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Genetic Engineering, Artificial Intelligence, and Natural Man: An Existential Inquiry into Being and Rights*

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Abstract
It is apt and usual to cogitate and ratiocinate man and human rights; it is less so about or with (other) animal rights; and much more less and lesser so with/about "plant rights" and those of cloned/the artificially intelligent agents'. This condition is unfair and not ideal because man, other animals, plants, and other human manipulations (AI) from nature constitute varying levels of being; therefore, they possess varying levels of rights. Hence there is a need to espouse the nature/levels of being, on the one hand, and to adumbrate the nature/types of rights and as related to being as such—which is the imperative of this article. Dwelling on the cornucopia of literature/hard common biological and other in nature as a basis for analysis, this article, first, seeks to establish that man, other animals, plants, and other human manipulations of nature constitute varying levels of being; and second, argues that each level of being as such possesses some rights associated with it. It argues further that either all beings have rights, or they don't. The work concludes that if one accepts that all the levels of being possess rights (accordingly, including plant, cloned and AI agents), then one has an obligation to all levels of being; but accepting the latter poses the most existential and ontological threat to humanity and all of nature (climate.

Keywords: Genetic Engineering, Artificial Intelligence, existentialism, ontology/being, rights

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Introduction

Essentially, philosophy is a critical inquiry into reality in order to achieve wisdom about it. This essence is traceable, etymologically and thematically, to ancient Greece beginning with Thales' quest for the basic stuff of being and other "curiosity and desire for fresh experience" (Bewaji, 1983: 71). Philosophy could also refer (nominal) to some unique body of a person's or social guiding/life principles. And, more technically, it refers to inquisitiveness, asking questions in every area of nature, reality and beyond. Historically, critical philosophy is also normative, it strives to proffer answers to human's wonders; it, again criticizes those proposed answers (skeptical), and oftentimes questions the basis of those proposals—which is radical and revolutionary (as was Socratic against the pre-Socratics, medieval against Socratics, and modern against medieval philosophical problematique). Hence, essential philosophy questions, and, sometimes, questions questions; it criticizes criticisms. Such is the conviction of this work concerning the concepts of being and rights. Its immediate quest is to question and argue against the all too common belief that the world is simply humans', and the thought that humanity exhausts the scope of existential concerns. This piece commits to establishing that all of natures are rights in varying capacity and form; and it is committed to espousing the scope of being and moral judgment about it. However, it is not the goal here to investigate the moral standard or determination of the basis for right actions, but that of rights in general.

It is apt and usual to cogitate and ratiocinate man and human rights; it is much less so about or with (other) animal rights; and never so with/about plant rights and those of cloned agent/artificially intelligent (to be used henceforth as AI) agent. This condition is unfair and not ideal because man, as are other animals, plants, and other human manipulations (AI) from nature constitute varying levels of being; therefore they possess varying levels of rights. In the following pages, we shall espouse the nature/levels of being, on the one hand, and will adumbrate the nature/types of rights and as related to being. Dwelling on the cornucopia of literature and common biological and other natures as basis for analysis, this article, first, shall establish that man, other animals, plants, and other human manipulations from nature constitute varying levels of being; and second, it shall argue that each level of being as such possesses some rights associated with it. The work argues further that either other natures have rights, or they don't. Hence the work shall build to the conditional conclusion that: 1. if one accepts that not all the levels of being possess rights (accordingly including plant, cloned agent and AI do not), then one has no obligation to levels of being other than man; 2. if one accepts that all the levels of being possess rights (accordingly including plant, cloned agent and AI do), then one has obligation to all the levels of being. To articulate all these views, we need to ground a firm statement on freedom (which is the basis of rights and obligation) amid some ontological theory (in order to highlight the nature and levels of being.

On Being (Ontology) and Existentialism

Ontology is a quest for a theory of being; it might get beyond the material to the metaphysical spheres. Conventionally, theory about being treats of it in the following criteria: the capacity of movement, respiration, nutrition, irritability, growth, excretion, and reproduction. Even though these criteria may not support the being of certain categories (such as abstract entities as spirits), universals (such as goodness and justice) and other qualitative condition, think the being of/in nature (sun, moon, planets, rivers, mountains, and stones). Fortunately, those criteria taught us at some early stage of our rational development support the being of man, animals, and plants. What does one think about the being-in-extraction (cloned agent/AI: forms of genetic engineering, computers, and robots)? Or do they not exist? No matter their respective qualities, each falls under some specific specie, each within its closed conditions of being which must be recognized as such, even by other specie-beings—the essence of Dasein (being-in-the-world, or being there)—each with its existential nature.

It is the goal of existentialism to detect and herald the recognition of every specie rights. Hence existentialism, which is the theory/philosophy that emphasizes individual existence, contemplates meaning, freedom and a choice—believing that philosophical thinking (beginning with the human subject) is not merely the thinking subject (Crowell, 2010). In existentialists' view, the primary virtue is authenticity; the individual's starting point is characterized by what has been called "the existential attitude" or a sense of disorientation and confusion in the face of an apparently meaningless or absurd world (Solomon, 1974: 1-2). Sartre's existentialist viewpoint claims that one "must exist as a person before it can be said of one that he is such and such type of person." The first principle of existentialism is that one is only what one makes of himself: in the beginning one "is nothing." Sartre eloquently describes this process when he says "we mean that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world and defines himself afterward." Hence man is not an object, but a subject, a quality that gives man his dignity—derived from one's freedom to choose. Sartre urges self-determination and insists upon the equivalence of human dignity and autonomy of the will (Sartre, 1947). Capacity to will exists only in man. A stone, (what Heidegger would consider to be a sein type of being, and what Sartre would call being-in-itself) is not capable of making choice and therefore it is not free. A stone is restricted to its position in the world. Likewise, a non-human animal, like a capybara, is a being-in-itself. Where the capybara moves about the world and seems to be making choices, those choices can never make the capybara something other than a capybara. The animal will never train for a marathon or make a fire; a capybara will never deliberately change its genetics through science. Man, on the other hand is not restricted; he himself "is freedom…, is possibility, openness to the future, and an indeterminate potentiality.

Moreover, Sartre and many apologists contrast being with nothingness. In this case, firstly, "existence precedes essence" regardless of other basic genetic and environmental deterministic elements. One cannot simply will oneself into a bird or

will an abusive childhood away. What Sartre's existentialism does propose is that since one's consciousness comes first, one can choose how to respond to or feel about one's genetic background or environmental characteristics both historically and in the present moment. Taken together, genetics and environment are typically referred to by existentialist as "facticity", the objective facts about the external world that the consciousness can respond to in a variety of ways. It also means that people have personal responsibility for everything that they do as autonomous individuals—a very popular and comforting belief. Hence many existentialists have also regarded traditional systematic or academic philosophies, in both style and content, as too abstract and remote from concrete human experience (Breisach, 1962: 5; Kaufmann, 1956: 12); this started with Kierkegaard's notion of existing "authentically" (Lowrie, 1969: 37-40). Authentic existence implies a life of freedom. Essentially, existentialist postulations thrive on the belief on freedom, responsibility, and rights. Unfortunately, historically, the category of right-holder(s) gets beyond natural man.

On Natural Man

By natural man (NM) is meant the "extra-sentient and rational animal, human being"; humanity. There are alternative perceptions of the essence of human nature. The major contention is between the dualist theorists (like Descartes, who argue that humans are made of material/physical body and non-material/spiritual elements), and the monists—contending that humans are simply replete with a single substance. The common ground is, however, found in both their characterization of human person as being with rationality, with intelligence. In this way, humans have some creative capacity to recreate or manipulate nature to suit his desire—in all spheres including transportation, healthcare, and science/technology. If one goes by theological account, man exists even though not in the quality of his creator, God; if man exists, is his creation non-existent, no matter how? Nevertheless, natural man (man as a natural being) arrogates to itself as the only being with intelligence; and denies such status to all other forms of intelligences—this condition has serious implication for the institution of rights. Thus concerning rights, the scenario depicts a dialogue between natural man and other intelligences (his creation, however an extension of nature).

On Genetic Engineering (GE) and Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Humans' quest to generate other form of active agent dates back in history. Those efforts culminate in multifaceted GE and AI. While the former refers to the manipulations of genes to generate new forms, the latter involves the science and technology "of making machines that can do the kinds of thing that humans can do" (Blackburn, 1996: 26); AI is the study "…of intelligence in thought and action; …techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular" (Boden, 1977: 4-5). In all, AI involves computer simulation

of natural essences and activities; it involves modelling a psychological phenomenon (programme) on a computer as sort of imitation or representation (to produce intelligent responses)—which is a serious challenge to behaviorism though.

GE (also called Genetic Modification, GM), is not just about creating weird species or making mutants out of men, it helps to improve the quality of the existing species of various organisms by enhancing their health, yield (agriculture and livestock) and overall quality. Hence it is the direct manipulation of an organism's gene using biotechnology. It is a set of technologies used to change the genetic makeup of cells, including the transfer of genes within and across species boundary to produce improved organism. GE is the group of applied techniques of genetic and biotechnology used to cut up and join together genetic materials especially DNA from one or more species of organism and to introduce the result into another organism in order to change one or more of its characteristics; it is the internal manipulation of basic genetic materials of an organism to modify biologic heredity or to produce peptides of high purity, such as hormones or antigens. These views widen the scope of GE to treating and curing various hereditary and terminal illnesses but acting directly on their genes. A gene is specific sequence of deoxynbonucleic acid (DNA). Each gene has instructions for the expression of specific traits such as hair or eye color, and height; but all the genes in an organism work together to produce a final product: a living organism (humans, for instance, have over 1,000 genes in the body).

There is a typology of GE, historically. Glow in the Dark Cats were cloned in South Korea in 2017; there is the Pesticide Resistant Plant or Environmental Friendly Pigs; Faster Growing Trees and Salmons have been created via cloning—producing a genetically identical copy of an organism; it helps to reduce the time needed to make a transgenic model and the result would be a population of genetically identical identically animal. The first ever sheep to be cloned was named Dolly in 1996 by scientist cloning. Further technologies have helped produce bigger and longer-lasting tomatoes, insecticides, corn, and banana vaccine. Thus, GE has many application in different fields of life; agriculture, pharmacy, medicine etc. Genetic engineering can be used for the production of human insulin. It is also used in gene therapy—used in treatment of various genetic disorders and diseases.

However, GE and AI take several forms. Chemical Genetic Engineering (CGE) deals with the separating, classifying and graphing of gene to prepare them for experiment. CGE includes genetic mapping, studying genetic interaction and genetic coding. Genetic Mapping (GM) is the process of determining the order of and the relative distance between genetic markers (specific sequences or heritable element that generates a phenotype) based on their pattern of inheritance. Genetic interaction is defined as a deviation from the expected phenotype when combining multiple genetic mutations. It maps functional dependencies between genes. Genetic interaction aids researchers to understand what set and combination of genes would produce a particular physiological, morphological and behavioral characteristics. Genetic Encoding (GEn) is the set of rules used by living cells to

translate information encoded within the genetic materials into proteins. Analytical Genetic Engineering is the research branch of GE in which virtual genetic models are created using Computer software. This is the research branch which computer programmes are used to theoretical study the implication of various genetic engineering activities before they are carried out in practice. The researchers develop a programme and check whether such splicing would be successful, if the desired result could be achieved. This is the trial and error stage and reduces risk of disasters rising real organism especially animals.

Applied Genetic Engineering (AGE) is the field of genetic engineering involved with the practical application of GE tools to manipulate the genes of living natures—including transgenesis and cloning. Transgenesis is the process of introducing a gene from another organism so that the organism will exhibit a new property and transmit that property to its offspring. Cloning is the application of the same property into an embryo such that one copy has exactly the same biological constitution. Cloning is the replication activity, a doubling effect. Its varieties include: In-vitro Fertilization (IVF); Artificial Insemination (AIn); Surrogate motherhood (SM); Transfer/freezing of embryos; Somatic Gene Engineering (SGE); and Germline Genetic Engineering (GGE)—all kinds having their definite mode of behaving. However, if AIs do (as GE products) behave and have minds, don't they also have rights and consciences? To address this concern, we need to initially spell out the nature of rights.

On Rights

The province of right is wide-ranging. Individual persons have rights; but actions and behaviors alone could be right or wrong. It is necessary and would be instructive to distinguish the province of Right from that of Rights—which itself is subdivided into legal and moral rights. The concept of 'right' has since been associated with claims which people have against others. In other words, they are the duties of others towards the right-holder—there can be 'rein' or 'impersonal' rights in this direction. Irele (1998) notes that the notion of moral rights is not as such related to that of duty or obligation, but closely related with the principle of need—one's 'due'—with correctness and goodness. Thus in moral philosophy, we delineate the concept of Right in the kind of question: What is right? 'Right' then means what is or that which is correct, expected, conforming, social behavior, or simply good. 'Right' is not mere prudence; it is social prudence. In other words, what is not wrong or what is ethical, of value, of what ought to be done. It is this 'ought to' question that makes the concept of 'right' the central concern of ethics.

Let us take a hypothetical analogy (Singer, 1994: 11). Imagine you are a surgeon who believes that human life is an ultimate value. One day you are met with a patient in the hospital who needs a heart transplant and there are no hearts available. In the next ward is another patient who has an equally pressing need for kidney transplant; both will die soon if not attended to. No suitable donors are immediately available. But there is a third patient who requires an operation to

remove a brain tumor. Your ability and efficiency are not in question. But you also know that you could continue a little slip (on the 'brain-patient'), though for which no one could really blame you, that results consequently results in the third patient's death; so then he becomes a suitable donor of both liver and heart for the other needing patients. Thus you would take one life, but save two. Note that all three lives were of same quality-family; they all wished to live. Yet would you be right in doing what you did? Some would condemn while other persons would praise your efforts. But which was the right course of action? And what makes such right? Now, the question before us is this: How do we come to know the actions that are right as distinct from those that are wrong? What is the justification of each claim? These are problems of morality and ethics respectively.

But unlike legal rights (as contained in the various national constitutions and statutes such as the UN Declaration on Human and people's Rights, the African Charter Human and People's Rights, and similar conventions around the world) which are explicitly codified, the province of morality or rightness of actions only need justification than identification. And philosophical theories and perspectives on the issues vary widely. And, since this is the central concern of ethics, our task in this terse discourse is enormously simple: to categorize, analyze and simply espouse the philosophical perspectives on the scope of right-holder.

Human Rights theorists (Locke and others) argue flowingly in favor of some inalienable/positive human rights. Such is simply psychological egoistic. Other theorist (Singer) and the Law touts animal rights. Now, human and other-animal rights are predicated on being; and if cloned and other AI qualifies as beings (as stones, rivers, the skies, and earth do), then why would these categories not have rights? Then it would be okay to talk about the rights of nature and other rights of other levels of being. Nature's duty is to nurture man; man's responsibility is to protect nature: man's right is nature's duty (just as the state's responsibility to man, and man's obligation to the state). If this thought is plausible, then are deforestation and other affronts on nature defensible? The free-killing/slaughter of animals for whatever purpose (as sacrifices to ancestral deities/gods in Africa, and for pleasure in Asia) against protectionism of animal rights in the west negates any positive answer to this. Now, doesn't it appear that the variety of animal species are so many such that one would be right to conclude that, first, 'plant and other-animal species' quantitatively outclass human species; and that, second, cloned agent and AI species are so complex beyond color and race (which is human-contrived)? Moreover, with this quantity/quality calculus, are rights acquired, ascribed, or innate with beings? The following analysis reveals a connect between (or among) the levels of beings and the associated rights.

Rights Holders: An Analysis

Above, we have presented a terse review of the concepts of rights, being, man, and forms of artificial intelligence. In this section, we analyze the (egotistical) issues concerning (human) freedom or otherwise (which forms the hub of existentialism)

but which, however, seldom exceeds humans' concerns about his'. In the first place, critically, could man be said to be uniquely free within a closed/deterministic universe? Humans' interface with the doctrine treats of this question in the affirmative. Yet, if such conclusion is said to be rational, what makes other specie-beings less possibly determined within a much more complex condition? Or does humanity exhaust the scope of freedom and existential concerns? The universe is not man's alone. In African traditional ontology, for instance, the gods/ancestral or other spirits are not only real but do will; and this is within some hierarchical ontological order (Asekhauno, 2016). But the question is: If gods and other spirit-forces in nature could be purposive, could that also be said about plants? To this I answer in the categorical affirmative. All beings (consciously or subconsciously) will and are purposive. A careful analysis could indicate some nexus between all the level of beings and the possessiveness of rights.

My immediate conclusion might have to contend with the possible argument that man and other animals do engage purposive behavior while plants/AI do not. What this means is that plants neither will, nor intend. Yet, concerning humans, we can distinguish those actions which originate directly in one's own self (or which one wills) from those one neither wills nor originates in one. In other words, we can differentiate 'acts of man' from 'human actions'. Oftentimes, one speaks of 'turning one's head' but some other time speaks of 'one's head turned'. These two strands represent the transitive and non-transitive use of the verb 'turn'. While the phrase 'turning one's head' stands for some behavior or action and thus an activity of one's mind; on the other hand, the parallel 'my head turned', implies that I speak simply of a movement of some part of my body, to wit: my head—which is a mere report of a sheer bodily motion, 'change of position', not action (Pritchard, 1968). The first kind of activity described above is willed, deliberate and therefore an action (act of man). And the second kind, such as blinking, hearing, sneezing, and yawning represents 'human act' (just like plants'). Perhaps this is why Mc Murray (1938) persuasively holds that the term action is ambiguous, (that) "it may refer either to what is done or to the doing of it…either doing or deed."

Thus, will is one's ability "to desire an outcome and to purpose to bring it about…volition" (Blackburn, 399). It means the propensity to act. Although it is possible to originate something, X, without willing it, but X begins to exist as soon as one perceives or becomes conscious of it. Cook Wilson holds that the origination of the thing requires one's willing it such that when one originates a movement of his hand, there is another requirement of his antecedent willing of the origination, and this willing in turn requires the willing or desiring to originate the movement (Pritchard, 1968). Some willing and desiring are biologically, psychologically, even spiritually originated. There is wonder, therefore, the ultimacy or authenticity of one being the origination of one's will. Thus when we think of ourselves as having moved a hand, we are also thinking of ourselves as having performed an activity of a certain kind and a mental activity of a certain kind, an

activity of whose nature we are dimly aware in doing the action and of which we can become more directly aware by reflecting on it. The fact of being aware of this/its special nature is made possible by our understanding, un-hesitantly distinguishing it from other mental activities such as thinking, wondering and imagining. About such an activity, Hume (1999) states "by will I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body or new perceptions of our mind." According to Locke, willing is different from desiring but it is not 'conation' (which is a psychological approach). Agreeably, Thomas Hill Green holds that a species of desiring desires in another sense than that ordinary sense in which we are said to desire while hesitating to act. To him, will is the self-conscious pursuit of a good (Blackburn, 162).

If willing itself is an action, then it is possible to will a willing. Desiring is therefore the willing of a will. Desire is a mark of emotion. Appropriately therefore, let us wrap up that while willing is the propensity to act, desiring involves the propensity to will something or an act, conjecturing that if we were to will X, our willing it might cause some change which we desire for its own sake. These conditions are part of the basis of man's disregard for other natures. Thus in his contention, Cook Wilson associates action with willing, and argues convincingly though that "to will an act as distinguished from the act itself is self-contradiction" (Anscombe, 1968). There are clear illustrations of this reasoning. For example, I will to eat, eating follows; but I will to sneeze, and sneezing does not follow. As against Blackburn (1996), willing is not followed by volitions but by actions, though not every case. The question that looms is: Is willing an action or is it not itself an action? If willing is an action, do we will the willing ad infinitum? However, we must admit that willing could be followed by acting or behaving; but sometimes, we will without having caused any palpable or observable change/behavior. Such is the condition of other natures as plants/AI. AI may lack reasons; they certainly have causes.

From the foregoing, we can conveniently claim that humans are embodiment of emotion: beings that will, desire and intend. These features portend the idea that the human will is free. Against deterministic theorists, philosophers such as Hume claim that human is a body of emotion, and leading to exasperating exaggeration by the likes of Nietzsche that the ultimate goal of man is the will to power. Others observe that willing, desiring and intentionality constitute rationality, which implies the ability for self-functioning and organization (Dubrovsky, 1983: 142); that man is an ethical and psychologically egoistic being; that rational action "is behavior done for reason or purpose of the agent" (Graham, 1996: 109). It is even rational to think that rationality goes beyond psychological egoism to some altruistic considerations. Thus rationality is of different degrees, and could be spurious. This conception implies that coercive activity (including those by non-humans, of kids and the comatose) are out of the category of the rational. Yet, among the rational,

the idea of the ideal compounds the problem already generated by the concepts of motives, willing and desiring.

Yet, this article informs that issues about, between and among species raise questions. If, going by Darwin, humanity evolved from apes and metamorphosed/morphed into its present quality, then racism (though misplaced) is a necessary phase of rational development. And plant kingdom could generate animal kinds (Darwin, 1875). Once it is that plants could generate animals, and animals man, then plants could generate man; this need no further validation. Bergson points out that

…the distinction between intuition and the intellect arose as a result of evolutionary processes….assuming that we are islands of consciousness that are somehow isolated from the world at large. In the history of the species, the instincts were originally our fundamental mode of dealing with world—nature. As the instincts became self-conscious and reflective, they developed into intuition (Lawhead, 2002: 482-483).

Instincts (or intuition) are not peculiar to humans; other (animal) species also do have and employ same. In fact, instincts rule animal kingdom; but some animals could possess higher instincts or be more intuitive than others. For instance, consider the Lion which has the capability to sense some prey at some distance, and moves out of her habitat searching and ambush-in-waiting for any which must eventually emerge. Similarly, apes (such as monkeys) express visible expressions of pain/agony and pleasure/happiness or love, showing again, that such are not unique with humans. How and why then must humans superimpose on other species?

However, the initial move has been righted especially among Western States: animal rights; the second expects to be recognized and taken: concerning plant rights. The current relations where, on the one hand, humans are simply the subjects, and plants, cloned species/AI are, on the other hand, the helpless objects is irrational and untenable since all the parties fall under some specie. It is humanity who considers itself higher-being and thus more rational than others. This is no less than speciesism, a worse condition than racism/discrimination that man detests.

Speciesism is an unnecessary fragmentation of being, and a result of some category mistake. The monists long ago persuasively held that being is one. Yet all of nature's species contain in some bio-diversity, and all involve in some cog or web of symbiotic relations—an essential fact that is being decimated by human excessive activity, with wildlife and the environment being the most hit (as the case of southern and Central America as well as sub-Saharan Africa). Any attempt to fragment all of nature along the lines of specie-superiority leads to the fallacy of discredited/pseudo symbiosis or suppressed ecosystem. Yet speciesism violates the principle of genetic variation, transformation, evolution, and adaptation. If Darwinism is tenable, then man did not found himself; for man therefore to lay claim to his superiority over other animals, plants and AI, it must first of all

discredit the natural order of the universe where waters fall from skies, nurtures plants/nature on which man/animals thrive. It might be wiser for one to remove the log in one's eye first. But that job could be lot easier achieved only where one recognizes the being of other species and accord them their statuses. If racism is segregational, irrational and therefore poses existential threat (a threat to freedom), speciesism is worse existential threat (a threat to nature), just as cloned beings are worst to humanity. If man/science could challenge the plausibility of God's creative act, one expects the worst from AI/computers against man (the threat of climate change and nuclear implosion/explosion is an indicator of this possibility). It might be worse for the West who touts animal freedom, as against Africa where even animals lack rights outside that to die at the whim of man.

Conclusion

This work highlighted the province of being, seen as so elastic but constituted in the whole of nature and the entire universe. Having established the nature of rights, the article also articulates the pedestal for the arrogation of rights to other nature-beings as animals, plants, and AI. Accordingly, some arguments were raised to dispel any philosophical grounding of the obvious disregard for plant/AI worlds. In fact, all of those grounds for such disregard are considered invalid conjectures of species-beings. Hence we referred to it as category mistake—an unnecessary fragmentation of being, since any attempt to fragment it along the lines of specie-superiority leads to the fallacy of discredited symbiosis or suppressed ecosystem.

Consequently, on must acknowledge, to wit, that man is only part of nature; that nature does not need man; but that man needs nature. Nature is replete with everything, including nothingness: the good, the bad, the ugly, and the beautiful; it could make/enhance or destroy any of its elements, including man, depending on men (in his freedom) manipulative ability on it. We conclude that man and other nature forms (including the products made by man) varying levels of observable rights. If man (a part of nature) assumes rights, then AIs (as part of man) do have rights. Once humanity recognizes she has rights, it cannot deny same to nature, her habitat—of which she is a microcosm. Could a fetus have higher rights over its expectant mother? The more general does have overriding right over the particular, not otherwise; yet, if the humanity claim to have right over other natures, then it would not astounded if someday GE and AI does over man. But if humanity would curtail GE and AI, then nature certainly would curtail humanity, ceteris paribus or ceteris tacentibus.

Nature wills; all its parts, therefore, will. Unfortunately, for centuries long, man has, in his ingenuity, willfully, consciously, selfishly abused raped, exploited, degraded or manipulated nature and consciously attempt to decimate it—the only restraint is man's awareness that he is part of it. The ecosystem has not just been battered, but has lost its quality and vitality. Hence man has misused his will and capacity; his destructive trajectory must stop. What the world witnesses now are nature's smaller ways of reminding man of its necessity, in defense of its

being/supremacy (flooding, diseases, wild fires, conflicts, famine/hunger, and hopelessness). And whatever else to be done to remedy the trajectory (including, perhaps, eco-solution ignited by political/ideological will and passion against adverse technology amid interceding/propitiating prayers) must regard the indispensability of nature and its rights.

Man and AIs are equally part of nature. Admittedly, our conclusion about their beings possessing respective rights might seem biased towards (but is also) apprehensive of GE and other AI's potential for counteracting the dehumanizing effect of human's speciesism with respect to being and rights, and the potentially devastating implication of excessive-appropriation of human's natural duties by AIs. But I must add that with such an effective willful relinquishing, man consciously gives up his rights to the next natural course—adulating a super nature in AI and GE. And if man's will is higher than other natures', then this relinquishing is also right; hence man must respect the emergent rights of those natures. But accepting either poses the most existential and ontological threat to humanity and all of nature.

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