

Rationality from Mulla Sadra's Viewpoint

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Abstract

Providing an exact explication of rationality in a way that would lead to the explication of the scope of rational discourse is among the most fundamental problems of philosophers. In the current essay the author struggles to reach a comprehensive definition of rationality via an exact description and analysis of ideas of Mulla Sadra (1571-1641) as the most significant philosophical figure in the Islamic world according to which one can present all human achievements in the domain of knowledge and science as manifestations of this rationality. Rationality in Sadra's intellectual system represents a comprehensive term with an analogically graded meaning that in different levels of certainty guarantees the validity of applied, theoretical and intuitive sciences. This comprehensive perspective of the domain of rational discourse can put an end to many disputes on the exact sense of rationality and in doing so, it can bring about a basis for more interaction and sympathy among scholars in various branches of science and open the path for deeper dialogue.

Keywords: Intellect, Rationality, Intellection, Sadra.

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Introduction

One of the historical disputes of scholars in various domains of knowledge and science is the dispute and quarrel on the meaning of rationality. Rationality in each one of the applied, theoretical and intuitive sciences has a particular meaning that is peculiar to that domain of science but inefficient in other domains. Many of the scholars of various sciences have declared their own particular definition of rationality, correcting and rejecting other alternative definitions related to other scientific domains as irrelevant. Therefore, one can say that there is no comprehensive meaning of rationality that can be accepted by all groups. Thus, wherever there is a debate on rationality, before any issue, one may ask what the meaning of rationality is. To which branch rationality actually belongs to. And it is the viewpoint of which thinker. In fact, the difference of opinions has rendered the logical and sympathetic dialogue in various domains of knowledge and science impossible.

In the current essay, the authors have sought to provide a comprehensive meaning of rationality through a description and analysis of Mulla Sadra's viewpoints. That's also can be integrated into one with various existing definitions. As far as the authors know, neo-Sadrites like Allameh Tabatabaei and Ayatollah Jawadi Amoli have made numerous efforts to show the consensus among philosophy and mysticism. But the effort for showing the consensus among applied, theoretical and intuitive sciences in Sadra's thought is made for the first time in the current study.

In fact, the present research is innovative from two perspectives: 1- the authors have struggled to depict all meanings of rationality from Sadra's point of view using the principles of the Sadrite philosophy –

principality of existence and gradational unity of existence – within a gradational system; 2- the authors have sought to concretize the consensus between applied, theoretical and intuitive sciences through a comprehensive definition of rationality.

To this end, we need to provide a short explanation of epistemological system of Sadra and the place of rationality in this system. Epistemologically speaking, Sadra is a realist and foundationalist. The rationality, that has taken form within this structure, endorses the validity of all applied, theoretical and intuitive sciences. Indeed, Sadra in addition to the current foundationalist basis of intellection has depicted more fundamental picture of intellection based on the intuition of rational truths. Based on human achievements in the domain of empirical sciences as well as discursive teachings, only a small part of that picture is considered to be general. It is necessary to be noted that for achieving the comprehensive meaning of rationality as conceived by Sadra, the thoughts of this philosopher should be considered from the point of view of two basic principles of the Sadrite philosophy i.e. principality of existence and gradational unity of existence. In coming discussions, these all will be pursued in step-by-step manner.

Practical and Theoretical Reasons and their Functions

For Sadra, intellect in the sense of “the knowing dimension of man” is considered one of the soul's faculties which has an epistemological function and in the course of substantial movement of soul makes itself actualized (Sadra, Vol. 6: 140). To explain the exact functions of human intellect, he makes use of the division of intellect into *practical* and *theoretical* ones. Sadra considers that the

perceiver, in all the stages of perception, is nothing but the immaterial soul or the intellect. Concerning this subject he says: perceiving something is nothing but the intention of the soul and the observation of the object perceived by the soul (Ibid: 162). Also in a more precise statement, he considers intellect as the perceiver of all matters (particular and universal) (Ibid: 8, 208 and 240). By discussing the human intellect being the perceiver of both particulars and universals, Sadra refers to a general and all-embracing meaning of “intellect” as a specific faculty of mankind and that is an intellect which does both theoretical and practical functions of human soul. Sadra has alluded to these two functions of intellect thus: there are two faculties of mankind, one of them pertains to the world, engaged in the management of the body and its movement and embarking on animal actions specific to this world which is called practical faculty or practical reason and the second pertains to the higher world and by virtue of it, man is affected by the first principles and gains all sorts of knowledge and occupies himself with other-worldly perfections from divine love to ardent desire for the vision of God and acquisition of divine satisfaction. Man, according to his practical faculty, is an actual entity whereas according to his theoretical dimension is a potential entity (Shirazi, 1987, Vol. 4: 293). The exigency of the practical reason, which is common among people, is its usage in animal desires and thinking on human management

according to livelihood, resurrection, world and afterlife (Ibid: 368). Among the knowledge, which are included in the domain of the functions of practical reason, are technical practical sciences which are useful for action and their practical results and are actualized through learning (Ibid, Vol. 3: 275), like the knowledge of architect which as a technical habitus causes the architect to make a building (Ibid, Vol. 6: 3)¹. Sadra states that both practical and theoretical reasons as two parts of the soul are essentially immaterial, with this difference that the practical reason perceives particular forms and also is perceiver faculty which pertains to action and drives its major premises from theoretical reason, and then by virtue of them, issues judgment on particular matters and also uses indemonstrable, generally accepted statements and uncertain empirical premises in its deductions, whereas the theoretical reason of perceptive power is concerned with speculation and its premises are self-evident (Ibid, Vol. 9: 82-83 and 85).

Therefore, we may conclude that in an overall view, rationality according to Sadra can be divided into two: (1) rationality as one of the functions of practical reason; (2) rationality as the fundamental function of the theoretical reason. The theoretical reason for its ability of perceiving pure rational universals is distinguished, whereas the practical reason is the perceiver of particular subjects and not universals².

¹ It should not be ignored that Sadra defines two functions for practical reason: (1) scientific function which concerns with the perception of particular science which for their practical usage are desirable; and (2) practical function which is concerned with actions whose goal is to be qualified by practical virtues (Shirazi, 1990, Vol. 9: 82-Sabzavari's glossary).

It should be mentioned that the topic of this article concerns with the scientific and epistemological function in practical reason.

² As it was said before, the meaning of particularity in practical sciences is that this kind of science pertains to material and concerns to meet the material need of mankind, whereas theoretical sciences, in themselves,

Furthermore, according to his definition of practical reason, Sadra sees all empirical disciplines and sciences which are sought for their practical and functional results, as the subject of practical reason. The fulfillment of this kind of knowledge which is a particular one is possible for all human beings. On the other hand, he includes all the sciences which for their theoretical aspect are pursued and are concerned with rational universal judgments in the domain of theoretical reason³. But an important point which is implicit in Sadra's view is that the rational universal statements pertain to a very limited part of the capacity of theoretical reason which all human beings have access to it in common; while this is the case that major part of this capacity pertains to the perception of imaginal and rational immaterial entities the perception of which is an universal perception. What Sadra means by universality here, to be sure, is a kind of existential extent and largeness⁴, not conceptual and propositional universality. According to Sadra, attaining such degrees of theoretical reason is impossible for ordinary human beings except few people (Ibid, Vol. 3: 510; Vol. 8: 234).

Degrees of Theoretical Reason

Before discussing Sadra's specific view on the particular meaning of intellection which is accessible only to a few privileged human

beings, we should first elucidate the different degrees of theoretical reason. In a primary consideration, Sadra regards the theoretical reason as having different stages and by quoting Ibn Sina (Ibn Sina, 2000: 334-335; 1984: 39-40; 2004: 355-364) speaks of four stages: (Shirazi, 1990: 420-421).

1. The stage of potential (or material) intellect: this stage is nothing but potentiality and the aptitude of intellection and lacks any actual intelligible form whatsoever. Potential intellect can become a rational world, similar to rational world existing in the First Principle (the creator) (Ibid: 369) and in fact, the ideal status of intellect is that it should perceive all truths in such a way that the rational and immaterial forms of all existence are realized in it (Ibid: 368).
2. Dispositional (or habitual) intellect: is a stage in which, the intellect has intuited immediate perception and this stage is a tool for the acquisition of theoretical sciences. It has the faculty of transmission to the stage of actual reason and the power of acquisition of knowledge.
3. The stage of actual intellect: is the one of acquiring theoretical knowledge for the intellect but not in a way that these sciences are always actualized

and without taking into consideration the effects and results of material and practical are desirable and in this meaning are universal. Therefore, the intension here is not conceptual or logical universality and particularity.

³ For more precise information about Sadra's view on the division of sciences, see Shirazi, Sadr al-din Muhammad, (1303AH). *al-Hashiah a'la al-Ilahiyat al-Shifa*, Tehran: Dar al-Phonoun, P. 2; Ibid, (1302AH) *Majmoat ol. Rasa'el al. Tesa't*, Tehran: 279-281.

⁴ Something similar to intuitive perception and knowledge by presence, like Platonic ideas. Such a perception consists in observation of a universal reality in the meaning of an immaterial entity which is devoid of the limitations of material world, not universal in its logical meaning.

for it, but whenever the soul wills, for mere fact of intention and attention of mind to them, these theoretical sciences are in actual stage present for it.

4. The stage of acquired intellect: a stage in which all sciences are always present for the soul and for their presence, there is no need to the intellection and attention of mind. In this stage, intellect perceives intelligible forms in the effusing cause of them.

The above naming of stages is due to Ibn Sina. Sadra, however, adopts a different terminology and calls the third stage "acquired intellect" and the fourth stage "actual intellect". Moreover, as we shall discuss later, he gives a new interpretation to these four stages according to his own philosophical principles, including the principle of the gradation of existence and the substantial motion.

Intellection as an Analogical Capacity and as having Different Degrees

Now after a brief review of functions of intellect from Sadra's point of view, it is necessary to point to the process of formation of human knowledge. Sadra proposes two different processes:

1. The formation of knowledge in the course of the process of *abstraction*, due to soul's relation with material forms: this exactly includes natural activity of human mind in receiving knowledge from the material world

which is common among people. According to Sadra, in such a process of intellection, the movement of mind is from particular to universal, sensible to intelligible and effect to cause which include all human disciplines derived from sensations, whether from particular sciences which lie in the domain of practical reason and universal sciences which are included in the area of theoretical reason (Shirazi, 1990, Vol. 9: 143).

2. The formation of human knowledge through the relation of soul with imaginal and rational truths: in order to acquire such knowledge, it is necessary that human soul, in the course of its substantial motion and by attaining a supernatural capacity, goes out of the natural world and enters into imaginal and rational ones and as the result of the intuition of imaginal and rational truths attains the knowledge of this sort of existential truths (Ibid, Vol. 3: 510; Vol. 8: 234). Since the soul obtains these sorts of knowledge as the result of its relation with supernatural and higher principles, the relation of this knowledge with the one derived from the material world is the relation of particular intelligible to the sensible and cause to effect and this kind of knowledge is in a higher order comparing to the first one. The latter kind includes both acquired and presential knowledge.⁵

⁵ It is necessary here to mention two points: first, any kind of human knowledge, whether it is obtained as a result of relation with the material world or due to relation with the higher principles, so long as mankind dealing in it is with conceptions and judgments is

within the domain of acquired knowledge and only when those sciences can be considered as a kind of intuitive knowledge that the perception of truths as a result of soul's direct relation with them and with any intermediary of concepts and propositions takes place.

It should be mentioned that Sadra explains all the stages in the process of intellection and perception on the basis of observation. Concerning this subject he says: "Perception of something is nothing but the intention of soul and is nothing but the thing perceived by the soul" (Shirazi, 1990, Vol. 6: 162).

He contemplates three different levels for existence: material, imaginal, and rational. Human soul can observe each one of these entities in their own worlds, but it should ascend to imaginal or rational worlds that are beyond the material world (Shirazi, 2008: 241).

Just as the soul, due to the perception of external objects, creates the forms of abstracted sensible things in the mind, so after perceiving the imaginal and rational entities and their absence from the mind, it creates universal forms of what it has perceived in the mind (Shirazi, 1990, Vol. 3: 510; Vol. 8: 234).

Therefore, at the beginning of the stage of perceiving imaginal and rational existences formation of universal concepts continues to occur in the mind of human beings, but this universality is not the kind of universality which has its root in the observation of the external sensible objects; rather it is a universality derived from the observation of abstract external existence and that abstract existence includes all beyond the material world from archetype to intellect (Ibid, Vol. 3: 510). In fact, human mind is able

to make universal concepts in two stages: the first stage is making universal forms derived from matter, and the second stage is making universal forms from the imaginal or intellectual world.

By referring to this matter that the abstraction from accidents according to the validity of intellect is something other than abstraction from accidents according to existence (Ibid, Vol. 2: 47; 2003: 191, 193, 196), Sadra explicitly distinguishes the intellection derived from the relation of soul with matter from the intellection based on the relation of soul with the supernatural and on the difference between the process of attaining these two stages of intellection. He says: "Abstraction requires abstracted forms being derived from matter but what is in itself an intellect (referring to the world of intellect), in its being intellected need not these abstractions and it is in the capacity of human soul that by virtue of intellection of these entities, becomes a rational world... and so what is essentially of the genus of imaginal forms (referring to the imaginal world) in its being imagined need not the abstraction and that is a form that if the soul is connected with it becomes a heavenly world" (Shirazi, 1990, Vol. 3: 362).

Elsewhere, he has also pointed to these processes. Sadra states that human knowledge is either a divine gift (illuminative knowledge) in which, case

Second, in attaining these two stages and sorts of knowledge, both practical and theoretical reason are at work, with this difference that the role of practical reason in attaining the science of the first category, it is more concerned with its perceptual aspect of it in dealing with livelihood affairs like building a house solidly whereas this role in the second category of

sciences, it is more concerned with action pertaining to the other world such as justice, charity, acquiring of virtues and purification of soul which is making the ground for perception of universals by theoretical reason (Shirazi, 1990, Vol. 9: 82).

universal sciences and rational lights are emanated from the Universal Spirit to human heart and then traces of them is represented in imagination; or acquisitive in which case, after connection of sensation to external particulars and abstraction of universals with respect to their similarities and differences, the soul is elevated to the stage of intellect. The first path is the righteous (people of mystic journey), and the second path is speculation (people of contemplation) (Shirazi, 1987, Vol. 6: 170).

Sadra interprets the ability of mind in making universal concepts which is obtained after observation of imaginative and rational entities as a special gift for human beings. As a result of such a perception, some kind of meanings is created in the mind whose abstraction is higher than that of universals derived from sensual forms, for essentially these meanings have not formed on the basis of sensual forms (Shirazi, 1990, Vol. 9: 82; 2000: 474). Of course, the process of the formation of these universal comparing to what it occurs to forms derived from matter is different. Universality which is obtained by soul's direct apprehension of imaginal or rational entities, from a far, means nothing but ambiguity. In fact, human soul in the beginning of its substantial journey toward higher worlds, since he has not attained perfect imaginal and rational abstraction, he will not be able to observe perfect entities in those worlds and Sadra interprets this kind of imperfect observation as an observation *from a far*. Through this imperfect observation, the soul is not able to recognize exactly the external personal individual in those worlds and only an

ambiguous perceptual images of them is obtained in the soul, which, because of their ambiguity are universal and therefore are applicable to many individuals (Shirazi, 1990, Vol. :289; 1993: 328).

One of the basic problems is that why Sadra at this stage of intellection, interprets universality as ambiguity and not abstraction. According to him, the conceptual universality which obtains in the mind as a result of abstraction pertains to a stage in which human mind is confronted with material and natural objects; therefore in a stage of intellection which human soul is confronted with essentially immaterial entities, there is no abstraction in this sense (Shirazi, 1990, Vol. 3: 362). For the latter kind of universality, one should seek another justification and Sadra by using universality in the sense of ambiguity has undertaken this work.

A more interesting point in the structure of Sadra's thought is that the rational capacity of mankind does not stop at this stage as well, but higher than the observation of imaginal and rational abstractions from a far, there is also another stage of perceiving supernatural entities which is based on the direct and close observation of them and the existential unity with them. He regards the genuine rationality as soul's ascending to worlds beyond the matter, its observation of imaginal and rational entities and ultimately its existential union with such truths (Shirazi, 2003: 410). He explains such rationality in various ways. For example, he writes: "So long as the soul is bound by physical characteristics, it cannot become actually intelligent and it's intelligible is not an

actual intelligible. Rather, as long as the soul is existent by its natural existence (the stage of acquired knowledge derived from the sensibles) or is mental existence (the stage of acquired knowledge derived from the Higher Principles), there is the potentiality of rational thinking and intelligibility in it not their actuality and when the soul passes from this existential stage and finds its rational individuation it will be apt to become the same as the intelligibles and its relation with the intelligible will become like its relation with individual entities" (Shirazi, 1990, Vol. 3: 365). For Sadra, the genuine rationality is the recognition of the truth of objects, that is to say the recognition of pure rational entities in respect of their essence, existence and truth not in respect of their general concepts and quiddities and this is something which does not obtain except for a few people (Ibid: 386). With this latter expression, Sadra in addition to the two first kinds of knowledge proves a third one.

Elsewhere, by classifying knowledge into general, special and objective apprehension of separated intellects, he refers to these stages. The general knowledge is common among all human souls and the special knowledge is allocated to some human individuals whereas more special than that knowledge which includes a fewer individuals is concerned with the objective apprehension of external immaterial entities (Ibid, Vol. 5: 266). Each of these stages can be connected with a particular meaning of universality. In the first stage, humankind deals with universality derived from sensible forms. The second stage is connected with ambiguity which is universality not

derived from sensible forms and the last stage is the observation of an immaterial entity and the union of soul with a specific fact which has an existential universality. This meaning of universality basically is other than the conceptual and mental universality, but it denotes to an existential extension and encompassing and external inclusiveness of entities in this stage of the universe of existence which is related to their truth devoid of matter.

Based on his belief in human intellect having different degrees, Sadra states that the soul becomes perfected in three ways: first, by virtue of rational forms related to incorporeal beings such as God and angels and this knowledge belongs to mystics; second by virtue of imaginal forms which reflect pure rational entities and this knowledge is proper to the righteous; and third by virtue of imaginative forms derived from physical matter which belongs to particular notions and this pertains to the common people (Shirazi, 1987, Vol. 4: 294-295).

Based on this division, as mentioned earlier, the acquired knowledge also includes two basic kinds: first, the acquired knowledge derived from matter which pertains to common people and its universality is also a kind of conceptual universality and second, the acquired knowledge derived from the observation of the rational entities and the Higher Principles which is special to the righteous and its universality is of the kind of universality based on ambiguity. The quality of the acquired knowledge for common people is as follows: first, the soul through senses attains primary concepts and judgments and then combines them with each other and from

it obtains the acquired concepts and judgments. The arrangement of these, i.e. sensation, primary sciences and secondary acquired sciences is a natural arrangement to the extent that the prior stage is the cause for the posterior one (Shirazi, 1990, Vol. 3: 381-382).

But the acquired knowledge in the second sense is obtained as follows: "An intermediate soul in potency and perfection, when it is connected with the universe of intellect, goes beyond the state of sensation and manages the body with some of natural faculties, and when it returns to the domain of senses, becomes absent of its rational remains which with substance of the faculty of returning and capacity of union, it can remember the rational perceived object which had disappeared" (Ibid: 510).

As it is understood from the process of the acquired knowledge in all human beings, in this stage of knowledge, the movement is from effect to cause and hence, Sadra emphasizes that since such knowledge does not result in a definite cause, it does not provide a certain knowledge of the effect as well (Ibid, Vol. 3: 388, 392-394) and therefore, such a knowledge provides opinion not certainty (Ibid: 399)⁶; rather for him, certain knowledge is a higher order and its specific feature is knowledge of the

effect through knowledge of the cause which includes three stages: certain knowledge, intuitive knowledge and truth of certainty. The first stage is the recognition of general theoretical subjects (special knowledge or observation from afar) which is obtained through argument; such as knowledge of the sun for a blind man (this is the same stage appropriate to the righteous and includes imaginative parables of pure intelligibles) (Shirazi, 1987, Vol. 4: 294-295). The second stage is the observation of immaterial rational entity (more specific knowledge or observation from near), such as observation of the Sun with physical eye, and the third stage is the union of the soul with the immaterial intelligent (knowledge in its most specific sense)⁷ which itself is the whole intelligible and has no instance in the world of sense, since there is no possibility of the union between two physical things (Shirazi, 1990, Vol. 3: 518).

It is necessary to mention that attainment to higher stage of intellection, besides the process of natural and psychic capacity of mankind, requires conditions which do not realize for everyone and include cognitive endeavor as well as religious abstinence and legal obligation which result in the passage of soul from the

⁶ What is meant by general human sciences based on opinion is not the rejection of ordinary human being attainment to degrees of certain knowledge, rather its more precise meaning of it is that these sciences because they have been on the basis of particular and sensible matters, comparing to sciences which have been derived from principles and causes possess a less degree of certainty and belong to a later stage of these sciences. On this basis, Sadra holds that difference between the masters of formal sciences and their deductive thought with the master of transcendental

wisdom which by their acquired intellect, receive science from its true source and first means and final ends is that they gain knowledge to the cause of object which is constitutive of existence and also constitutive of its true term (Shirazi, 1987, Vol. 6: 45).

⁷ It should be mentioned that Sadra in many other cases has considered the complete observation of rational separate substances with the union of soul with them as one stage.

natural world to the external imaginal world and thereof to the intellectual world (Shirazi, 1981: 9). The reason why Sadra does not consider mere scientific conduct as a sufficient means for understanding supernatural truths is his conviction that perceiver and the object perceived should have general resemblance with each other (Shirazi, 1990, Vol. 1: 387). Therefore, until the soul does not ascend to the stage of immaterial truths, it is not possible for it to attain to true knowledge of them and such an ascent to higher stages needs, besides the acquisition of knowledge, the acquisition of the habits of ethical virtues through action.

Summary of Sadra's Viewpoints and Conclusion

According to the previous discussions we could classify the intellection stages from Sadra's stand point into the five following categories:

1. Intellection in the sense of understanding the knowledge pertaining to particular and material objects as a function of practical reason: Sadra regards the most superficial layer of human intellect relevant to the domain of practical reason which all applied sciences are included in this area, sciences which for their practical results are desirable. In this outlook, all knowledge which today is called "science" lies in the domain of the activity of practical reason.
2. Intellection in the sense of understanding the universal and necessary sciences: this stage of intellection which is beyond the function of practical reason and is its

basis and foundation, occurs for all human beings at primary stages of realization belonging to the theoretical reason capacities which includes two stages: (a) The stage of perception self-evident concepts which Sadra calls as primary intelligible. Sciences, which in this stage of intellection are realized, are the same principles which are common among all human beings, principles which are the foundation for other sciences, including those lie in the domain of practical reason as well as sciences at a higher level which are in the domain of theoretical reason. (b) The perception stage of universal and necessary sciences which lie in the domain of theoretical reason and have been formed on the basis of these self-evident concepts. This certain knowledge includes universal statements in the area of natural, mathematical and philosophical sciences which are desirable by themselves not for their practical results.

3. Intellection in a sense of observing the abstract imaginal and rational entities from afar: this stage which Sadra calls as more particular to elites of mankind includes soul's observation of incorporeal beings from afar which also includes the acquired knowledge of external objects by virtue of mental forms, with the difference that the mental forms in this stage are derived from the intuition of supernatural truths, both imaginal and rational entities; whereas, the mental forms in two former stages were derived from the observation of material and natural

entities. This mode of intellection occurs in the intermediate stages of realization of theoretical reason and as it is clear, it is within the realm of the acquired knowledge.

4. Intellection in a sense of observing the imaginal and rational entities from near: this stage includes the clear direct observation of abstract imaginal entities in a way that there is no ambiguity in it and for this reason is devoid of any conceptualization by the mind. Sadra considers the results of such an observation as the knowledge of truths of object as they are, that is as external individual entities. This stage of intellection is realized in the higher stages of theoretical reason.
5. Intellection in the sense of union with rational and imaginal entities: this stage is more particular than all previous stages and Sadra regards this union as the one with supernatural truths and annihilation in immaterial truths in such a way that there is no duality between the soul and those truths. This stage of intellection is concerned with the highest stage of the realization of theoretical reason

by which, all faculties of theoretical reason, are actualized and converts it into active intellect and unified with it⁸.

It should be noted that on the basis of gradation of intellection in mankind, the certainty resultant from human knowledge will be gradational so that in each stage of intellection will be proportioned to the same stage. Therefore, whatever in the course of rationality, we pass elementary levels and transcend to higher levels, our cognitive product will be more certain and closer to the truth. In addition, on the basis of Sadra's special view toward the process of intellection and its rational product, a comprehensive picture of rationality will be obtained which includes all cognitive areas of human beings and proves the validity of his knowledge at different levels including applied, theoretical and contemplative knowledge and thus many of the disputes over identifying the real and genuine instances of human rationality.

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⁸ It is worth mentioning that in some cases, Sadra has regarded the observation of objective truth as one with

those truths. Therefore, one can place the two latter stages together in one division.

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
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چکیده

ارائه تعریفی دقیق از عقلانیت، به گونه‌ای که منجر به تبیین روشن از دامنه خردورزی شود، از جمله مسائل مهم فلسفی به حساب می‌آید که تا به امروز مباحث بسیاری حول آن شکل گرفته است. از این میان، ملاصدرا (۱۵۷۱-۱۶۴۱ م) به‌عنوان یکی از اندیشمندان بزرگ در حوزه فلسفه اسلامی با بهره‌گیری از مبانی تأسیسی خود-اصالت وجود و تشکیک در وجود-تلاش کرده است تا به تعریفی از عقلانیت دست یابد که به مقتضای آن، تمام دست‌آوردهای بشر در حوزه دانش، نمودهایی از این عقلانیت به حساب آیند. ملاصدرا با این نگاه، عقلانیت را اصطلاحی جامع با کاربردی تشکیکی دانسته است که در سطوح مختلفی از یقین، تأمین‌کننده اعتبار علوم کاربردی، نظری و مکاشفه‌ای است. اهمیت چنین نگاه جامعی به حوزه خردورزی، در پایان دادن به بسیاری از مجادلات در این مسأله است، به گونه‌ای که منجر به همسویی و همراهی دیدگاه‌های بسیاری از اندیشمندان در این حیطه خواهد شد.

واژه‌های کلیدی: عقل، عقلانیت، تعقل، ملاصدرا.



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