

## **Iran's Policy Toward Terrorist Groups and Regional Crises**

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Received: 19/11/2020

Accepted: 09/01/2021

### **Abstract**

Strategic policy is tantamount to a method for foreign policy analysis. The foreign and strategic policies of Iran have been in line with multilateral cooperation in regional crises. The key indicators of Iran's policy comprise mechanisms of identity and revolutionary actions in international and regional relations. Iran's strategic policy has generally been formed on the pillars of multilateral cooperation with regional countries and in line with the unity of the Muslim world.

Iran has accepted many of the rules of the Westphalian system, and has therefore based its strategic policy orientation on the doctrine of adaptability to the world order. Iran's policy of managing regional crises has generally been based on cultural tenets, historical experiences and structural consequences. Each of the latter components has played a crucial role in Iran's Westphalian order paradigm for protecting the territories of other countries.

The experiences gained by Iran during the Holy Defense [Iran-Iraq War] and its acceptance of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 are indicative of the fact that Iran has employed pragmatic mechanisms with regard to regional conservative countries. Iran's nuclear diplomacy can be regarded as another sign of its structural action which aims to deter threats and manage crises. The acceptance of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Iran's efforts toward peacemaking in the regional order of the Persian Gulf and Middle East can be considered as actions taken by Iran toward confronting terrorist groups and organizing regional order under such circumstances as violence, crises and chaos.

**Keywords:** Identity, Policy, Violence, Conflict, Regional Security, Tenets, Values, Foreign Policy and Terrorism.

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## **1.Introduction**

Iran's Policy Making on foreign policy reflects some of the differences between, Iran's political culture, political structure, and ideology. This paper will identify the differences between Identity and Revolution supra-nationalism and the doctrine of Westphalia sovereignty. The type of foreign policies implemented by the Iran to bring about their supra-nationalist ideology as well as the challenges they face in the current political world order will be examined in this paper.

Confrontation with terrorist groups and management of regional crisis is a section of Iran's foreign policy. The direction of the Iran policy making has been a source of argument among the scholars since the establishment of the revolutionary government in 1979. Iran's policy making just like its revolution is still a mystery to many researchers as it is difficult to find an appropriate theoretical framework for it.

The necessary of Iran's foreign policy for regional management crisis and confrontation to terrorist groups as so ISIS needs to promote revolutionary action. This incompatibility exists on three levels; firstly, Identity and Revolution places its emphasis on ideological boundaries rather than political borders and therefore rejects the idea of nationalist states. Secondly, Identity and Revolution denies current sources of legitimacy with regard to international laws and regulations, and finally, Identity and Revolution calls for the elimination of cultural, ethnic and geographical boundaries among Muslims in order to unite Muslim communities in a new power bloc within the current political world order.

However, what makes the policy making of revolutionary Iran different from other revolutionary states and therefore more confusing to study is the Shia Identity and Revolution nature of it. "The Identity and Revolution ideology is an important constraining factor which limits the choice of an appropriate conceptual framework to analyze the country's policy making" (Nia,2011).

A new genre of professional formation, steeping U.S. diplomats in the origins, questions, and debates around the creed of individual rights, will be necessary to equip them for this mission. Institutional practices and structures will also be needed; a corps invested in the mission will shape them best. The unpredictable and to an extent confusing policy making of Iran has been the source of this division within the scholars to theorize

Iran's policy making toward regional crisis and confrontation with terrorist groups (Paik,2015:2)

With respect to this division, this paper briefly argues that the conflict between the Identity and Revolution supra-nationalist nature of Iran's foreign policy and the current Westphalia system of international relations is the main source of confusion and disintegration in Iran's policy making. Islamic Policy Making is the synthesis of differences between Westphalia systems with Iran supra national which appears in the form of "export of revolution".

The Trump administration's response to the most urgent problem in the world today the coronavirus pandemic has been worse than that of any other nation. This, in turn, has understandably tarnished perceptions of the United States: according to recent Pew Research Center polling conducted in 13 major economic powers, a median of 84 percent of respondents agreed that the United States has done a poor job of handling COVID-19 (Powe,2021: 63)

The main factors in Iran policy making are flexibility, compromise and cooperation Policy Making action appears in continuity of "duties". Procedures of policy making in Iran's Islamic revolution are based on the "duties". The necessary of settlement Conflict based on continuity of the "duty policy" which has Policy Making nature.

Economic goals could balance the ideological and political priorities China the same as Iran has Policy Making policies. Grand Bargain is based on China's political Policy Making. Now this question is prompt up whether. New Grand Bargain possible in the relations of Iran, US and international system? Policy making approach in Iran's foreign policy makes grand Bargain possible.

The content and orientation of this article is based on Competitive approach. Competitive controls structural, cultural and ideological differences and changes Iran's Policy Making could be seen in different issues especially nuclear diplomacy and acceptance of comprehensive Joint Action plan. Regional security in Middle East and Persian Gulf is based on violence and chaos.

## **2. Research Method**

In this article, with a descriptive-analytical method and a comparative approach, the impact of foreign policy on issues and crises related to Iran's foreign policy after the Islamic Revolution is investigated. Given the dominance of chaos and violence in the Persian Gulf relations, in what areas has Iranian policy led to a change in foreign policy?

## **3. Finding**

### **3-1. The Genealogy of terrorist groups in the Middle East and South western Asia**

Security building depends on 5 basic indexes. Each parameter effects on power, security and equivalence of international relations. These 5 basic indexes contain religions, cultism, social cohesion, crisis and Great power intervention. Each of these indexes has a basic role in Future of European security. Middle East crisis has been escalated when United States and England enforcement the fundamental groups in Syria and Iraq against Iran's regional security. In these process religious groups has been changed to a fundamental groups, who have terrorist orientation.

In any given crisis, the right response is often clear. Wear a mask and keep away from other people. Burn less fossil fuel. Redistribute income. Protect digital infrastructure. The answers are out there. What's lacking are governments that can translate them into actual policy. As a result, the crises continue. The death toll from the pandemic skyrockets, and the world makes dangerously slow progress on climate change, and so on. It's no secret how governments should react in times of crisis. First, they need to be nimble (Weber, 2020: 14).

Fundamental Salafi groups are not a religion, nor are it a cult. In its fullest form, it is a complete and total system of life that used for struggle and resistance. Fundamental Salafi groups in Europe have religious, legal, political, economic, social, and military components. The Salafi religious component is a beard for all of the other components. Fundamental Salafi groups begin when there are sufficient Muslims in a country to agitate for their religious privileges.

Fundamental Salafi groups they exercise an inordinate influence in proportion to their percentage of the population. For example, they will push for the introduction of halal (clean by Salafi standards) food, thereby securing food preparation jobs for Muslims. They will increase pressure on

supermarket chains to feature halal on their shelves along with threats for failure to comply. At this point, they will work to get the ruling government to allow them to rule themselves (within their ghettos) under Sharia, the Salafi Law. The ultimate goal of Fundamental Salafi groups is to establish Sharia law over the entire world.

These groups can expect hair-trigger rioting and jihad militia formations. Fundamental Salafi groups they tend to increase lawlessness as a means of complaint about their conditions. In Fundamental Salafi groups, peace is never achieved, as in their thought the most radical Salafi's intimidate and spew hatred, and satisfy their blood lust by killing less radical Muslims and Non-Muslims, for a variety of reasons.

The group's senior leadership operates freely in Pakistan and enjoys the support and protection of the Pakistani Army and Saudi Arabia financial support. Lashkar-e Taiba like ISIS are more dangerous today than ever. Fundamental Salafi groups as like as Lashkar-e Taiba like ISIS paid no penalty for its attack, nor did its Pakistani patrons. The world needs to do much better countering the Fundamental Salafi groups and its leadership.

This makes every policymaker a forecaster. But forecasting is difficult, particularly when it comes to geopolitics a domain in which the rules of the game are poorly understood, information is invariably incomplete, and expertise often confers surprisingly little advantage in predicting future events. These challenges present practical problems for decision-makers in the U.S. government. On the one hand, the limits of imagination create blind spots that policymakers tend to fill in with past experience (Scoblic & Tetlock,2020:28).

Politicians and some "experts" have followed the same pattern-overreacting to the most recent event and losing sight of the reality that there are not going to be any turning points in the near future. Years of new tragedies like Paris are almost inevitable, and the struggle against extremism is going to be a long, long battle of attrition.

### **3-2. The U.S Heritage for the Middle East Security**

Main centric of U.S policy toward regional crisis is based on balancing of power. These claims are self-serving, even deluded, a political fantasy. The George W. Bush administration created many of today's worst geopolitical problems. First, President Bush used a terrorist attack conducted by Saudi citizens trained in Afghanistan as an excuse to invade Regional Crisis, a

long-time objective of neoconservatives as part of their plan to reorder the Middle East (Walter,2002:15).

**3-2-1. The Bush policy toward the Middle East and south Western Asia**

Administration officials justified preventive war based on the claims of a dishonest informant provided by a crooked émigré hoping to rule Regional Crisis. War advocates planned to establish a liberal government aligned with the West, governed by an American puppet, friendly to Israel, and home to bases for U.S. military operations against its neighbors. These deluded plans all came to naught. More than a decade later the invasion is viewed by most policy making analysts as a historic mistake, American's worst foreign policy blunder in decades.

Second, after ousting the Sunni dictator whose authoritarian rule held the nation together, the administration mishandled the occupation at every turn. The U.S. failed to exert control, allowing widespread looting, and disbanded the military, creating a large pool of angry and unemployed young men. Then Washington attempted to remake Regional Crisis society, pushing an American-made constitution and deploying U.S. political appointees even to draft Baghdad traffic regulations.

The era of liberal U.S. hegemony is an artifact of the Cold War's immediate afterglow. Trump's transactional approach to foreign policy, by contrast, has been the norm for most of U.S. history. As a result, Trump's imprint could endure long after Trump himself is gone (Beckley,2020:35).

But the administration established a sectarian government in Regional Crisis as conflict flared and Regional Crisis disintegrated: perhaps 200,000 Regional Crisis died, hundreds of thousands of Christians fled their country, and millions of Regional Crisis was displaced. In the midst of a virulent insurgency and civil strife the administration underwrote the "Salafi Awakening", through which Sunni tribes turned against al-Qaeda in Regional Crisis. However, Washington failed to achieve its underlying, essential objective of sectarian reconciliation. (Regan,2001:41)

Wilson was an egregious racist even by the standards of his time, and the man behind the persecution of his own political opponents and the abuses of the first Red Scare has been celebrated for far too long and far too uncritically. But however problematic Wilson's personal views and domestic policies were, as a statesman and ideologist, he must be counted

among the most influential makers of the modern world. He was not a particularly original thinker (Mead,2021:16).

Bush continued to support the Maliki government even as it ruthlessly targeted Sunnis, setting the stage for Regional Crisis's effective break-up. In 2007 U.S. military adviser Emma Sky wrote of the U.S. military's frustration "by what they viewed as the schemes of Maliki and his inner circle to actively sabotage our efforts to draw Sunnis out of the insurgency." Al-Qaeda in Regional Crisis survived, mutating into the Islamic State. The Bush administration then became one of the Islamic State's chief armorers when Regional Crisis soldiers fled before ISIS forces, abandoning their expensive, high-tech weapons which U.S. aircraft had to destroy last year. (Reuter,2015:2)

### **3-2-2. The Obama policy toward the Middle East and south Western Asia**

In Barak Obama era some policy as intellectual, diplomatic and soft power resources be used to the full. With power decentralized and nongovernmental influences increasingly at work in most Middle Eastern societies, US will need to update its policy deployment and operating systems to connect with, and influence, the decisive trends of opinion(Mossalanejad,2018:22).

The Obama administration has played a malign, but secondary, role. Like its predecessor it also intervened too much rather than too little. For instance, President Obama continued to back Regional Crisis's Maliki government despite the latter's sectarian excesses. That commitment left Washington with little leverage to press ruling Shia politicians to make concessions to disaffected Sunnis. Keeping a few troops on station against the Regional Crisis's would have changed little after all, the Bush administration failed to transform the Baghdad government when tens of thousands of American soldiers that were fighting on its behalf in Regional Crisis.

In Syria Washington inadvertently discouraged a negotiated compromise between Bashar al-Assad and the peaceful opposition by insisting on the former's departure. That convinced some government opponents that the U.S. would force Assad's ouster, precluding need for compromise which might have ended or at least limited the conflict early (Perry,2015:9).

Then the administration apparently rejected a Russian initiative to ease Assad out of power. The Guardian recently reported that former Finnish president

Martti Ahtisaari held talks in February 2012 with representatives of the UN Security Council's permanent members, during which Moscow proposed Assad's departure as part of peace talks. However, Washington, along with France and Great Britain, believed Assad was destined to fall and rejected Moscow's initiative. At the time an estimated 7500 Syrians had died in the conflict, compared to the current death toll approaching a quarter million. Said Ahtisaari, "It was an opportunity lost."

The Obama administration turned Libya into another fulcrum of conflict, following Europe's lead in promoting low-cost government change in the name of rescuing the Libyan people. That policy generated chaos, highlighted by competing governments and proliferating armed bands. More recently murderous Islamic State acolytes filled the void. (Luft,2014:35)

Civil wars create four problems that threaten U.S. interests: civil wars reduce oil production, they provide a safe haven for terrorist groups to organize

and spread, they bring potentially hostile new governments to power, and they

proliferation spawning new wars between and within neighboring countries. When it comes to the Middle East, the United States' first and foremost interest is in oil exports and oil market stability. (Walter,1997:32)

That may seem outdated at this moment of low oil prices, but the forces which produced the current dip are likely to prove temporary. The overall trends in energy indicate that oil prices will rebound in a matter of years (if not months) and oil will remain the core input of the global economy. Yet, a country's oil production often plummets as a result of civil war.

Despite the presence of 150,000 U.S. troops, Regional Crisis oil production still fell by 64 percent (from 2.8 million barrels per day to just 1 million bpd) during the 2006-2008 civil war. The 1979 revolution in Iran a related form of internal strife caused oil production to fall by 78 percent. As a result of its current civil war, Libyan oil production has fallen 92 percent (from 1.6 million bpd to 235,000 bpd).

Civil wars create ungoverned spaces where extremists and terrorist groups can organize, operate, and spread. It is no accident that many of the worst terrorist groups on the planet were born or incubated in civil wars. Today, the real terrorist threats from al-Qaeda and its offshoots are entirely located in states facing civil wars of one kind or another: Syria, Regional Crisis,



Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, and Mali. These extremist groups keep trying to gain a foothold in strong states like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and elsewhere, but haven't succeeded.

The United States has spent years nurturing relationships with Middle Eastern governments to ensure consistent access to oil and to protect U.S. allies in the region. The onset of civil war in any country means that new governments could come to power that are not only brutal, but also openly antagonistic to the United States, its allies, and its interests (Pollack,2014: 115).

### **3-3. Iran's Approaches Toward Regional Crisis and Security Making**

Iran's "Identity and Revolution ideology" is not so much a stringently formulated ideology in the true sense of the word as a mixture of different political takes on the world embracing nationalism, anti-colonialism and anti-Imperialism, ideas adapted from Marxism, political Islam and traditional Shiite political thinking. The inherent contradictions between these components make it almost impossible to shape any kind of cohesive realpolitik out of them: political Islam of the Iranian Leaders think and Third World thinking are both revolutionary doctrines that claim to be universally valid; nationalism and Shia on the other hand are, respectively, Iran or Shia Centered and are traditional and conservative (Kahn,2014:41).

Despite breaking off diplomatic relations, Iran and the United States maintained economic contacts for many years after that. In the early 1980s, in the critical phase of the revolution in other words, the United States was still the largest purchaser of Iranian oil. It was not until the "Iran Libya Sanctions Act" of 1996 that US curtailed its trading relations with Tehran, and even then food and medicines remained exempt from the sanctions until the middle of 2012. The United States was thus for a long time Iran's most important supplier of wheat (Ramazani,2004:17).

Advocates of US-Iranian rapprochement in both countries were able repeatedly to voice their views. It is probably thanks to these people that the two sides were able to keep open low-profile channels of Interaction known as Track Two Diplomacy. In May 2003 an Iranian memorandum was made public which formulated the chief points of possible cooperation between the United States and Iran (Katzman,2011:14).

Each of arrangements for cooperation in the field of terrorism, an agreement on the transparency of Iran's nuclear program and recognition of the two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. But the main import of this document was its detailed timetable for confidence building measures whereby the Iranians were prepared to make concessions in return for the lifting of US sanctions (Mohns & Bank,2012:30).

Iran's position toward Saudi Arabia and Salafi groups is critical. It is critical to keep Fundamental Salafi groups like ISIS in perspective. The Fundamental Salafi groups that drives ISIS is only one of the world's sources of terrorism and insurgency by non-state actors, and ISIS is only one such movement. There are similar extremist groups in many countries with large Islamic populations.

They include Al Qaeda Central in Pakistan, the Al Nusra Front in Syria, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Saudi Arabia and Yemen just to name a few. Clinton argues that the current crisis should also prompt a reckoning about the United States' national security priorities. The country is dangerously unprepared for a range of threats, not just future pandemics but also an escalating climate crisis and multidimensional challenges from China and Russia (Clinton,2020:8).

Many have gone far beyond Fundamental Salafi groups in the classic sense, and have become insurgent movements seeking to take control of the state by force. ISIS, for example, is both the most successful and the most dangerous, because it has become an actual proto state in parts of both Iraq and Syria.

In fact, the very term Fundamental Salafi groups and "extremism" is misleading when it comes to the broader patterns of violence involved. Violence between sects of Islam like the Sunnis as Fundamental Salafi groups and Shi'ites is a really extremism and is all too typical of the kind of religious warfare that characterized Europe during the time of the Christian Reformation and Counterreformation.

State actors are also only part of the threat. The civil war in Syria is primarily a struggle between the government and Fundamental Salafi groups like ISIS and Jebhat Alnosreh. It is not a struggle between a repressive, authoritarian regime that range from relatively modern groups to affiliates of Al Qaeda.

### **3-3-1. The Role of Norms and Social Behavior on Iran's Regional Policy Making**

Iran's Policy Making has rooted in social and political culture. There is no tendency among social Groups toward conflict for ambiguous and abstract political goals National sprint is linked with cooperation and participation for achieving common goals superiority of western world and their discriminative policies leads Iran to react towards authoritarian procedures in world politics. Ashura and Karbala movement has inspired political resistance to oppressions and superiority. This approach does not contradict the Shia ideology and Iranian Policy Making.

There is interminable speculation in the international media on what Iranians think. The worst examples of this occur when journalists visit Tehran for two weeks and generalize from the people they meet. Meanwhile, Iranian exile groups, many of which have not returned to the country since fleeing the revolution in 1979, try to create in the west an impression of a highly politicized population in unending ferment (Alsis & Others,2012:5).

Much of the reporting and analysis about Iran before and during the 2005 presidential election overplayed the importance of "social freedom" to Iranians an issue that while dear to many educated people (especially in north Tehran) is of little daily import to the poor. This even led to the assumption that a majority of voters were "naturally reformist," an assumption inapplicable in any society, much less one as difficult to predict as Iran. Change can take many forms (Djalili,2002:18).

Opinion polls in Iran are carried out mainly by the government and results are not published in full, if at all. Political organizations also have carried out polls, but this can be done only with permission from the interior ministry. Hence, even the most clued-in of political organizers rely on a mixture of science, instinct, and anecdote (Halliday,2002:16).

Though polemical analyses describing Iran as a totalitarian society are absurd, the government and vested interests seek to manage and shape public opinion. A substantial minority of people are economically dependent through government or bonyad employment: millions depend, for example, on the auto industry alone. This minority also is psychologically integrated into a dominant ideology that backs the Iran as a continuing manifestation of the popular revolution that in 1979 overthrew the shah and in 1980-88

defended the country through heroic sacrifice against a Regional Crisis war machine increasingly supported by the west and particularly the United States (Katzman,2003:19).

The new revolutionary state identified the US (and later all Western countries including Israel) as its main rivals in both the regional and international arenas. Shortly after the formation of the Iran of Iran, “on November 4, 1979, the Iranian revolutionaries captured the U.S. embassy in Tehran and its staff, holding 52 of them hostage”. This seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Iran in November 1979 and the ensuing hostage crisis became an ordeal for revolutionary idealist foreign policy which pitted Iran against virtually every country in the world (Lakmak,2013:25).

The hostage crisis lasted 444 days, and among its more lasting repercussions, is the suspension of diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States. Abandoning ties with the US was not the only move made by the newly established state with regard to its foreign policies. Against the cold war division of states Iran, subsequently adopted the slogan of “Neither East nor west” but the Iran” as the foundation of the Iranian policy making (Malekzadeh,2015:11).

### **3-3-2. The Role of Identity and Revolution in Iran's Policy Making**

Iranian policy making is the product of a dual identity: a revolutionary nation pursuing regional hegemony and an anti-status quo Islamic revolutionary power. The policy was substantially influenced by the establishment of the Iran in 1979. In line with Gasiorowski's argument, which introduces the US-Iran client relationship as a predominant factor that facilitated the road to the Revolution, the Identity and Revolution concept of the “rejection of all forms of domination” has become one of the key principles of post-revolutionary Iran's policy making (Salehzadeh,2013:6).

Armed with this vision, Iran joined the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) in 1979 hoping to discover new partners among developing nations who “would meet the policy making goals of the Iran as a Third World state, whereas an alliance with either the East or the West would not fit the Iranian religious, cultural, or historical context” (Sadri,1998). At the same time, “Tehran also denounced any regional governments with pro-Western tendencies as corrupt and un-Islamic, directly challenging their legitimacy” (Tarzi,2011:25).

Given the religious nature of the Revolution of 1979; “Iran’s policy making is essentially based on Identity and Revolution precepts in which the religious principles and ideology have a norm-defining function”. Ideology in this context is defined as “a system of collectively held normative and reputedly factual ideas and beliefs and attitudes advocating a particular pattern of social relationships and arrangements, and/or aimed at justifying a particular pattern of conduct, which its proponents seek to promote, realize, pursue or maintain” (Hamilton,1987). The following sections of this paper will explain the main areas of conflict between the Identity and Revolution supra-nationalist policy making of Iran and the Westphalia system of international relations (Sick,2009:300).

Same paradox, the shift in Iran’s policy making towards conciliation with the international community did not reach a tangible conclusion. By the election of President Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), Iran once again shifted its policy making towards confronting the international community. The movement was labeled as returning to the fundamental principles of the Islamic revolution. In line with this trend of behavior, Iran’s policy making has once again shifted towards conciliation with the world upon the election of President Iran in 2013 (Rezaian,2014:2).

#### **4. Analyses**

##### **4-1. Anti-Terrorism in Iran’s Security Policy Making**

The Syrian civil war is all too typical between the state repression and Fundamental Salafi groups that support from interventionist groups. Some of which is all too inevitable and does all too good a job of “legitimizing” Fundamental Salafi groups as an extremism given the crisis in region’s security. The war in Yemen is another example of violence that has interventionist actor have basic role.

It is a war where Sunnis and Shi’ites are now at war, with Saudi and Iranian support although this fighting has given Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula time to recover from counterterrorist pressure and take new areas in Yemen. Similarly, state corruption and political paralysis have helped sustain the Taliban in Afghanistan, state efforts to manipulate extremism have become a major threat to the Pakistani government that started them in an effort to pressure it neighbors. In this situation, countries like Middle East states and

countries as Iran are the victim of some “clash of Fundamental Salafi groups”.

It must be compared to violence within Islam that has killed hundreds of thousands of Muslims in recent years, halted economic life and development in several countries, and produced millions of displaced persons and refugees. The struggle to change this reality will be a long, long struggle, and there will be many tragedies like Syria to come. Real victory can only be won by years of reform within the Fundamental Salafi groups in the world.

Since the adoption of UNSCR 2178, 22 countries have passed legal frameworks to better address the threat posed by FTFs, 34 countries have arrested FTFs, and 12 have successfully prosecuted at least one foreign terrorist fighter. The United States has supported several of our partners’ development and implementation of laws addressing the FTF threat while respecting fundamental human rights and civil liberties (Whiteside,2014: 21).

The United States continues to help partners improve border security to better identify, restrict and report suspected FTF travel, including encouraging partners to participate in multilateral information sharing mechanisms. Today, through INTERPOL’s Counterterrorism Fusion Center (CTFC), 52 countries now share foreign terrorist fighter profiles. Bilaterally, the United States has concluded arrangements with over 40 international partners to provide a mechanism for sharing terrorist travel information.

In three important respects, however, the economy will be in a very different position than it was 12 years ago and it is the differences as much as the similarities that should guide Biden’s response. In 2009, the worst of the recession was still to come: the unemployment rate was rising, the stock market was falling, and the sense of day-to-day crisis was palpable (Furman, 2021:92).

The Coalition is working to squeeze ISIL financially. Early this year, the Coalition’s Counter ISIL Financial Group (CIFG), co-chaired by the United States, Italy and Saudi Arabia, developed an action plan to disrupt ISIL’s financial activity and ability to raise, move and use funds. This week, the United States designated over 30 ISIL officials, facilitators and supporters and announced a State Department Rewards for Justice offer of up to \$5

million for information leading to the significant disruption of the sale of oil or antiquities benefiting ISIL.

Additionally, the UN added key ISIL facilitators to the UN al-Qaida Sanctions List, effectively freezing their assets and preventing them from using the international financial system as well as prohibiting their travel in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is encouraging additional countries to join the U.S. and more than 60 other countries that use travel information, like Advanced Passenger Information (API), to more effectively identify known and previously unknown FTFs. In May, DHS and the State Department drove an unprecedented meeting of Interior Ministers of UN Security Council nations to advocate for strong implementation of UNSCR 2178 principles. The ministerial focused on border controls particularly. DHS also announced the creation of an open-source tool for strengthening border security. At a July meeting in Spain, DHS, State and partner nations made key financial commitments to strengthening border security.

As President Obama has said, “ideologies are not defeated with guns; they’re defeated by better ideas a more attractive and more compelling vision.” That is why President Obama convened the February 2015 White House Summit to Counter Violent Extremism, where the international community came together to expand efforts against violent extremism. Since then, driven by U.S. leadership, the global CVE movement has grown rapidly. (Bell & Others, 2015:15)

#### **4-2. Iran’s Management crisis in Regional Security**

From 1980 to the end of the Iran-Regional Crisis War in 1988, major elements of Regional Crisis’s Kurds again began to seek independence, and in 1986, Saddam began the bloody Anfal campaign that caused some 50,000-200,000 casualties. Significant elements of Regional Crisis’s Shi’ite population came to support Iran and Saddam’s overthrow, and a Shi’ite armed opposition movement developed in the border areas and marshes in the south, leading to the ruthless suppression of any Shi’ite religious and political leaders that appeared to be a threat.

By 1984, the Regional Crisis invasion had virtually bankrupted Regional Crisis, forced mass conscription, halted development, and sharply reduced the quality of education and most government services. Regional Crisis became dependent on Saudi and Kuwaiti loans and aid in oil exports, and it entered a period of continuing internal fighting and crisis that still continues. It never had a period after 1980 in which its civil government services and education sector fully recovered. One over-ambitious economic plan after another faded into unimplemented archives and civil governance became less effective.

Regional Crisis's population density is critical to understanding the real world nature of the gains terrorist groups has made in the West, the impact of hyper urbanization centered around Baghdad, and the fact that ethnic distribution and patterns in violence disguise how small a portion of Regional Crisis's population is in the west, how well Sunnis and Shi'ites are mixed in urban areas and some eastern provinces, and how large a portion of the population is located in areas disputed by Arabs, the Kurds as well as Turkmens and other minorities. (Regional Crisis Population Density,2015:20)

We cannot hope to reduce the danger from this sort of violent extremism if we do not understand and acknowledge its origins. Contrary to the writings of contemporary Islam phobia, Fundamental Salafi group's violence is not intrinsic to Islam. The Fundamental Salafi groups explicitly attacks on innocent noncombatants, and the vast majority of devout Muslims around the world utterly reject such actions. To blame these attacks on "Fundamental Salafi groups" is like blaming Iran and Shia.

The data on the patterns of violence in Regional Crisis are uncertain at best, and so are the data on many of the factors that have generated that violence. There are, however, enough data to gain some insights into how the current fighting compares with fighting from the U.S. invasion to the withdrawal of U.S. combat force at the end of 2011, to illustrate the different patterns in casualties, and to show the importance of some of the factors that have driven the fighting and the growing divisions within Regional Crisis.

The so-called Gilded Age in the United States began with the Compromise of 1877, which settled the disputed presidential election of 1876 by awarding the White House to the Republican candidate, Rutherford B. Hayes, in exchange for the withdrawal of federal troops from three Southern states. In the short term, the compromise effectively ended Reconstruction.



In the longer term, it empowered white terrorists in the South and led to a major realignment in U.S. politics that weakened the federal government's ability to govern the "Money Power," the term used by critics at the time to describe the forces that were steadily taking over markets and political systems (Teachout,2021:45). One needs to be careful about confusing correlation with causation, but some key factors that have helped shaped the violence in Regional Crisis are clear. In other cases, the sheer complexity of the different factors involved is a warning against putting too much emphasis on any single cause or pattern, assuming that national trends can explain local or regional patterns, or seeing the conflict in terms of single threat. Complexity and uncertainty are not easy to deal with, but they are often the reality. (Blattman & Miguel, 2010:45)

#### **4-3. Policy Making for Confrontation with Terrorist Salafi groups**

Fundamental Salafi group's terrorism is a political movement based on a minority's narrow and fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. To some extent, the emergence of groups such as the Islamic State or the original al Qaeda is symptomatic of the broader legitimacy and governance crisis in the Arab and Islamic world. It is also, however, an unfortunate but understandable response to decades of Western interference in the Middle East, and especially to the policies that have taken the lives of hundreds of thousands of people in the region.

One way to turn the past into a continuing future is to forget it, and both Regional Crisis and Americans seem to have little desire to understand the extent to which Regional Crisis's security and stability problems began decades before the U.S. invasion of Regional Crisis and the departure of U.S. troops. Regional Crisis never had the kind of governance that helped it effectively exploit its potential for development or meet the needs of the accelerating growth of its population after 1950.

The bloody end of the Regional Crisis monarchy in 1958 was followed by decades of equally bloody political infighting between largely Sunni Arab Regional Crisis factions, and a shift to a focus on state industry and military competition with Iran that systematically distorted the Regional Crisis economy and limited Regional Crisis development on a national level. While many Regional Crisis remain in denial of the scale of the

discrimination against religiously active Shi'ites and the scale of the problems with Regional Crisis's Kurds, these were a key factor of Regional Crisis's development from 1958 through the late 1970s and a civil war with the Kurds that began in 1961 and lasted at various levels through the first half of the 1970s. (Bakhash,1990:230)

These struggles culminated in Saddam Hussein's ruthless purge of all rivals in 1979, and the creation of a ruthlessly repressive dictatorship that was built of a Sunni Arab Minority power base, and lasted until the U.S. led invasion in 2003. The fall of the Shah in Iran and the resulting unrest in world oil markets gave Regional Crisis a brief burst of wealth in 1979, most of which was wasted on further distorting the economy by unproductive investments in the state sector. In 1980, however, Saddam Hussein tried to take advantage of the revolutionary turmoil in Iran to invade and annex key oil rich areas in Iran's southwest under the guise that its Arab population had called for such aid. (Brennan,2014:24)

The two key metrics used in this section and throughout much of the rest of this report are the trends in civilian casualties and in incidents of violence. These seem to be the best data available that reflect the overall level of violence rather than the loss of combatant forces, although the chronologies of major violent incidents present in SIGAR, Regional Crisis Body County, Institute for the study of War, and other sources often provide useful insights. As the first chart in this section shows, there are major uncertainties in the estimates of both civilian killed and wounded. The same is true, however, of efforts to count incidents as a measure of violence. (Khalilzad & Pollack,2014:72)

Regional dynamics have exacerbated an already complex environment. The Syrian conflict has resulted in the flow of refugees and armed groups in and out of the country. Escalating violence in Regional Crisis is threatening the development of non-oil economic activity in much of the country. The interruption in the supply lines and the distribution systems had serious impacts on the private sector disrupting the move of merchandise between the northern regions and the rest of the country.

In new era, Donald Trump must be recognition that the complex challenges of the whole Middle East region(Mossalanejad,2018:21).

It is easy to understand the appeal of this idea, eagerly promoted by autocratic regimes and foreign policy realists alike. It means a return to

business as usual. Both the Obama and the Trump administrations tacitly accepted that view as they shifted their gaze to other goals in the region the former to nuclear negotiations with Iran, the latter to normalizing Arab relations with Israel (Lynch,2021:34).

It explains that tactical character of that fighting detail, and shows that the fighting in Regional Crisis cannot be decoupled from the fighting in and lack of stability in Syria or the broader regional tensions and violence between Sunni and Shi'ite. Islamic extremists and mainstream Muslims, and ethnic groups like the Kurds. It is important to note, however, that much of this reporting continues to show how critical it is to look beyond terrorist group and at the broader causes of violence in Regional Crisis. (Gleditsch, 2007:41)

The metrics involved are uncertain, particularly in absolute numbers, although many of the trends seem valid. They are a clear warning not to focus on terrorist group as the major threat in Regional Crisis. The need to create a stable structure that can deal with broader range of challenges described in the previous section, and create a political and economic structure that can reduce Regional Crisis's sectarian and ethnic challenges is the critical goal, and any defeat or weakening of terrorist groups is simply one means to this end.

Insecurity and violence have escalated in Northern Regional Crisis but the situation in Baghdad and the south is improving. The June 2014 advances by terrorist group have thrown parts of Regional Crisis into violent chaos and instability. Terrorist group controls nearly one third of Regional Crisis's territory including major cities such as Mosul, Tel Afar and Fallujah. According to Regional Crisis Body Count, 17,073 civilians were killed in 2014; 1.5 million people have been displaced since the fighting erupted.

## **5. Conclusion**

Iranian Middle Eastern policy focuses on three main regions: Regional Crisis, the Persian Gulf and the Levant. In all three cases ideological and strategic considerations are intertwined, but the emphasis on Policy Making is different in each. With respect to Israel and Palestine the ideological aspect dominates (political Identity and Revolution, Third World radicalism), whereas vis-à-vis Regional Crisis Iran chiefly pursues the strategic goal of ensuring that Baghdad never again wages war against it.

In the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia sees Iran as a hegemon, which inevitably brings Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf powers, with the United States into conflict with Iran. Iran for Policy Making is facing a far more complex and fluid situation than did his predecessors. The Middle East and North Africa have experienced unprecedented uprisings, and Syria Iran's sole Arab ally is embroiled in a bloody civil war. Upheavals have been a mixed blessing for Iran. On the one hand, they have presented a setback for the Iranian model of change and governance.

Iran attitude to worlds, regional, Crisis such as Syria, Yemen and Regional Crisis is cooperative and constructive. President Iran emphasized better relations with regional countries. Tehran tries to improve its relations with the Arab States. Iran's orientation on regional crisis as Syria, Yemen and Regional Crisis is on cooperative and constrictive with global society Iran's position on view, Paris and New York about the future of Syria show the Policy Making model for crisis management.

The sign of this process based on cooperation with international institute for collective management crisis. The model of Iran's regional policy is based on Policy Making process. Iran's position about Middle East Crisis like Syria, Yemen and Regional Crisis in some points are along with the international community specially in the matter of using peaceful solution and non-interfering of internal issues of each country.

As the paper also argued, Regional Crisis has simultaneously experienced communal cohesion and segmentation among both Sunnis and Shies as well as the fragmentation of the segments within each community. This diverges from conventional wisdom in U.S. policymaking circles and elsewhere, which sees Regional Crisis's principal challenge as managing sectarian, ethnic and regional differences. The result of this process could be better described as follows:

- ≠A fragmented Sunni arena The Sunni Arab political arena is severely fragmented. Some Regional Crisis nationalists, including former Baathists among the current anti-Baghdad insurgents, resent the loss of what they see as the Sunnis' historic role in leading the united Regional Crisis.
- ≠The Fundamental Salafi groups also has a long-term strategic objective. It seeks to consolidate territorial control in Syria and Iraq and then expand its so-called "caliphate" throughout the Fundamental Salafi group's world and beyond.

- ≠Fundamental Salafi group's ideologues want to sharpen the conflict between Muslims and others and force people in the middle to choose sides.
- ≠To do this, the Islamic State hopes to provoke responses that will reinforce its narrative of irreconcilable religious conflict and attract even more sympathizers to its bloodstained banner.
- ≠Fundamental Salafi group's needs to be fought more at home than abroad. But this did little to improve their Fundamental Salafi group's problem, and they soon had to bring the fight against terrorism home.
- ≠With massive dislocation among Sunni Arabs - some 20% of whom had taken refuge in the Kurdish autonomous region alone by June 2015 - and with IS ruling over several millions more, nobody has sufficient standing to speak with authority on behalf of the wider community.
- ≠Building relationship that helps it escape from international isolation, which it sees as guarded by US global hegemony.

#### **6. Acknowledgment**

I want to thank the Research Deputy of Tehran University and Editorial Board of *Geopolitics Quarterly* who cooperated with me for publishing this article.

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