of emotivism and Frege's influence on it. But useful researches have been conducted in the field of emotivism. We can refer to these articles: "Ayer's Ethical Theory: Emotivism or Subjectivism?" (Wiggins, 2010, pp. 181-196), "Emotivism and the Verification Principle" (Miller, 2015, pp. 103-124), and "The Virtues of Contemporary Emotivism" (Waller, 1986, pp. 61-75).

## 2. Features of Non-cognitivism

Moral realists believe that ethics has a determinate subject-matter. They also contend that a moral statement is representational in that moral sentences are an expression of moral judgments. Antirealists have expressed a view that contradicts this. They believe that realistic notions in relation to ethics are a redefinition of non-cognitivist perspectives (Eli Calderon, 2007, p. 3).

It is needless to say that this idea is also another focal point of the influence of Frege on emotivism. To put it otherwise, non-realism and particularly Ayer's Emotivism is among the issues raised by Frege. Moreover, emotivism is a reduced or minimal form of Frege's atomism. Our reason for this claim is the fact that in emotivism the meaning of moral terms and their linguistic usages and application are taken to be identical. This reduction implies that to reach a moral term's meaning one needs to find the motive that has given rise to the term itself (p. 4-5).

## 3. Epistemic Foundations of Frege

### A) Methodological Foundations

Many philosophers believe that Frege has at least has two basic principles:

(Janssen, 2001, pp. 115-136)

### **Principle of Compositionality**

The principle of compositionality is one of the key principles of Frege without which Frege and the relevant philosophy of meaningfulness cannot be known. Then, before reviewing the ideas of Frege scholars in this essay, we need to provide a short account of the content of this principle: “the meaning of a compound expression is a function of the parts and the role that they play in the sentence” (Janssen, 2001, pp. 115-136). Carnap is the first scholar who has attributed this principle to Frege as the Principle of Interchangeability (Carnap, 1947, p. 121). Zadeh also believes that in this era it was agreed that Frege’s Principle of Compositionality had limited application in natural languages (Zadeh, 1983, p. 254). Moreover, Burge like the rest of the aforementioned thinkers is of the belief that Frege’s arguments ... almost always presuppose their compositional principles in advance as follows: A) the denotation of a complex expression is practically dependent upon only the clarification of relevant logical component expressions; B) the sense of a compound expression in practice is merely contingent upon the meanings of its logical component expressions (Burge, 1986, p. 99).

### **Principle of Contextuality**

To clarify Frege’s second principle, we need to pursue our discussion by reviewing the ideas of those philosophers who have considered this principle to be Frege’s Principle. However, like the first principle, it would be better first to provide an account of the content of this principle as delineated in the beginning of *Grundlagen der Arithmetik*: “Never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a sentence”. It is evident that in this part there are several subtle points that need to be discussed in their own turn but they lie outside the scope of the current essay. Generally speaking, it needs to be mentioned that the goal of the second principle is sufficiently clear and the number of philosophers and linguists who have considered it a Fregean principle is very informative (Pelletier, 2001, p. 5). For example, Baker argues that “Frege is the thinker to whom modern philosophy owes a major debt due to the destruction of semantic atomism” (Baker & Hacker, 1980, p. 258). He continues to note that Frege was the first philosopher who formulated the idea that a “word only has a meaning in the context of a sentence” (p. 258). Sluga, as a Frege scholar, believes that Frege has articulated this principle in a very memorable form in *Foundations of Arithmetic*, as follows: “It is only

within the context of a proposition that words will be really meaningful and this relationship creates sufficiency. In other words, if the proposition as a whole is meaningful, this will imply that its conceptual components influence the totality of this proposition's content" (Sluga, 1980, p. 55).

Therefore, one can argue that regardless of the fact that the "Principle of Contextuality" is a proper methodology for the implementation of the theory of natural languages, as previously mentioned, a huge number of philosophers in this field who are known as seasoned Frege scholars, contend that this is itself one of Frege's focal doctrines (Pelletier, 2001, p. 6).

Accordingly, the fact is that Frege's influence has grown to vast proportions in the modern philosophical perspective and this influence, i.e. resorting to the principle of compositionality and principle of contextuality, as noted by A. J. Ayer has exerted a considerable impact on the theory of emotivism.

## **B) Logical Foundations**

### **Methodological Logicism**

Logic has a special place for Frege and, of course, he has offered a specific reading of logic which is different from traditional logic. Frege's logic is of a "methodological" bent which can be studied from different perspectives as we show in the following. According to Frege, because traditional logic pays attention to mental notions and judgments and also the influence of language on logic, it is more a "psychological" study and classic logicians instead of dealing with the objective propositions independent from human minds and truth laws governing them and the process through which new propositions are inferred from existing propositions, have dealt with the conditions of the truth of propositions and the procedure of thinking and judgment. He believes that psychology has an idealistic origin because everything is reduced to the idea. Although the definition of idealism is extensive, it seems that the idealism which is criticized by Frege is subjective, not intersubjective because we can suppose such ideas as mathematical propositions and call the people who believe in them, idealists. However, this latter type of idealism is intersubjective. Thus conceived, Frege is a realist in the philosophy of mathematics who believes in the existence of notions independent from the mathematical mind which can be used in the analysis of language too. One of the solutions that are used by Frege in order to clarify language is the distinction between "sense and reference [Sinn/ Bedeutung]". Moreover, the analysis of a sentence into "function and argument" is another doctrine to which Frege resorts in order to clarify a sentence. This strategy has given rise

to another series of problems in Frege's work; e.g. concept [Begriff], predicate, identity, and truth. In fact, Frege's action provides man with a new ontology and epistemology. New problems are created which have not been created by subject-predicate language and certain problems are marginalized which were of priority in subject-predicate language. We see that with this type of linguistic analysis proposed by Frege, the relationship of man with himself and the surrounding world will be different and this will give rise to a new world. One can dare to state that if through Kant an "epistemological turn" took place and the possibility of knowledge was studied, through Frege a "linguistic turn" took place and the possibility of speech was discussed (Meysami, 2006, p. 27).

### **Anti-methodological Logicism**

Frege believes that thinking means the "relation" that man develops with language and thought and this relation is not merely psychological and we should not confuse psychological considerations related to the mental state of the speaker with what he says and thinks. The study of the nature of the relationship between language and world, on the one hand, and language and thought, on the other hand, is completely independent of the private considerations of human experience. We contend that this basis can be considered as the third aspect of the aforementioned double features. Having said this, these three features have a deep and undeniable impact on analytic philosophers after Frege, including Wittgenstein, Russell, and Carnap. This is undoubtedly what has influenced Ayer's emotivism too. This issue will be discussed in full detail in our study of the ideas of Ayer. One of the other epistemic aspects of Frege is logic. The logic, which with its specific framework has diametrically influenced Ayer, has special features which are as follows:

2-1) Frege believes that the Aristotelian notion of logic is not correct. At the same time, he sought to avoid the psychologization of knowledge and the interpretation of the logical foundations of mathematics based on such a notion. Contrary to Aristotle's account of knowledge or thinking, Frege believed that thought is a "proposition". Thus, thinking is essentially propositional. Of course, Frege means taking a sentence into consideration without paying attention to its truth and falsity. Then, expression of thought and objectivity are directly related and a sentence is not merely subjective (Khatami, 2012, p. 608).

2-2) Moreover, Frege strongly denies the idea that logic is a type of "psychology". In "The Foundations of Arithmetic", he strongly denied this idea and opposed it: "Being true is not identical with the belief in being true. Whether an individual or a number of individuals or even all believe in a

subject's being true, we cannot still reduce the truth into the belief of individuals. If something is true while everyone considers it to be false, this would not be a contradiction. By the laws of logic, I do not mean psychological laws of being true... Then, if being true is independent from someone's approval of it or his denial of it, then the laws of being true are not psychological laws, rather they are measures which have their origin in an eternal foundation. These measures would be neglected by thought and this is, in fact, what we see in reality but they do not stop working" (Frege, pp. xv-xvi).

2-3) Frege's theory of "Functions and Objects" lies in the domain of logic. Frege believes that there are two types of "object": i) real objects which are found in the sensory world, ii) unreal objects that belong to thought. The definition that Frege offers of realness is nothing but impressing human senses in direct and indirect fashions. Unreal objects are sets, numbers, thoughts, and so on and so forth. No number can be found in the outside world. Objects are calculated with numbers. But the number itself cannot be sensed by the five human senses. For example, "7" as a number cannot be found in any place in the world. Human thought has a similar situation. Man is related to sensible objects, but thought is considered to be an independent entity like numbers. Frege believes that thoughts or numbers are not a function of the external world; rather, they are an independent entity and have a true identity that does not exist in any place. To put it otherwise, unreal objects are not correspondent with the real affairs. Of course, it is noteworthy that the objectivity of number does not lie in its being sensible, according to Frege, it is not also an attribute of anything; rather, a number is a concept independent from the mind (Salerno, 2011, p. 11).

### C) Semantic Foundations

The domain of linguistic philosophy is one of the other foundations that are emphasized by Frege's philosophy. This becomes further crystalized by distinguishing between word, sense, and reference, objectification of meaning, understanding of meaning by various minds (Frege 1997, pp. 325-345), and finally, the belief in unique reference for an expression (pp. 151-171). The author believes that the universal spirit governing Frege's thought, which is focused on linguistic analysis, meaningfulness or meaninglessness of words and propositions and, in general, dissection of the parts of a sentence, has influenced the spirit governing Ayer's thought. Emotivism has also emerged in such epistemic geography and it is almost impossible to expect an idea to take form outside the shadow of *Zeitgeist*. In fact, emotivism is nothing but an analysis of words and propositions within a psychological framework. Emotivism is grounded in the principle of verifiability. Therefore, we will first

provide a criticism of the principle of verifiability and then turn to criticize Ayer's ideas of tautological propositions and synthetic propositions. This course of discussion will allow us to critically review the foundations of the theory of emotivism.

#### **D) Epistemological Foundations**

Frege is one of those philosophers who consider knowledge to be immediate. In this field, he denies the epistemic value of mental forms, including notion and judgment and presents an epistemological perspective. He states: "I accept the objective but non-actual domain" (Frege, 1997b, p. 204-205). In fact, he does not distinguish between mental notions and judgments. But the question is that instead of leaving mental notions and judgments outside the domain of knowledge, what does Frege replace with it that deserves to be known? Instead of the content of the mind's consciousness and mental notions, Frege proposes "senses". In Frege's project, senses are similar to mental notions in one respect while from another perspective they are similar to the meanings and external objects. Since senses are not sensible and our "senses" are not touched by them, e.g. we cannot see them with our eyes, they are similar to mental notions because mental notions cannot be sensed too, therefore, they are distanced from the external objects. But since the senses are independent of the mind and they do not subsist on the consciousness and the conscious soul, we can compare them with the external objects and in this way, they are distanced from mental notions. Frege calls the sense of a sentence "Der Gedanke" (thought) and in an article with the same title, has discussed it in a detailed way. According to Frege, the senses of sentences, i.e. thoughts that have an objective existence in the outside world, constitute sciences and human knowledge and, in fact, all knowledge is acquired via its correspondent sense and since thoughts exist in an objective form and are not dependent on people's mind they are always fixed and stable while since everyone can become conscious of them, they are conveyable (Frege, 1997f, p. 336-337). Frege sought to demonstrate that sense in general and sense of a sentence in particular, i.e. thought, which constitute sciences and human knowledge are not mental affairs; rather, they are objective and independent from minds. The argument that he offers to this claim is that if sense and thought constitute human sciences and they are mental or, as he states, idea or notion, there will be no knowledge that could be shared or disputed by various individuals because everyone would be alone with his own special mentality and imprisoned in his own internal world and thus, knowledge becomes non-conveyable. By arguing for the abstract existence of sense in the outside world



correspondent to the material and sensible object, Frege has a type of Platonic approach. According to Frege, the human mind in the course of knowledge grasps these abstract and objective entities and it is these abstract entities that belong to human knowledge, not the mental forms and not the material objects. In fact, in Frege's epistemic system, acquired perception, i.e. knowledge that is a product of mental forms, does not have any place and knowledge is just the product of grasping of senses and thoughts in a direct way and without the mediation of concepts.

Here we should turn to the study of the validity and criticism of the principle of verifiability that has had a considerable influence on Ayer's emotivism.

### **Principle of Verifiability and Its Evaluation;**

1. Logical Positivists claim that one of the essential differences between their empiricist stance and the empiricism represented by Hume, Mille, and Mach lies in the fact that positivism has been founded upon ethical considerations and judgments, not on psychological hypotheses and claims. They may have believed that having perceptions that are essentially different from our current perceptions is practically impossible for us but they didn't take the principle of verifiability to be necessarily tantamount to correspondence. Now if there was the possibility of religious and mystical experiences and perceptions to be taken for granted, part of the metaphysical statements will be necessarily verifiable and then meaningful (Soroush, 2009, p. 318).

2. Like Ayer, we can argue that we do not deny mystical perceptions and experiences, but assuming a relationship between those experiences and the truth and falsity of an indicative statement is a baseless assumption for us, because it is not clear if these experiences belong to empirical language or not. In fact, mystics have an experience that they express through the proposition that "Reality is One" but the latter is not empirically verifiable. The mystics can answer that our initiations and self-discipline can be expressed in ordinary empirical language and if someone does not want to act according to it, there will be no alternative notion of the principle of verifiability but the current perceptual notions (Soroush, 2009, p. 319).

2. Some positivists like Ayer claimed that the principle of verifiability provides the ordinary meaning of "understanding" and "positive indicative meaning". For example, Schlick believed that the principle of verifiability is nothing but the "expression of the use of meaning in the propositions" whether in science or in ordinary life. "Meaning" lacks any other meaning. Then, if someone assumes that we have added an extra meaning to the meaning, he has

certainly committed a big mistake. The core of this argument is that if the aforementioned principle is nothing but a possibly true statement of the specific verbal use, the respect that the proponents of this principle pay to it will not be consistent with its logical status (Ashby, 1956, p. 56).

3. Finally, it is said that this principle is nothing but a recommendation or resolution for use of the phrase “statement of an indicative meaning”. This resolution prevents the emergence of fundamental intellectual agitation and leads to the clarification of many philosophical discussions. Ayer is one of those philosophers who believe in this idea of the principle of verifiability. It is needless to say that the latter sentence does not suggest that it is necessarily true or tautological (Ashby, 1956, p. 56).

### **Principle of Verifiability, Critical Study**

The most prominent doctrine conveyed by this principle is that sentences have a perceptible indicative meaning only if they express an analytic and empirically verifiable statement. This is undoubtedly rooted in Frege’s doctrines. The Principle of Verifiability simultaneously refers to the demonstration of truth and evaluation of the truth of a sentence. Therefore, it seems that this doctrine, in addition to verifiability, is also concerned with demonstrability. Some sentences which are “emotional”, i.e. express an individual state of mind, “what a nice weather!” or “please close the door”, or “where is the street X?”, do not express any fact regarding the external world; rather, they represent our individual desires.

In other words, although they cannot be experienced and verified, they are still meaningful. However, since they do not have any indicative content that would add to our knowledge, they are not subjected to truth and falsity. All propositions but analytic propositions have either cognitive or empirical or real or descriptive or true meaning. For example, “the earth is larger than the moon” is either meaningful based on an actual experience or its truth or falsity can be determined. But do metaphysical (theological, ethical) propositions have a similar nature or not? It is clear that a proposition like “the Absolute Truth is identical with Absolute Good” or “God has created the earth in six days” does not have any directly knowledge-bearing meaning. According to this doctrine, metaphysical propositions and expressions of theology, ethics, mysticism, art, aesthetics in various ideologies of human sciences are considered to be nonsense, unknown, and meaningless (Khoramshahi, 1999, p. 24-25).

### **Elimination of Metaphysics**

One of the most fundamental epistemic achievements of Ayer is the

elimination of the metaphysics relying on such doctrines as being non-analytic, non-empirical, and, naturally, the existence of a measure for its evaluation. Ayer who strongly believes in the idea that “whatever is acquired through experience is acceptable” puts all transcendent propositions to the sword. He is strictly faithful to the doctrine developed by analytic philosophers like Frege, i.e. “No proposition or statement which is concerned with a transcendent “truth” which goes beyond the whole scope of sensory experience has any real meaning”. Such a perspective naturally leads to the elimination of all religious and metaphysical propositions. Ayer resorts to the same measure with which he had declared ethics nonsense in order to describe religion and religious and metaphysical propositions as invalid and void of truth (Ayer, 1945, pp. 4-14).

He claims that one of the ways through which we can attack the metaphysical philosopher is questioning the premises of the propositions used by him. To put it otherwise, Ayer believes that the premises of every proposition, even the metaphysical proposition, begins with sensory observations. Accordingly, Ayer concludes that “admittedly from empirical premises one cannot reach the permission of something regarding features or even the existence of a supernatural entity” (Ayer, 1945, pp .5). From this perspective, one can indeed call Ayer a phenomenalist. For in “Language, Truth, and Logic”, he contends that material objects are defined based on sensory contents. Accordingly, he believes that demonstration of the existence of objects is possible only by means of the emergence of a number of their sensory contents. It is just based on this idea that the demonstration of a theory of phenomenalist perception is wrong; rather, one needs to examine which phenomenalist theory is indeed better (p. 53).

Moreover, he believes in the same procedure in proving the principle of meaningfulness. To put it otherwise, Ayer's desirable sense of meaningfulness implies that a sentence is meaningful and fact-based for a determinate person only if this person knows how to prove that type of proposition which the aforementioned sentence expresses. In other words, he must know that under which determinate conditions what observations he needs to make in order to consider this proposition true and confirm it or regard it false and refute it. But if the propositional function was in a form that its truth or falsity would be consistent with every type of experience that he thinks he will undergo in the future, then as far as the person is concerned, if that “propositional function” is not a tautology, it will be merely a pseudo-proposition (Ayer, 1945, pp. 53).

Of course, it can be useful to note that it seems that Ayer's idea is not clear indeed. For it is not clear whether the function of the principle of demonstration is related to those non-analytical utterances that attribute meaningfulness to a group of sensory experiences that demonstrate the utterances or if it is concerned

with the function of the principle that says that the meaning of every non-analytical meaningful utterance is given to us by the sensory experiences related to it that demonstrate that utterance. He butchers metaphysics and theological thoughts with the same sword with which he slaughtered ethics. In other words, his measure for slaughtering metaphysics is “verifiability”.

Accordingly, every sentence is meaningful in relation to a determinate person when he can verify the veracity of the content of the sentence. Said differently, he should know which observations under which conditions have led to the approval or denial of this proposition as a truth (Ayer, 1945, p. 4).

He contends that the words of metaphysical philosophers are not nonsensical and meaningless just because they lack real content; rather, declaring such words meaningless is due to the fact that in addition to the lack of a real content these words are not a priori either. In other words, metaphysical sentences are invalid because they are neither empirical nor analytic. This is to say that the same criterion based on which moral propositions have been considered to be meaningless, is used to justify the nonsensicality of theological and metaphysical propositions. According to Ayer, philosophy can retain its original and meaningful nature when it thoroughly eliminates metaphysics from its domain. Of course, Ayer reminds us of the important point that it is indeed language that renders metaphysics and metaphysically grounded philosophy meaningless. In this regard, he states: “But the metaphysical philosopher, contrary to the poet, does not intend to write nonsense; rather, it is being deceived by the words or wrong arguments like those which lead to the denial of the reality of the sensory world that causes this” (Ayer, 1945, p. 14).

In another place where he discusses the difference between mysticism and metaphysics, Ayer repeats the discussion of language and the value of application of words: “Henceforth we can pursue our philosophical investigations without paying attention to this type of metaphysics and also to the undesirable type which is the result of the incapability of understanding the way that words and language act” (Ayer, 1945, p. 14).. Elimination of metaphysics and, as a result, religious propositions was the outcome of acceptance of the principle of verifiability. This principle is itself the product of Frege’s ideas. Overall, we can conclude that Ayer considered metaphysical sentences and propositions to be thoroughly nonsensical and poetic nonsenses of metaphysical philosophers. In this regard, he writes, “it is truly easy for us to write wholly meaningless sentences without noticing their meaninglessness” (Ayer, 1945, p. 12).

Accordingly, Ayer insists that the idea that a number of current issues of philosophy enjoy a metaphysical color and are consequently taken to be nonsensical does not imply any unacceptable thesis regarding the personal

affections of the philosophers. Here, Ayer takes a further step and evaluates the function of the metaphysical sentences of the philosophers merely in view of the fact that they stir other people's feelings and emotions based on moral and aesthetic norms. He argues that "The view that the physician is reckoned among the poets appears to rest on the assumption that both talk nonsense." (p. 13). Anyway, elimination of metaphysics is an epistemological approach adopted by Ayer which is the result of his radical belief in the ideas of the Vienna Circle and the positivist philosophers of linguistic analysis.

#### 4. Conclusion

Ayer's general strategy in his theory of emotivism is grounded in the analysis of language. This is a subject that is itself based on the main element of the analyticity of the propositions or their empirical content. In other words, moral and metaphysical propositions which do not have any of these two conditions cannot be scientifically discussed, explained, or theorized.

As a matter of fact, Ayer's current approach has its origin in the ideas of analytic philosophers and particularly Frege as the pioneer of domain analysis; foundations which have an extensive scope in various logical, psychological, linguistic, and epistemological domains. Moral emotivism is truly a product of the empiricism that has taken a lot of advantage of Frege's methodological, logical, semantic, and epistemological foundations. The invalidity of ethics is the decisive result of such foundations and every other result but the meaninglessness of moral propositions in emotivism is against its constitutive foundations.

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