

Human Rights, Human Security and Political Theologies

Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela *

Abstract

Human rights, particularly in the form of international human rights law, intersect with religion and peace at foundational levels, as symbolically highlighted by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The Preamble to the Declaration proclaims in its very first line that respect for human dignity is the foundation of peace, and proceeds to declare that freedom of belief, alongside freedom of speech and freedom from fear, are the highest aspirations of humankind. One could similarly highlight the special relationship between the project of human rights, peace and religion, particularly religious tolerance, in the texts of the universal, as well as regional, human rights instruments adopted since 1948, as well as the text of the Charter of the United Nations of 1945.

The relationship between contemporary human rights, on the one hand, and religion and peace on the other, is arguably determined by the structure of international human rights law as a political discourse, which describes the relationship between individuals, society and the State. The visible influence of social contract theory on the wording of the Universal Declaration reminds us that from its inception, the project of human rights is intimately linked to religious diversity (because of the birth of modern sovereignty in European wars of religion and evangelical imperialism) and peace (because of the connection that the Declaration draws between the stability of States and respect for the human dignity of citizens).

Against this known conceptual and historical backdrop, this paper starts with the displacement, at the global level, of human rights by the ambiguous discourse of "human security," since the early 1990s. A general idea is that "human security", which has rapidly evolved to become an organizing principle of policy-making for governments as well as non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations, constitutes an alternative, sometimes deliberately advocated as such, to the discourse of human rights. Although received, and arguably uninformed, commonsense considers human rights as a threat to State sovereignty, the confrontation of human rights with "human security" reveals, first, how human rights is bound to sovereignty

* Professor of Law at Universite du Quebec a Montreal. Email: alorite@aucegypt.edu

and, second, how "human security" refers to political parameters that are foreign to those of the UDHR. In that sense, this paper discusses how the structurally very deep relationship between peace, religion, and the project of equality in diversity promoted within international law by the UDHR is sidelined by the general project of "global governance," to which "human security" has contributed a legitimate basis for disregarding the sovereignty on which human rights depend.

Methodologically, the paper seeks to bring together a structured and coherent conceptual backdrop to the resistance offered more recently by a group of States to the continuous use of "human security" within the United Nations and beyond. This is done through the use of the technical notion of "political theology," which systematizes the foundational place of religion in political discourse by describing political-theoretical language (such as that of the Universal Declaration) as secularized versions of religious worldviews. This allows for a constructive confrontation of human rights and "human security" as parallel political projects, in a way that describes the project of "human security," connected as it is with other strategic concepts of global governance (like the "responsibility to protect"), as a threat to the original architecture of international human rights law. This threat is shown to derive from "human security's" potential hostility to both human rights' international law component (sovereignty) as well as its human rights component (equality in diversity), particularly by associating humanitarian concerns with the passing security concerns of dominant States.

Approaching "Human Security" as an Exotic Discourse

Ever since its official adoption and endorsement by the United Nations Development Program in 1994¹, the expression "human security" has inspired an enormous corpus of academic literature and is still at the basis a variety of programmatic and policy initiatives by both governmental and non-governmental actors.² On the academic side, the expansion of human security references in policy-making circles has opened up opportunities for debate about the relevance and instrumental usefulness of the expression from the specific perspective of disciplines such as international

1. See: UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994*, 1994: 22. A significant use of the expression, however with no further development, occurred in the Agenda for Peace report submitted by the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. See: An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, UN Doc. A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 1992, §16.

2. It is customary to refer illustratively to the human security bibliography prepared by the Harvard Program on Conflict Research in 2001, although the document, as its small introduction signals, does not follow a particular conceptual commitment to what it however refers to as a "contested concept." The bibliography is available on the website at: www.hpcr.org/pdfs/HPCR_-_Bibliography_on_Human_Security_-_2001.pdf. Naturally that document today would be much more extensive.

relations¹, political economy², (Duffield and Waddell, 2006: 1-23) or security studies³, as well as less disciplinarily defined contributions.⁴

This paper engages the idea of human security from the perspective of international law, and tries thereby to highlight two elements of “human security” as a discourse: its political nature and its stabilizing position in the protean political discourse of global governance. To unlock that perspective, the paper suggests two simple gestures: First, juxtaposing “human security” discourse and “human rights” talk; second, framing the comparison against the background of the idea of political theology, that is, the general idea that political concepts of modernity are inherited from particular pre-modern (Judeo-Christian) theological constructions.⁵ These two gestures are the starting point to make sense of the seemingly incoherent or awkward discourse of human security about sovereignty, that is, the archetype of politico-theological concept.

This paper, while feeding on existing critical discussions of human security thinking, suggests that the discourse of human security reveals specific normative depth in contact with an international legal perspective and that, conversely, “human security” sheds a particular light on the properly political nature of human rights. The rise and mainstreaming of human security, whatever its actual effects in practice, result in implicit ideological shifts which, once they are made more apparent, shed contemporary light on the UN Charter’s and Universal Declaration’s strong proposition that the respect for human rights is the basis not only for justice, but also for peace.

Received conceptual commonsense about human security

The most important series of parameters that circumscribe mainstream discussions of “human security”⁶ relate to the historical rooting of the

1. See: McFarlane and Khong, 2006.

2. See also Jorge Nef, 1999.

3. A landmark in discussions about human security within security studies is a series of contribution around the use of the concept of human security for security and strategic studies collected in the *Security Dialogue*, published by International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, Norway. See: Special section: What is Human Security?, 2004.

4. See: Kaldor, 2007.

5. See: Schmitt, 1988: 36.

6. The use of inverted commas denotes a reference to “human security” as an expression and a concept, to distinguish it from human security considered as a phenomenon. There is naturally a connection between the two; the important point is that the inverted commas do not aim at conveying skeptical or even sarcastic distance.

expression, and the variously loose genealogical narratives that accompany the concept everywhere it goes.¹ We can reduce these parameters to two standard definitional tropes. The first, more static dimension of the definition, is the *a contrario* marker: human security is a counterpoint to “national security” (Ewan, 2007: 182) or “State security”² (Thomas and T. Tow, 2002:378) a different or alternative understanding of what security means. The second, more dynamic element lies in the historical narrative of the appearance and slow success story of human security among international policy-makers and practitioners. The two definitional dimensions can be connected by the idea that historical events explain why national security, for instance, gives way to human security.³ But the fact that there may be a disconnect between the two markers or, even more radically speaking, the fact that we may not exactly know what the relationship is between them, has not been an obstacle to the acceptability or spread of the concept.

In terms of historical emergence, everyone knows therefore that human security arises out of economic development policy or/and the domain of conflict resolution/peace building, as an end result of a long process of perfecting stakeholders’ knowledge as to what either economic development really is, or what the relationship between conflict and security is, or both. The two sources of “human security” – development policy and security policy – give rise to an institutionalized dispute about more “vertical” or more “horizontal” versions, based on how much each policy source is privileged.⁴

1. See: McFarlane and Khong, 2006.

2. A thematic line in human security debates is that of not only relating national security and human security (as opposed alternatives, mutually complementary elements of the broader security domain, etc.), but also, as a subset of the antagonistic version of the relationship, considering human security as part of a campaign against the centrality of the State as such.

3. Some have merged again the historical narrative parameter and the analytical opposition with national security by suggesting that the so-called “war on terror” has contributed to the convergence of human and State security. See: Liotta, 2002: 473.

4. Vertical meaning here the notion of downward transformation of the concept of security from the State to the people and particularly the threat of violence that the State posed to, and that people pose to people; whereas horizontal would mean extending security beyond a focus on punctual and/or physical violence to factors of threat to life, health and existential stability more generally. See: McFarlane and Khong, 2006: 248, where the authors defend their vision (focusing on organized violence) as against the trend that they see in the wake of the 1994 UNDP report, down to the 2003 *Human Security Now* report.

On one side, given its official endorsement and, at least for some time, promotion by UNDP, the rooting of human security in development thinking and practice makes it the outcome of the linear conceptual trajectory that leads from growth-based conceptions of development, to social development, to sustainable development, to human development, to human security.¹ The process of growth is marked by the sequenced expansion of “development” to include at each juncture a new element, overlooked up to that moment as a factor in the proper measurement, and therefore definition of “development”. Just as sustainable development reaches out to the environment and future generations² human security reaches out to the question of political stability and more generally broader environmental sources of threats (or “clusters of threats”) to the standard of living or way of life.³

From the other side of the debate, human security is said to be concerned with forms of political instability that impact on the well-being of people – regardless of “development” concerns. In that sense, security has a human component in at least two obvious ways: States are a source of insecurity for ordinary people, and some people are a factor of insecurity for both people and States.⁴ The literature on human security has been said to be unfruitfully obsessed with the difference between this last formulation and the previous, more development-oriented, one.⁵ But

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1. The best account of that unlinear narrative, probably due to its critical frame, is provided by Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell in “Securing Humans in a Dangerous World”, *International Politics*, 43 (2006), at 5 ff.
 2. Sustainable development was famously defined by the Brundtland Commission as implying “meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” *Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development*, UN Doc. A/RES/42/187, 11 December 1987, Annex, Chapter 3.
 3. An example of that perspective, reaching out from development to political stability, is generally the one that is taken in the central “human security” issue of “HIV/AIDS as a security problem”. See: *HIV/AIDS and Security*, UNAIDS Factsheet, August 2003, available at: data.unaids.org/Topics/Security/fs_security_en.pdf (accessed December 20, 2008). See also, similarly, but from the perspective of a major NGO, International Crisis Group, *HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue*, Issues Report N°1 19 June 2001, available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1831> (accessed December 20, 2008).
 4. This vision, focusing on the threat of both public and private forms of violence, would be associated with the “narrow” vision of human security. For a succinct discussion by an important architect of that vision as a policy-making tool. See: Axworthy, 2001: 19-23.
 5. See: Ewan, 2007: 182–189.

both seem to find a common object of concern in the notion of State failure, which is associated with rising insecurity for people, whether the State is unable or unwilling to enhance the security of people.¹

As one observer put it more succinctly, “human security” emerges as the meeting point of development and war.² But given the by now canonical distinction between “broad” and “narrow” versions of “human security” – loosely speaking, more development- or more conflict-oriented – it is possible to see it as the overlapping intersection of a broader understanding of security and a broader understanding of development.³

The more visible way in which “human security” is a floating signifier is in this institutionalized division between “broad” version, associated with the Government of Japan⁴, and narrow versions, promoted by the Government of Canada.⁵ The uncertainty about the

1. As usefully presented by a commentator coming initially from a military perspective:

The [human security] paradigm calls attention to the broad spectrum of different kinds of deprivation and thus can help identify the ties that are broken in situations of conflict. It can assist in identifying what must be restored, rebuilt, or replaced to achieve stability and peace. These ties, at various levels, are particularly and profoundly fractured in those cases of tragedy now labeled “failed states.” These would seem to be egregiously in need of the features in any vision of human security, and typically are characterized by profound deprivation: little economic security, food security, or health security. A deteriorating natural environment also characterizes some. Most are notorious for sectarian violence or seething ethnic tensions. Any reference to human rights typically is almost laughable, with rampant, predatory criminality, abuse of women and the most vulnerable individuals, and warlordism. Personal and community security tends to be tenuous at best. Failed and failing states are relational catastrophes with environmental, economic, and social dimensions. (Henk, 2005: 102)

2. See: Mark, Waddell, 2006: 6.

3. See: Wilkin, 2000: 638.

4. The explicit goal of “dissemination” of the concept of human security by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/sector/security/action.html>). Japan’s commitment to “human security”, from which it approached the 2008 G-8 summit in Hokkaido, is visible in the framing of its foreign aid policy. See: Diplomatic Bluebook 2006, Chapter 3, entitled “Efforts to Tackle Various Global Challenges to Promote Human Security”, Available at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2006/index.html>.

5. Canada is most famously behind such central “human security” initiative as the Canadian Consortium on Human Security (<http://www.humansecurity.info>), the Human Security Centre at the Simon Fraser University in Vancouver BC (<http://www.humansecurityreport.info/>), or the Human Security Network (<http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/network-e.php>). The Canadian vision of “Human Security” is best illustrated by the writings of Lloyd Axworthy, See: Axworthy, 2001: 19-23.

meaning of “human security” is moreover the object of fierce debate among IR and security scholars, among whom not everyone is convinced that the concept does either mean anything, or serve any purpose.¹ None of this has however prevented the extremely successful destiny of the concept, manifest in the existence, on a global scale, of academic journals of human security,² inter-governmental networks on human security³, or such high profile initiatives as the UN Trust Fund for Human Security, created with support from the Government of Japan.⁴ It could certainly be said that the apparent fluidity of the concept, fueled by a continuous discussion about its contents, is one of the reasons allowing for that explosion of activity.⁵

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1. On the utility of the concept and how to frame it for it to be useful to IR studies, See: Petman, 2005: 137–150 and Paris, 2005: 479–81. For a more skeptical view about the operational distinctness or even existence of the “human security” paradigm as an alternative approach to security, See: Chandler, 2008: 427.
 2. Visit the website of the Journal of Human Security at <http://www.rmitpublishing.com.au/jhs.html>; and the website of the *Revue de la sécurité humaine/ Human Security Review*, published by the CERJ Program for Peace and Human Security at the IEP (Sciences Po) Paris, Available at: www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr/journal/.
 3. To the already mentioned Human Security Network sponsored by the Canadian government, we should add its Japanese counterpart, the Friends of Human Security. See presentation and documents on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/friends/index.html (accessed 20 December 2008).
 4. The website of the Fund is hosted by the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs at the United Nations. See: <http://ochaonline.un.org/Home/tabid/2097/Default.aspx>.
 5. Interestingly, the irrelevance of the conceptual fluidity or contestation is well manifested in two significant attitudes towards it by policy-makers. One attitude is sheer dismissal of the floating nature of the term and lack of properly or consensually circumscribed referent; the other is that of embracing the splits and differences as if they did not prevent actual policy-making or field work. The first one is the known attitude of the Human Security Report Project, which publishes the Human Security Report; in defending the Centre’s adoption of the narrow version of human security, they state: “*Scholarly debate is a normal part of the evolution of new concepts, but it is of little interest to policymakers*” (*Human Security Report 2005*, at viii). The second attitude is that of the Swiss Government, which states on the website of its Department of Foreign Affairs:
Two different – but not contradictory – interpretations of the term exist. In the broader interpretation, poverty, hunger, disease and natural disasters constitute just as grave a security risk as armed conflicts. In its narrower definition the term means the protection of the individual from threats such as violent conflicts, human-rights violations, arbitrary power, landmines, sexual violence, internal displacement and people-trafficking. Switzerland’s foreign policy takes account of both these interpretations.
Available at: <http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/peasec/sec/humsec.html> (accessed on 20 December 2008).

The structural centerpiece of human security discussions today is occupied by the 2003 report *Human Security Now* produced by the Commission on Human Security.¹ That report, in the fast production line of global reports, follows closely the equally over-cited 2001 *Responsibility to Protect* report and preceded the 2004 *A More Secure World* report, adopted by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and the High Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, respectively. The relationship among those different reports lies in the clarification of the apparent common line, suggested by cross-referencing, would be. The argument has been advanced that an important function of the concept of “human security” is its slogan-like power of interconnection of themes and agglomeration of stake-holders²; a cursory look at the literature shows that “human security” can be associated with the development of international humanitarian law after the cold war, the creation of international criminal tribunals, and so-called humanitarian intervention, but also natural disasters³ and the outbreak of epidemics.⁴ Certainly, there seemingly lies an assumption that all these have something or another to do with “humans” and with “security”, regardless of whether one eventually adheres, for philosophical or policy-making preferences, to a broader or narrower version of what that really means. However, the vagueness of the concept and its federalizing power is paradoxically more manifest in the concept’s chief ambiguity: is “human security” a counterpart of national security? Or does “human security” replace state security? Or is human security a larger version of state security? Does human security contribute to state security while being substantially independent? These unanswered questions suggest that “human security” plays the important functional role of potentially

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1. Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, New York (2003), Available at: <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/index.html>.
 2. This is a theme pursued by the authors of *Human Security at the UN*, *supra*. More critically, again, the idea that human security is an organizing concept that “crosses boundaries” is explored in Mark Duffield, 2008.
 3. See: Glasius, 2006: 353-378; Thakur, 2005, (“*The suffering and death inflicted by last December’s tsunami and Hurricane Katrina shows the need to reframe security in human terms*”).
 4. See the work of the NGO Helsinki Process on “human security”, which takes a middle-ground approach to human security, adding threats posed by epidemics to small arms circulation, child soldiers or violence against women. Helsinki Process, *Empowering People at Risk: Human Security Priorities for the 21st Century*, Working Paper for the Helsinki Process Report of the Track on “Human Security” (2005), Available at: <http://www.helsinki.fi/netcomm/ImgLib/53/>.

instrumentalizing State security for the humanitarian benefit of the “people¹.” The 2005 *Human Security Report* (then published by the Human Security Centre at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver) summarizes well the contrast between rhetorical saturation and conceptual fluidity by taking the position that academic debates about the contents of human security are eventually pointless.²

The Discourse of Human Security on Human Rights

The relationship between *Human Security Now* and the *Responsibility to Protect* is intuitively sufficiently obvious for them to be often cited together, and for the first to refer to the second, and for subsequent reports to cite both.³ The correlation becomes however more concrete if we consider how accounts of “human security”, ever since the *Human Security Now* report, include considerations on the very notion of sovereignty and changes undergone by the institution of sovereignty – the chief topic of R2P.⁴ The sense of obviousness with which the relationship between sovereignty and human security is received is not however matched by conceptual clarity. The definition of human security given by the Commission on Human Security is the following:

[T]o protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms— freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity. (*Human Security Now* report, 2003: 4)

Among the many obvious oddities of that statement, one can simply note that the definition has no subject or agent: someone is to be

1. See: McFarlane and Khong, 2006: 148. (Where the authors argue that “human security” was also a way of appropriating resources by claiming a high level of priority, embodied by questions of security, for development matters).

2. *Human Security Report 2005*.

3. Both “human security” and the “responsibility to protect” are used on the first page of the High-Level Panel’s 2004 report, in a boxed segment entitled “Towards a new security consensus.”

4. See: McFarlane and Khong, 2006: 23.

protected, but who does the protecting? This is certainly reminiscent of the diffusion of responsibility in R2P, but becomes more significant if we add that the definition does not contain any reference to either human rights and or sovereignty. A more detailed textual analysis of the Report would show that it deals with the relationship between human rights and human security in a confusing manner: human security either enhances human rights,¹ or encompasses human rights,² or else both have common goals but the latter is broader than the former.³

That human rights are treated so casually must be related to the fact that sovereignty is, apparently, not immediately central to the definition of human security either. This is significantly paradoxical because in all discussions about human security one can see or sense the nearby presence of the *Responsibility to protect*, which is itself (based on) a reassessment of sovereignty, as the name of its authoring body suggests. Maybe the most significant signal comes in the *Responsibility to Protect* report, when in the very first pages the Commission announces that:

the conditions under which sovereignty is exercised – and intervention is practised – have changed dramatically since 1945. Many new states have emerged and are still in the process of consolidating their identity. Evolving international law has set many constraints on what states can do, and not only in the realm of human rights. The emerging concept of human security has created additional demands and expectations in relation to the way states treat their own people. And many new actors are playing international roles previously more or less the exclusive preserve of states. (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001: 8)

Given the confusing (or deliberately loose) relationship between national security and human security, it is only natural that the position of the State in the conceptual or policy universe of human security will be equally wavering. All this serves only to highlight that available mainstream discussions of human security do not seem to be troubled by these questions at a conceptual level.

1. See: *Human Security Now* report, 2003: 2.

2. See: *Human Security Now* report, 2003: 4.

3. See: *Human Security Now* report, 2003: 10.

Political theology: Political Monotheism of International Human Rights

The larger conceptual universe of “human security” is that of the political discourse of global governance, in which human security finds a place next to R2P, but also for instance sustainable development.¹ Governance, for our limited purposes, means something like governing without government, governing without a central supreme authority; and “global” means that the space of reference is defined by the jurisdictional limits that organize the world into separate spheres of territorial jurisdiction and a famed “plane of international law” where inter-State relations take place.² In other words, global governance is governing without reference to the fact that all source of political authority for individuals derives from the State, alone or in association with other States.

“Political theology” as an expression refers, as noted above, to the borrowing by political thought of conceptual constructions from pre-modern theological rationalizations, but also, more normatively, to the process of secularization that renders the “political theology” hypothesis enlightening for liberalism.³ The centerpiece of the political theology thesis is the figure of the sovereign, and its relationship to the subject/object of sovereign power; that relationship is there seen as a secularized version of the relationship between the God of monotheism to humans, variously referred to the absolute law-giver and law-enforcer.⁴

It can be said here that human rights law, as a political framework, is deeply associated to that image of political power. Human rights are seen as constitutive of the relationship between the sovereign and the legal subject of that sovereign considered as absolute law-giver and law-enforcer; schematically speaking, that relationship is highlighted by liberal social contract theory, conceived as a secularized version of the revelation that brings about the reign of divine law. Human rights, conceived as “fundamental” rights within the domestic scope of sovereign jurisdiction,

1. The most intriguing alternative to the idea of human security’s relationship to global governance presented by Lloyd Axworthy may be that pursued by Professor Mark Duffield. See: Duffield, 2008; Duffield, 2001.

2. See: International Court of Justice, *Nottebohm case*, 1955 *ICJ Reports* 4, excerpted in 22 *International Law Reports* 349 (1956).

3. See: Schmitt, 1988: 36. For a detailed examination of the political theology thesis in the thought of Schmitt, with an emphasis on its relationship with Schmitt’s antiliberalism, See: Vatter, 2004: 161-214.

4. See: Schmitt, 1988: 36.

mark precisely the contour of the scope and the normative limits of sovereign power, whether their origin is otherwise deemed to be divine, legal, or social or any combination of those.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) expresses the deep connection between sovereignty and human rights by resorting to the received language of liberal social contract theory, visible in the Preamble's justificatory narrative of human rights' entrance in international law.¹ As such, international human rights law is founded on State sovereignty and cannot possibly, from a legal perspective, be understood as being situated in opposition to it. In a way, the Universal Declaration could then be reconstructed as the international version of the logic of many State constitutions, where the limits to the power of State organs are sanctioned by the monitoring activity of judicial (although sometimes also executive or legislative) institutions in charge of so-called constitutional (or judicial) review against a charter of fundamental rights – here the political process of intergovernmental relations is used for the purposes of having States remind one another of the basic idea that the dignity of human beings marks the boundary of State power.

Political theology is moreover closely associated to the definition of the sovereign as the overseer of normalcy and exceptionality, that is, the figure of the sovereign as the border between law and non-law.² The provocatively stated background idea is that the exception is as central to sovereignty as the miracle is to theology, from the notion that the real power of the God-sovereign is shown in its unique ability to be in control of the order of things so as to be uniquely able to suspend it.³ The question of "exception", materialized more dramatically in the issue of the "state of exception", lies behind the notion that, as Hannah Arendt famously put it, the first human right is the "right to have rights"⁴ simply because the process of construction of international human rights law generates divisions and exclusions.⁵ The most dramatic case, as signaled

1. The first three preambular paragraphs, reaching the political climax with the statement that "*it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law*" could be seen as displaying a subtle logic that echoes for international law the statement of the (religiously inspired) social contract grounding of the American Declaration of Independence.

2. See: Schmitt, 1988: 5.

3. See: Schmitt, 1988: 36.

4. See: Arendt, 1958: 298.

5. See: Noll, 2003.

by Arendt, is the constitutive exclusion of refugees, determined generically to be human beings precisely missing a sovereign in charge of acknowledging their rights. The founding of human rights law thus results after 1945 in the creation of separate body of international norms for refugees, distinct from, but with complicated relations to, human rights law. Refugees represent in that sense the “end of the rights of man”, as Arendt put it, given that the presence of millions of refugees seemed to mock the pretensions of the UDHR.¹ The seeming paradox comes from the fact that the forms of international law appear thus at times to be ill-suited to the impatient absolutism of human rights values considered in abstraction from their legal form.

Structurally, the problem is repeated in contemporary episodes, in which seeming manipulations of the fundamental forms of international law seem to some an insult to the very project of protecting human dignity (Guantánamo’s legal construction as an extra-legal space², the *Tampa*’s sovereign abandonment in non-sovereign space³, the preemptive exclusion of would-be asylum seekers⁴, and so on). In all these cases, human beings are shown to be facing the ultimate power of the God-like sovereign(s), that of denying them (legal) existence. The silver lining or flip-side of the exclusionary dynamic of international human rights is that it serves also as the basis for the expansion of its reach, through the constructive dialogue that is essential to its particular functions.⁵ The more recent and much belated adoption of the UN Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities is certainly illustrative of what is at stake in the project of consolidating human rights as part of the process of international relations.

The notion of political theology allows in all these cases to insist that international human rights law be seen as a political project attached to the figure of the sovereign, a theological derivative showing its true nature in the power of abandonment.⁶ Clearly, the discourse of human rights makes human dignity dependent on the existence and the necessarily

1. See: Arendt, 1958: 267.

2. See: Steyn, 2004: 1-15.

3. See: Bailliet, 2003: 741-774.

4. *Regina v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and another (Respondents) ex parte European Roma Rights Centre and others (Appellants)*, [2004] UKHL 55.

5. See: Rancière, 2004: 297-310.

6. For the relationship between the social contract image and the notion of sovereign ban or abandonment, See: Agamben, 1998: 104-111.

extreme power of the sovereign as a borderline figure that both creates law and is a creature of the law that it creates.¹

Human Security: Glimpses of a Political Theology of Global Governance

Contemporary human rights law has certainly a complex relationship with the idea of emancipation, framed by its complicated (and contested) affiliation with political liberalism.² The fact that human rights are rights of humans, or rights of the human, refers implicitly to a triangular relationship between right-bearer, duty-bearer, and interests covered by the right-duty relationship. The association of human rights with a social contract narrative of legitimate political authority, as in the UDHR, is therefore useful in bringing up the notion that the interests covered by those rights pre-exist the formation of the political authority, whatever their ultimate source may be. The formation of the central authority, the supreme law-giver, serves the purpose of protecting the rights of participants in the contractual process against the threats posed by human condition itself in the “state of nature”. The moment when political society is formed and the “state of nature” is abandoned marks the constitutive moment of inclusion/exclusion, and that moment is reiterated in the development of human rights law, every time the recognition or expansion of human rights norms is favored or hampered through legal interpretation.

The state of nature remains as the condition of those not included in the polity, and as agreed upon by various contractarians, it is the condition prevalent among the various polities formed by different peoples.³ The state of nature is, whether among humans or Princes, a condition of existential insecurity; and the state of nature is abolished by political society only in a metaphorical sense, because (despite common empiricist and racist slips by contractarians) it serves less as an empirical

1. As Schmitt says it, “a borderline concept is not a vague concept, but one pertaining to the outermost sphere”.

2. A famous discussion on the potential for emancipation of human rights can be found in Karl Mark, *On the Jewish Question*, See: Tucker, 1978: 26-52.

3. In the words of Hobbes, “...*though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Sovereaign authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in a state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours, which is a posture of War.*” See: Thomas Hobbes, 1996: 90.

necessity than as the legitimating counter-image of centralized political society based on contractual delegation, with all the dark sides that the legitimating function carries along with it.¹

Human security is a discourse about humans and about security. As mentioned before, even though human security is supposed to mark a shift in the “referent” of security, from State to humans, it is clear that “human” in human security means both security of humans and the human factor in security, that is, security from humans. For some, by associating development and security, the discourse of human security participates in the general outlook that depicts poverty and underdevelopment as dangerous, that is, as breeding grounds for insecurity for all.² This certainly takes us back to the dialectical relationship that social contract sees between prosperity and security.³ More generally, associating humans and security invokes again the specter of those times when being human – or simply human among simple humans – was in itself risky. Associating the concern for the security of/from humans with the image of the state of nature sets, if only as a preliminary matter, a basic contrast between human rights and “human security”: the human of human security is not considered as problematically fragmented in public and private sides, a legal and non-legal dimension, a political and a natural existence.

As a background proposition, it could be said that the language of human security is a language of confusion, a language that is apparently dismissive of analytic distinctions. As proposed above, analytic distinctions are the heart and soul of the operation of human rights, with all the problems that the risks of legalism and formalism carry for human rights as a would-be political discourse.⁴ The holistic reach of “human security” is connected to the already mentioned discussions about the proper circumscription of the concept and its federalizing power; others have simply described the adoption of the fluidly all-encompassing human security agenda as a means of concealing the absence of any real political and security vision.⁵ This critique highlights comfort in confusion, fluidity, and polysemy as more than sloppiness, whether it is seen from the perspective of political realism or human rights legalism: it

1. See: Henderson, 1997: 11-38.

2. See: Mark Duffield, 2007.

3. See: Locke, 1980: 29.

4. See: Kennedy, 200: 101; Koskeniemi, 1999: 99-116.

5. See: Chandler, 2008: 463-469.

points to a particular political construction of the world within which the idea of human security and its evolving practice make sense, even though that image may be assumed or half-conscious.

The relationship envisaged by human security is alien to the image of political theology with which (positivist) human rights law is associated. The relationship envisaged by “human security” is not between a legal subject and a law-giver, as that relationship appears in all jurisdictional clauses of international human rights instruments. As seen in the *Human Security Commission’s* definition, the agent of human security (who produces human security) is not really clear; but the counterpart, the receiver, the interlocutor, is not really clearly visible either, even though the slogan “put people first” supposedly concretizes the paradigmatic shift in security “referents”. The haunting relationship between the “responsibility to protect” and human security does therefore not lie in whether we endorse its Canadian or Japanese version, but rather in the fact that they are both connected in the reappraisal of sovereignty, which is the foundation of “R2P” (sovereignty as responsibility, as opposed to sovereignty as supremacy). As opposed to human rights discourse, which frames the political relationship between humans and their delegated sovereign with the help of the social contract assumption, “human security” takes this presupposition as its very object, which naturally results in the dissolution of both sovereign and legal subject as the relevant interlocutors.

R2P consists in the extraction of the question of human rights and sovereignty from its legal environment, for the purpose of producing a devious image of sovereignty that is then undermined through the instrumentalization of human rights.¹ The complicated Kosovo strand of human security, decisively officialized in the now thriving R2P industry, boils down to the initial move of pitting morality against formal legality², then generalized as a displacement of the link between international legality and sovereignty, in favor of a focus on the connection between

1. This notion is particularly well represented by the narrative given in *Human Security and the UN*, where the authors provide a unilinear narrative where the development of human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as international criminal law through international criminal tribunals and courts, is interpreted as a long march against the traditional concept of sovereignty. This is the fastest way of connecting R2P and human security, if we do not want to pay attention to the legal and political-theoretical nuances that are crushed by that type of sweeping and epic narrative.

2. See: Koskenniemi, 2002: 159-175.

legitimacy and sovereignty. This shift is arguably the most important conceptually speaking, in that it explains, from the perspective of international law, the expansion of the whole industry of human security and R2P as much more coherent and revolutionary than the simple ideas of a return to natural law, or just war theory, or even very uncritical notions of imperialism.

Article 2(1) of the UN Charter, the cornerstone of the whole Charter edifice, does not mean anything significantly complicated if approached in isolation. If commentators have generally focused on Article 2(4) of the Charter (the prohibition of the use of force), the key shift is at the level of Article 2(7) (*domaine réservé*), in its relationship with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Focusing on Article 2(4) is the source of the superficial question of “broad” versus “narrow” conceptions of human security, based on the unmistakable (yet forcefully repressed) primary focus of the *Responsibility to Protect* on military action. The 2001 report serves however as a basis for human security by extracting the logic of Article 2(7) and the Security Council’s practice in the 1990s out of the constitutional framework of the Charter. The legitimacy of the Security Council’s much debated interpretive practice flows from the treaty-based (and social contract-like) power to overcome sovereign borders on the basis of: the formal delegation of Article 24(1)¹, the equally formal proviso of Article 2(7)², the executive regulatory power granted by Article 25³, as well as the seemingly limitless interpretive power of Article 39.⁴ This framework is the basis for the utterance that a particular humanitarian catastrophe is indeed a threat to peace and security; appeal to human rights, however appealing, is in this context purely cosmetic. The

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1. Article 24(1) says: “In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”
 2. Article 2(7) says: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”
 3. Article 25 says: “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”
 4. Article 39 says: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

legitimacy of any application of Article 2(7)'s proviso is grounded in formal legality – whatever the Security Council says is the law by the sheer operation of Articles 25 and 39 of the Charter, however extreme that proposition may sound in times of both Security Council's overreach and Security Council's paralysis. The NATO action and subsequent R2P theorizing pits legitimacy against legality, by extracting the substance of the Security Council action from the framework within which the (moral or immoral) substance is given international legitimacy (usually called legality). The operation of international law's arguably annoying formal limits is thereby deemed illegitimate on grounds of its obstruction of justice. The radical nature of that move may be thought to lie in its tempting assimilation to civil disobedience. The move is however much more radical than that in that it is a gesture of rebellion against law as such, for the apparent and only immediate purpose of resisting the operation of an unjust norm, Article 27(3) of the Charter.¹

Arguably, the solidity of the political theology model lies in the strict differentiation between the internal jurisdictional sphere and the plane of international law, which makes it so innocuous or tolerable to strictly positivist international law.² R2P legitimates the operation of shadow Security Councils, meaning States playing to be the Security Council and believing that they actually are the Security Council; this destroys the formal distinction between “internal” and “international”, in as much as this scenario (unilateral/multilateral intervention in the domestic realm) is why we have the Article 2(7) proviso in the first place. R2P, under the guise of formal requirements for “legitimacy”, is really a turn to moral substance – the moral substance of States, whatever that may be – which provides the façade for an intervention that in the end will be legitimated only by the superior force of the intervener. In that perspective, the 1999 attack on Belgrade is not that different from the 2003 attack on Baghdad.

From the perspective of political theology, and from the perspective of

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1. Article 27(3) says: “Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.”
 2. There are complicated relationships between the political theology idea, the borderline figure of the sovereign, and the notion of an essentially liberal international order, even in Schmitt's work itself. Among many interpretations of how Schmitt's varied slogan-like contributions can help clarify the post-Cold War moment of ultra-sovereigns and under sovereigns, See: Weigel, 2006: 61-76.

social contract theorizing, the sovereign is tied to a border, the border between inside and outside, internal and international, just as it is tied to the operation of the distinction between law and non-law, between the normal and the exceptional.¹

Human rights represent, in their strong connection with sovereignty, the operation of normalcy or even the constitution of normalcy, as in the fact that the state of emergency is precisely seen in international law as an “exception” because of the normal operation of human rights norms.² Human security moves the “human” back into the state of nature, precisely characterized as the state of insecurity, permanent risk or permanent threat, that marks the border of the Leviathan. Human security therefore focuses, quite naturally, on the security of humans in the absence of the sovereign: it properly constitutes the objective and object of governance, just as much as human rights (or fundamental rights) can be seen as the object of contractarian government.³ Human security thus conceived supports coherently the supposedly divergent Canadian and Japanese versions: it draws attention, as far as the former is

1. Here also, there are complicated connections to be made between social contract theory and the notion of a secularized absolute law-giver in the figure of the sovereign. Again, for present purposes, general considerations will be sufficient, even though the details of social contract theory would certainly yield more complications. To start off the discussion, Hobbes’ understanding of the sovereign and the nature of the contract that ties it to its subjects and that extracts them from the state of nature, See: E. Merriam, 1906: 7-151.

2. Article 4 of ICCPR says:

In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.

Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms says:

In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.

3. In Locke, the purpose of the Commonwealth is to preserve the “lives, liberties, and estates” of the individuals who contract into it, although as is known Locke puts emphasis on the protection of private property, which is particularly threatened in the state of nature. See: Locke, 1980: 65.

concerned, to levels of instability or violence that threaten the security promised in State-based societies¹;

and, as far as the latter is concerned, to the artificial distinction between the variety of factors that affect human beings' existential security, particularly the distinction between social, political, and natural factors.²

The backdrop of R2P is foregrounded in the image of the sovereign not fulfilling its promise of putting an end to the state of insecurity, otherwise known as the state of nature. From there we reach immediately the structurally unavoidable obsession of human security discourse with the question of failed or failing States.³ In the move from constitutionally

1. The Human Security Report 2005 discusses the expansion of focus to cover a variety of forms of violence, and says very interestingly that: "*Political violence is a term that embraces more than simply war, genocide and terrorism. It also encompasses state repression: torture; extrajudicial, arbitrary and summary executions; the 'disappearance' of dissidents; the use of death squads; and incarceration without trial. All of these are as much part of the human security agenda as they are of the human rights agenda.*" (at 65).
2. Snapshots from *Human Security Now* (at 6-7) summarize that position best: Human security thus broadens the focus from the security of borders to the lives of people and communities inside and across those borders.... Human security is concerned with violent conflict. For whatever form violence takes, whether terrorism or crime or war, violence unseats people's security.... Human security is also concerned with deprivation: from extreme impoverishment, pollution, ill health, illiteracy and other maladies.... Each menace, terrible on its own, justifies attention. Yet to address this range of insecurities effectively demands an integrated approach. That approach would keep the full range of human deprivation in view, for all people. It would attend not only to the protection of refugees from ongoing violence—but also to their health and livelihoods. It would concentrate on the provision of basic education to the poor—but also on basic education that is safe, that strengthens civil society and that creates tolerant societies. It would not focus on peace to the exclusion of development or on the environment to the exclusion of security. Instead, it would have a spectrum of basic variables in full view.
3. A particularly illustrative, though perhaps extreme, example of outright association of human security and State failure can be found in a *Carnegie Endowment* brief: Conceptually, a consensus is developing around two ideas. First, interventions in weak states should start early, before the states begin to fail: prevention is, as usual, better than cure. Second, state weakness and impending failure must not be judged solely on the basis of the problems that threaten the security of the state, for example the existence of armed movements or high levels of ethnic strife. It must also be judged by conditions that threaten the physical integrity, welfare, self-determination, and opportunities of citizens—in other words, human security. The state's inability to deliver services or to institute the rule of law is as problematic, and potentially as threatening, a source of failure as is the state's inability to maintain secure borders or a monopoly over the means of coercion.

organized political society, we witness the reappearance of the state of nature, the progressive dissolution of political societies, and the correspondingly progressive sliding of their constituencies back into the nasty, brutish and short life of insecurity. In other words, from monotheistic political theology it would be tempting to say that we move to a political theology of atheism – the kind of atheism that Spanish conquistadores may have deemed disturbing when deciding how to treat the New World’s dwellers.

Biopolitics of Human Security: The Political Theology of Global Governance

The state of nature is an ideological construction. It has been appropriately described as a tool of imperial self-justification, and occupies a constitutive position in liberal imperialism.¹ The *mission civilisatrice* ideology is not an anomaly of liberal politics, and neither is therefore the enduring life of the expression “civilized nation”, astonishingly still used today. If we turn to human security, we can notice that the insistence on States providing security to people, and on the problem of the incapacity of States to do so, does not refer to all States. There is certainly a mass of evidence to suggest that the focus of the literature is primarily, and close to exclusively, on the loosely conceived “Global South”. The ideological importance of the anxiety about “black holes” of insecurity resides in the fact that we are here devising a mode of coexistence between “effective States” and “ineffective States”.² Human security, with its inner narrative of a looming state of nature, is in its normative function the framework for the relationship between them, or rather the framework for the engagement of failing States by effective States, thereby giving rise to a newly relevant type of global border.

The ideological mechanism of human security is very typically constructed on the circular relationship between a descriptive and a normative side. This appears in the insistently non political nature of human security discourse and practice, which is very busy devising and discussing variously complicated and objective measurements of humans’ security.³

1. See: Sakej, 1997: 11-38.

2. See: Duffield, 2006: 122.

3. Again, the Human Security Report 2005 is very helpful in providing glimpses of the puzzling world of human security research, especially the type of research that →

Given that the general idea behind the enterprise is that sovereignty is fading, the whole discourse legitimates its own disregard for sovereignty which it defines as fading based on the indicators that it will use for the measurement of human security, itself an implicit gauge of the level of State failure. It follows that the atheistic outlook on those newly savage societies is not the outlook of the still strongly monotheistic societies who have kept their own law-giver. It is in that sense that the new border is constituted, between effective and failing States, a border that runs generally on an East-West line, but that is however significantly mobile.¹ The existence of the border suggests the existence of a new sovereign and new forms of sovereignty.² The important point is the fact that it is not a territorial or more generally spatial border, but rather a political border, the border along which runs an authority that fixes the limit between the normal and the abnormal, or the exceptional. Global governance, understood as the governance of the globe without a global government, occurs on that border, in the relationship between those

←discards academic debates. Here is a long quote, provided for illustration, but which would deserve textual analysis:

Is it possible to combine indicators of this kind into a single composite human security index? The short answer is that it is certainly not currently possible, and that it is probably not desirable. There are a number of practical challenges. The most serious is that the existing datasets used to measure human insecurity are not comprehensive enough— and many are not updated annually. Data on homicide and rape are missing for most of the least secure countries in the world and there are no global data on indirect deaths—those deaths caused by disease and the lack of food, clean water and health care that result from war. Moreover, even if it were possible to create a single composite human security index, it is not clear that doing so would be desirable. ... Aggregating very different measures—death rates and rankings of human rights violations, for example—also raises difficult questions about how to weight the different measures when combining them. And while providing useful insights into the least secure countries, such measures are not very useful for determining the most secure countries, the majority of which are found in the developed world. Here the difficulty is that there is not much insecurity to measure. By definition, highly secure countries rarely experience warfare, so very few suffer battle-related deaths. And human rights measures for some of the most secure countries are also missing from the Political Terror Scale dataset. The World Bank instability indicator does include the more secure industrialised countries, but it is too narrow to serve as a useful measure on its own. Differentiating among countries that are not afflicted by war, are highly stable politically and have very low levels of political repression is extraordinarily difficult.

1. See: Pugh, 2004: 39-58.

2. Duffield uses the term “contingent sovereignty” as the new notion of sovereignty that allows for the new North/South relationship ultimately supported by the notion of “human security”. See: Duffield, 2006: 66.

two universes.¹ In that sense, the political theology of global governance is one of polytheism rather than monotheism or atheism, given that the authority of the planetary law-givers and their legitimacy is always temporary, and is recomposed at each juncture and for each borderline issue.

This brings us to a last consideration, to make sense of the structural ambiguity of human security as being both security of humans and security from humans. The relationship between humanness and security is nowadays generally approached through the lens of biopower or biopolitics, or the inclusion of biological life, its continuation, health, multiplication and perfection, within the realm of political action.² Michel Foucault outlined biopower as the technology of power defined by the objective of control (as opposed to discipline, for instance) and organized in *dispositifs* of “security”.³ The logic of human security discourse is unmistakably biopolitical, as the definition of human security in the 2003 report signals quite plainly. From that perspective, the distinction between security of humans and security from humans is meaningless. Punctual decision-making at the global level can certainly relate to protection of the population’s health, but it can do so for the sake of protecting one population’s health against the threats posed by the neighboring population’s lack thereof. That the techniques of global governance are biopolitical or that a variety of techniques interconnect as a technology of biopower is well illustrated by the many ways in which threats are associated with movement or mobility of factors of destabilization. The ambiguity of the “security of” versus “security from”, that is, the conceptual underpinning of the ambiguous relationship between State security and human security, is well expressed in the typical categories in which the concern over life fit within human security projects. One of the prime objects of attention for human security as proposed already by the Commission on Human Security in 2003 is refugees, the ultimate outcasts of human rights; it is however not surprising that the category of the “refugee”, a legal construction, is therein merged within the broader category of “people on the move” – a category that deliberately disregards heretofore fundamental legal distinctions, thereby constructing a mass crystallizing all threats solely on

1. See: Duffield, 2006: 79.

2. See: Foucault, 1976: 178.

3. See: Foucault, 2004: 7-8.

the basis of its mobile existence.¹ Following the canonical description of parameters that distinguish biopolitical mechanisms from sovereign power, we find here the archetypal attention to populations rather than individuals.² And another textbook implementation of biopolitical gaze will appear in human security concern about epidemics, and the particular place of HIV/AIDS in the panorama of threats to populations and, through them, States. The security *dispositifs* which organize biopower have as a primary driving force the need to control risk and stabilization of uncertain environments, or *milieux*, considered as the meeting point of threats.³ Securing humans in the deployment of human security means therefore stabilizing the risk posed by the meeting point of threat factors, “movement” (of people or weapons or germs) appearing as such a milieu.

Because the state of nature is not piercing through everywhere, the movement that needs to be stabilized is the movement that affects the new border, and the overall approach within which human security is situated can therefore be justifiably mistaken for a strategy of containment.⁴ This most pessimistic or radical critique of human security as part of a general radicalization of development is the most visible counterpoint to the idealized version of human rights as a framework for emancipation and equality, or emancipation through equality. Human security, the project of securing the human, does away with emancipation and paradoxically, given its origins in development thinking, abandons the problematic frame of unilinear economic development altogether, in favor of a frame of structurally accepted and enforced planetary discrimination. The biopolitical focus of human security puts forward moreover, through the evaluation of human life in terms of global stability, the genealogical relationship between biopolitics, eugenism and racism, this time on a global scale.

A Concluding Thought

The problem, in the end, at least as seen from human rights language, is that human security discourse, despite its own personal independent pedigree, does not appear or operate in a vacuum, but rather in a social


1. See: Human Security Now, Chapter 3, p.41.

2. See: Foucault, 1997: 212.

3. See: Foucault, 2004: 22-25.

4. See: Duffield, 2008: 145-165.

and cultural environment, and interacts with the environment in ways that associate it with a variety of other practices and discourses. Human security lives in the same cultural environment as the still pervasive discourse of the “war on terror”, which connects with the human security discourse in many complicated ways,¹ not the least of them being the obsession with failed or failing states. Human security as a tool of foreign policy, merging traditionally separate foreign aid, security and development branches of foreign activity, should equally be examined in detail in the case of the European Union, where staunch advocates of human security have managed to offer the idea to save European foreign policy from irrelevance, while on the side Europe fortifies itself more and more against those adequately indistinct “people on the move” of human security. Progressively a larger and more complete networked picture of global governance would appear. At its conceptual center, we would find a conceptually powerful signifier: human security. The next step, implied in what precedes, would naturally be to step back and consider how the zone of “human rights” is crucial for the operation of the human security on the new border of the civilized world of effective States.



1. See: “Philippines: New Terrorism Law Puts Rights at Risk”, Human Rights Watch, 15 July 2005, Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/07/15/philippines-new-terrorism-law-puts-rights-risk> (Accessed 20 December 2008).

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