



The Basics and Functions of Putinism in Russia

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Abstract:

The present Russian political system is tied up with Putin's name; and Putin is considered as a full-fledged political reality. Today's powerful Russia, which has got a new life after the Cold War and the weak collapse period, and has a major impact on global developments including the Middle East, is not understandable except under this title. What inspired writers to analyze Putin's performance is to study the causes of the existence of a personality such as him and the formation of Putinism in today's Russian society. Knowing the performance of Putin and Putinism requires a clear answer to some questions like, why the phenomenon of Putinism in the 21st century whit democratic structure has emerged and persisted, and what is Putinism at all? The hypothesis that will be presented to understand this issue is that the long-standing political culture of Russia and the geographical and historical imperative of Russian nation have led to the emergence and continuation of Putinism in today's Russian society, as well as the security and economic problems of the 1990s, humiliation, pressure, and blockade of the west against Russia is the mainstay of the emergence and continuation of Putinism. To investigate the hypothesis of research, firstly we examine the system of pseudo-democracy and then we will discuss Putin's functions and behaviors in the economic, political, and social spheres. Finally, we will discuss about the Russian domestic context and the external factors that led to the formation of Putinism.

Keywords: Putin, Putinism, Political system, Authoritarianism, Pseudo-democracy, Russia

Introduction

In recent years, Putin has been known as a famous politician in the world. Entering the Middle East scene, he highlighted his pres-

ence in international politics and challenged strategic conditions in the Middle East. In the past two decades, Putin has become a great

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international reality, and this name has been used not only in Russia to understand the Russian politics, but also in the world to understand international equations. After a decade of turmoil and chaos in Russia, his actions led to order, stability, and peace in the country. Although Russia has faced problems at the political, social, and economic level over the past 15 years, but compared to the Yeltsin's ten-year period, the situation has been much better and safer, and recent polls in Russia show that Putin has had a very high popularity, yet. What made Putinism famous is this fact that he created a relatively undemocratic and reliance on a circle of power, which turned the ballot box and parliamentary system into an apparent phenomenon. So, different analysts used the notion of Putinism to refer to a kind of political system based on the constitution, people's vote, different electoral structures, and a fairly free economy.

The purpose of this research is to study the cultural, economic, and political backgrounds of present Russia to review its political system, and to introduce us one of the most important components necessary for the recognition of the today Russia. However, our discussion in this article is not related to Putin's performance in foreign policy, but rather is about the military formation of Putinism in Russia. In this respect, the authors focus on Putin's behaviors in various political, economic, and social spheres, and through examining these behaviours and practices in the contexts of internal conditions and external factors, finds an appropriate answer to the question of why the phenomenon of Putinism emerges and persists in the 21st century's Russia with the democratic structure. The main hypothesis regarding the security and economic problems of the 1990s, would be the humiliation, pressure, and blockade of the west against Russia. The

authors try to investigate this article by analyzing and criticizing the data and discussion of experts and scientists of Russia.

The Russian economy relies on the vast energy resources and president Vladimir Putin takes this responsibility due to its wealth of resources. He has been able to emancipate Russia from the anarchic situation of the Yeltsin era and to bring about the current state of harmony, but despite the creation of security and the integration in the country, he has been criticized. Among these criticisms is the formation of the oligarchic government and the monopoly of huge energy resources in its circle and its followers. Since the infrastructure of the Russian society lacks a national bourgeoisie, it is clear that this country was unable to accept a different kind of Capitalism (namely the western developed capitalist) except for state capitalism or peripheral capitalism. In these type of systems, the institution of the state has changed and bureaucracy is growing very strongly because the state is completely dominated in all institutions. In other words, in modern Russia, the state apparatus oligarchies is organized in such a way as to serve oligarchy, it means the state and its oligarchies are the same. To answer the questions and examines the hypothesis, first we examine the system of pseudo-democracy and then we will discuss about Putin's act and behavior in the economic, political, and social spheres; and finally the issue we are discussing about, will be the Russian domestic bases and the external factors that led to the formation of Putinism.

First. Theoretical Foundation : Pseudo-democratic Political System

One of the important issues to understand the government's policies is their typology. Political systems are very diverse in the fields of theory and practice, and there are different

types of political systems in today's world. Here are some of the political systems discussed and interpreted by theorists of political thoughts. These systems include democracy/ social democracy/ authoritarianism/ totalitarianism/ conservative state/ liberal state/ communist government/ and ultimately the foundations and elements of the formation of the Pseudo-democratic system and its functioning. In the pages that follow, our goal is to look at a Pseudo-democratic Political system with a theoretical overview of the various political system in two parts of public and certain forms, and by modeling it, provide a platform for a more accurate understanding of Putin's political system. The issue of pseudo-democracy has emerged in developing countries. In these type of systems, political life is neither totally democratic nor totally totalitarian. Such countries essentially involve the process of modernization and development, and the transition from tradition to modernity and the conflicts arising from these conditions prevent the establishment of democracy and totalitarianism, as well as the traditional social structure of the dispersed and abandoned possibility of the full establishment of a modern political system, whether democratic or totalitarian (Bashiriye, 167 : 2003).

If the features of a Pseudo-democratic system exist in a monarchy, it is usually called the developmental dictatorship or benevolent tyranny that has been called the legal tyranny in Russia. According to Fareed Zakaria, Russia is not considered as a liberal democratic country. He talks about non-liberal democracy. In this kind of democracy, there are no public satisfaction and no rule of law.

In the book, titled, *"The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad"*, he wrote: "after the collapse of communism, Russia immediately moved to-

ward a free and fair election, hoping that this election would led to a liberal western style democracy; it also begins a series of economic reforms in the early 1990s, hoping to create a western style capitalism, but most of them failed" (Zakaria, 103 : 2006).

Societies that pass from tradition to modernity are involved in such systems. Indeed, they are somewhere between democracy and authoritarianism systems. In pseudo-democratic systems, people have the right to vote, elections are hold, and the political parties compete with each other, but all of these are done at the surface level and in fact governments are ruled out invisibly. In such societies, if an institution or organization threaten the government, will be easily excluded from participation in the political process. The voices of the oppositions are rarely heard and the media are completely under control. In these countries, three historical resolutions have been the pattern of the organization of political and social life: first, the French revolution; second, the industrial revolution; and third, the Russian revolution with the pattern of the former Soviet Union. Ideas such as constitutionality, constitution, national sovereignty, nationality and democracy were derived from the political model of French Revolution. All of these concepts contradicted the indigenous political systems of autocracy and traditional patriarch, theocracy, sheikh-salary, and so on. Although each of these systems in inevitably adapted some of that thought and made strange, intellectual, and political mixtures. (Bashiriye, 167 : 2003)

The industrial revolution has been the economic pattern of many of these countries to industrialize economic growth and modernization. Naturally, the combination of the requirements of the economic model of the industrial revolution and political pattern of

the French Revolution in the developing countries have been very difficult. The third pattern, the government pattern of the Russian Revolution, with emphasis on a powerful, planetary, and great state, was in conflict with the legacy of the political model of the French Revolution. The main problem of many developing countries has been to create a modern state structure (divorced, bureaucratic, and new). Hence, the pattern of the Russian Revolution could not be used properly (BasBashiriyeh, 168, 2003).

The Pseudo-democracy system is generally based on the foundation of the transition period and its specific conditions. In other words, the pseudo-democracy is the product of the transition from an authoritarian system to a democratic system. In this situation, the conscious and unconscious government neither can allow a broad democracy nor can stand against it. This system has many examples in eastern and southeast Asia countries. Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore can be considered as the most pseudo-democracy systems.

An important feature of these systems is that focus, authority, and control are not just used for the ruling person but are used to reduce chaos and create a condition for growth and development, too. Some countries have a democratic outlook, that is a constitution, a chamber whose members are elected by popular vote, a judicial organization, and a guarantee of freedom of speech and assembly, but in practice, all organizations move in a way that keeps the statesmen in power. In particular, the characteristics of the Pseudo-democratic system include the existence of a political parasitic leadership, weak political institutions, the lack of interdependence among peoples legitimized by the election to the power of their leader. Pseudo-democracies may buy or spoof votes

as the last resort to guarantee the continuation of the existing regime. Pseudo-democratic systems often cover all form of authoritarian, such as resorting to force, intense monitoring, abetting and culturing personality to a limited extent, which undermines the credibility of democratic procedures. Political leaders resort to traditional and charismatic legitimacy and, at the same time, participate in a system that must be fundamentally rational and limited to the rules. This will also lead to low credibility of democracy, because this temptation comes at the top leaders who do not need to adhere to the rules and criteria by designing specific claims about their authority (O' Neal, 2012 : 179-180).

Positive functions of pseudo-democracy system include the creation of an order against chaos, the emergence of the growth against non-development, the emergence of justice against injustice, and the existence of social and welfare services against the class system. At the end, the following analytical model will be presented as a summary of the topics:

Substrate variables	Swift variables	Independent variables	Dependent variables
Political culture and necessity	Contempt and international pressure	Economic and security problems	Putinism
Indexes		Indexes	
The state capitalist economy		Putin's government attitudes in politics, economics, media security, and communications	
- Chechen crisis			
- the existence of mafia			
- corruption and Bribery			

Second. Russia's Post-collapse

The Soviet Union was in a very chaotic situation in 1991. The limited reforms sparked people's passion for further change. The end of communism in Eastern Europe has led to more stimulation of opposition in the Soviet Union. In the meantime, ethnic and nationalistic conflicts intensified as different ethnic and national groups, each sought political gain. The situation after the 1991 coup caused separation of the republics that formed the Soviet Union, from each other. In this process of deconstruction, the desire of the ethnic groups in each of these republics had an important impact. So, the Soviet Union divided into 15 newly independent states, which Russia was one of them. These republics (with the exception of the Baltic states including Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), shortly after the incident, formed an interconnected confederacy known as the commonwealth of independent states. Each of these countries was forced alone to face the problems of creating a political, economic, and social system over the ruins of communism (O' Neal, 282, 2012). By the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet empire in the late 1980s, the nationalists' feelings in the Baltic republics, which forcefully and contrary to their desire to join the Soviet Union at the end of the second world war, were demolished, and in March 1990, the parliament of all republics voted for their independence (Toloui, 451 : 2012). A demonstration of the North Caucasian Democratic forces, shortly before the start of the war, proved the inability of former Soviet leaders in Russian national politics (Bonavita, 160, 2010).

Two factors contributed to the sudden collapse of communism: the first one was the re-emergence of the cold war conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. After the decades of the 1950s and 1960s, the main

feature of which was an international competition, the arms race, and the emergence of honor events such as the Cuban missile crisis. The two superpowers began a period of the detent, in which peaceful coexistence between the two sides was considered as the main goal. But this course lasted less than a decade. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which was to continue the survival of the Communist regime in decline, as well as the election of Ronald Reagan, as the president of the United States in 1980, caused the relations between the two countries to blur.

Reagan, who called the Soviet Union a Colonial Empire, launched a new policy to strengthen US military power. But the growing economic downturn in the Soviet Union created major problems for the Kremlin to face this costly challenge. At the same time, in a situation where the United States and the Soviet Union entered a new and costly cold war period, a new generation of political leaders in the Soviet Union took over power, including Mikhail Gorbachev (O' Neal, 279 : 2012). One of the main reasons for separatist activity can be seen in the economic potential of these republics, because the Chechen Tatar or Kashghrstan regions had a lot of wealth and resources. On one hand, due to high economic resources and high populations, and that is, western aid and guidance led to tensions in the region, such as Chechenya. But these republics that were financially dependent on the central government were in a more conservative politics. After the defeat of the 1991 coup, Gorbachev resigned from the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party and the European countries, then the world gradually recognized the Baltic republics (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia) as independent republics. After the independence of the Baltic republics, the republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan,

soon announced their independence (Koolaei, 251 : 2001).

In the introduction of the book, titled, "*Russia in the Hands of Mafia*", Hanse pointed out that the most important reason for the collapse of the Soviet Union was that Marxist and Leninist doctrines did not pay attention to the criminal attitude of the economy and the socialists and communists trusted in the correctness of the theory and made others to expropriation of landowners, financiers, and founders of Soviet power, to put an end to the abuse of economic power. During the 1990s, Russia experienced a full - scale economic catastrophe. Industrial production declined by 50%, the level of life declined dramatically, and the average life span was reduced.

Russia's oligarchy, not in the process of modernization of the country, but in the period of corruption and decay of the Soviet system was formed; and its capital, not through the formation of a new economic institution but through redistribution of the properties, accumulated and proved properties to be an anti-nationalization. In other words, the oligarchic capitalism in Asia was a manifestation of a "peaceful revolution" and in Russia was a social product of a kind of reconstruction. Corruption became the only national criterion for decision making. But old Nomenclature, despite having a great deal of redistribution of property, was forced to accept newcomers. Industrial, real estate, and mining factories were transferred to subtle managers who were elected by the party and government agents to act like lawyers. In practice, the same managers had a large share of the property, although the old Nomenclature did not go away. This was the process that took the lead in the emergence of "oligarchies", that is, more than forty super-rich people who controlled a large volume of the

economy of the former Soviet Union super-power. After the oligarchs, at a later stage, the "new Russians" were smaller employers, which they also were able to earn concessions. But they did not have real power. Political - business gangs were created who united the government bureaucrats, public figures, and employers. The battle over the distribution of property among these gangs represented a major component of political life and the main form of competition. The same "political capital" took control of public-private group media. In the midst of defining and praising freedom of speech, censorship was reestablished effectively in most media outlets. It was censorship that was not formal, but a private one, which unlike the Soviet era, had no place to complain about it (Kagarlytsky, 2009, 230-321).

☆ Nomenclature was a class of managers and owners of capital in the decades of Soviet regime that controlled and enjoyed political and legal immunity.

The former Soviet regime really collapsed. What is the political bill of the new regime? There is no political prisoner in the new regime, but tyranny is dominated in the executive branch, civil liberties were obtained and political freedoms were in operation but the separation of the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary was mocked.

Glasnost was the title of discussions in the media for some time, but the ruling powers did not have the necessary transparency. Freedom of information was the ultimate victory of society, and newspapers and television channels were independent of the state and were not part of the financial and lobby groups of the government. Freedom of the press has often lost its mission and became the place to settle the opposing groups, and defamation could not always be considered as the detriment of the opposition. The ideo-

logical press gave its place to ordinary newspapers. All of these led to a dangerous illusion for Russia about democracy and freedom. Democracy was not considered as respect for other's liberty and a kind of legal regulation (Scott, 2012: 364).

The Soviet Union, after France, had the second largest place in the world in terms of alcohol and number of drinkers. New violent and anti-alcohol laws were announced in May 1985. Alcohol consumption in the Soviet Union reduced the average age of Soviet citizens. Drinking in the Soviet Union was a very harmful phenomenon. This was the case since the Tsars era. Along with rising economic benefits and revenues from selling alcoholic beverages to the extreme drinking costs of the people, the problems have also risen. Increasing crimes, lack of work, frequent absences, increased in capacity children of alcoholic parents, alcohol-related illnesses all put heavy burdens on the national economy of the Soviet Union. Unofficial statistics showed that even the level of the government liquor did not increase the amount of consumption, and the sale of counterfeit liquor contributed more to the health of the community (Koolaei, 2001: 171). Communities in the post-communist countries, like the political and economic systems, experience fundamental changes. During communist domination, a single interpretation of human relations was presented, while, after the collapse of communism, people saw a more uncertain future. Those societies that had passed the communist era were now more likely to have a more liberal way of doing individual activities, however, this possibility was more risky.

The removal of the universal ideology of people's lives created a social vacuum that should be filled somehow. In all of these countries, the transition from communism was a painful process, because people had to

adapt themselves to new realities and create new collective identities for themselves (O' Neal, 2012 : 296).

With the arrival of the fall of 1999, it became clear to everyone that the Yeltsin's era is approaching its end in Russia. The issue was not just that, according to the 1993 constitution, president (Yeltsin) could not have run for the third time in the presidential election, but basically ended the capacity of the political and economic model that had emerged from the coup of 1993. The group of oligarchies, in which there were differences, but united in control of the country, split into hostile groups and fought with each other until the last breath (Kagarlynsky, 2009 : 367). Yeltsin, besides his own office, did not turn to other institutions of the country. He always weakened the parliament and the courts. He pursued a brutal war in Chechnya and did not give any consideration to the usual consultation processes, let alone restraint. In the last months of his presidency, Yeltsin did something that was called a coup by historian Richard Pipes (who had supported Yeltsin severely): he resigned six months before the presidential election, and appointed his prime minister, Vladimir Putin, as assistance president. By doing this, the upcoming presidential election was irrelevant, namely the adoption of power rather than a real struggle (Zakaria, 2006: 102).

The Yeltsin's team, held in power in the year 91, had a plan called "500 Days", which changed 500-day communist and socialist models of the country in the model of liberal American-European capitalism. Yeltsin's team was not politics. They were some researchers. To make reforms, they decided to democratize informally (Zand Shakibi, Template Discourse Dialogue: No 78 :8). Yeltsin did not do anything for the construction of political institutions in Russia.

Indeed, he actively weakened almost all the rivals' centers of power, such as parliaments, courts, and local governors. In 1993 constitution that he left for Russia is a disaster, a law that created a weak parliament, a dependent judiciary, and an unbeatable president. Perhaps most sadly, Yeltsin did not establish a political party (Zechariah, 2006: 106). Yeltsin has been described as someone who has devastating genius: he destroyed the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, as he watched the collapse of the Russian economy. Some even saw this as a strong personality (he paved the field, and created new conditions). Others saw Yeltsin as a complete visualization of the most compelling facets of the Russian soul and the most shameful feature of the Russian national character: irresponsibility, trust in one's luck, ignorance and impoliteness along with humiliation in front of the stronger, more self-satisfied, and humbleness against the West. In short, anything that has always been in the face of progress has been incompatible with European culture and freedom and has always been a hindrance to the successful modernization of the country. This is what preserves tsarism and totalitarianism (Kagarlitsky, 145 : 2009).

Former US secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, in a recommendation to President Bush, urged the US foreign policy to support the republic power in the Soviet Union and, in fact, undermine central authority. He believed that the interests of the United States lie in the absence of a concentration of power in the Soviet Union since the emergence of centralized Soviet power has always been an expansionist tendency. He called for the Baltic republics to gain independence and called on Bush to support them (Col. ,2000, p. 1380). In recent years, the Russians faced within the borders of the federation and their peripheral republics in Central Asia and the

Caucasus, with the independence of ethnic and religious groups -most affected by Islamism in Afghanistan- and in many cases oppressed their military has paid. But it has always been blamed by Europeans and Americans and, in some cases, have been squeezed by the region. For instance, in the case of Chechnya, during the 1990s, there were many criticisms and protests on behalf of the West.

Third. The Emergence of Putinism in the Russian Political Arena

Vladimir Putin was born on October 7, 1952, in Leningrad (current St. Petersburg) (Bloksky, 9: 2003). His father was a Navy commander. Vladimir spent his childhood and education era in poverty. He was a clever and smart boy. After graduating from high school, he was able to take the entrance to the Leningrad State University and pursue his higher education in law (Toloui, 471: 2012). Putin started exercising from the age of 11-10. In that regard, he says, "Since I realized that having a good warfare is not enough to be the first to speak on the street and school, I decided to work in boxing..., but I did not continue it for a long time and decided to start Sambo (Gurkan, 2001: 36-38). When we talk about Putin, it should be remembered that he played a significant role in his education and personality not only in building his sporting life, but also in the development of his human personality aspects and in sports. Although he was not a husky man, but was professional (Bloksky, 2003 : 67). In the last year of studying at the university, Putin'S interview with one of the KGB officials was arranged and Putin recruited after the graduation from the university in 1975.

Putin describes the last months of his service in Germany, which coverage with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the collapse

of the Communist regime of East Germany, as bitterness; and resigned from KGB after returning from the mission in 1991, and started working in the municipality of St. Petersburg. He served as vice mayor in the second year of service in the municipality of St. Petersburg and during the struggle with mafia groups in the city, rejoined the new Russian security organization FSB, which replaced the former KGB.

In the course of the Yeltsin election campaign, Putin takes over Yeltsin's presidential campaign in St. Petersburg in the run-up to the presidency of Russia, joining the presidential office in 1996. In 1998, according to the records of Putin, Derek G.G appointed him to the presidency of the new Russian security organization, and in the summer of 1999, he appointed him as prime minister in an unexpected step.

Within five months serve as the prime minister, Putin took effective steps to fight corruption, suppressed mass mafia groups and established security in the major cities of Russia, and after the resignation of Yeltsin and the patronage of the presidential office, by intensely suppressing the Chechen rebellion he enjoyed a privileged position among Russian military and nationalists. In the March 2000 election, in addition to Russian nationalists, military men and ordinary people who wanted security and economic well-being, some former communists voted in favor of Putin's record in the Communist Party and the Soviet security organization (Toloui, 472 : 2012). Putin focused on strengthening the legal framework. He improved his position with the use of the united Russian party in the Russian parliamentary elections (Koolaei, 91: 2013). Delao believes that Putin's characteristics caused he look at politics as a career. Referring to Putin's political choice, he explains that two important deci-

sions in Putin's life led him to this present position. First, entering the security service and second, working with Yeltsin. According to Delao, these two decisions together helped the Putin's successes to achieve the first place of power (White Flower, 236: 2011). On October 7, 2012, Vladimir Putin has been 60 years old. According to Article 317 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the president at this age should resign, otherwise his presidency would not be legitimate. But Putin, however, cheated to run for presidency in two periods, and his presidency is illegitimate now. From the characteristic features of Putinis, oppression, feudalism, fascism, and the oligarchic rule can be named during the history of the blend in the socio-political forms of Russia.

Putin used clever methods to keep people in his circle around. He colluded with Chechen bandit, extremist jews, fanatical orthodox and greedy entrepreneurs. As his unlimited power increased, gangs grew. Although in 2000, when he came to power, there were pirate and mafia structures since the past times, but they appeared professionally during the reign of Putin (Poleev, 2012). The Chechen War was his only winner ace. This war, in a familiar way, was a major tool in his election campaign and was the only means the regime had to strengthen its position in the society. However, the effective consolidation of the situation required two conditions: either a decisive victory or the arrival of the enemy at the gates of the capital. But none of these two did not materialize. The Russian armed forces did not break the resistance of the Chechens, and Bassaev and Meshkodov did not reach the Kremlin's gates. Anti-war sentiment grew increasingly in society, and opposition to Putin was gradually rooted in the army, including among frontline forces. That is, in the fall of 2000, it became

clear that the situation was getting out of control and waiting for anything, from the widespread escalation of soldiers to rebellion among military units deployed to the front. Putin's group succeeded in squeezing opposition among the electronic media, but now people were less likely to believe in television. Yeltsin has even been able to reverse the widespread public outbreak of the war, and this was when the press authored by the opposition to the war after a while prompted the popularity of the president. Putin risked and caused everything exactly against him. By closing the mouths of the opposition, he was deprived of any directing of public opinion, even though the advertiser's lies had always revealed from the curtain (Kagarlynsky, 2009: 438-439).

According to the constitution adopted in 1993, Russia is a democratic country and the basis of this system is political parties. But Putin, like Nicolae III, dismissed opposition parties after the 1905 Constitutional Revolution.

He also turned the parliament of Russia into a positive political force for two months. This situation can not stand against the executive branch. At the same time, he set up a powerful party in the name of united Russia, which runs the country. It is hardly possible to mention Putin as a dictator. Putinism has the appearance of democracy, which may have led the country to democracy once again. According to the political and economic journal, "Foreign Policy", the sovereign democracy for men and women and young people whose anarchy of the 1990s is a proverb that has a long gap with them, is a daily insult. They do not compare themselves with their grandfathers and grandmothers in the Soviet era, and even their fathers and mothers in the post-Soviet era, but they look at contemporaries of their period in democratic European countries and the United States. The

most significant factor in the legitimacy of Putinism, which is considerably better than the 19s, is getting erosional (Ferraro, 2011).

During the ruling of Putin, the Kremlin has shown less loyalty to its colleagues, and there are many examples of degrading the status of these colleagues. Machiavelli in the book, tilted, *The Prince* said, "how can you be the ruler of a nation while surrounded by a group of old colleagues and friends who may be smarter or more experienced than you." That is why Putin chose Medvedev as his successor, who had less experience than his older colleagues, and, on the other hand, another reason for this choice was that it was possible that his old colleagues would have been unable to accept his development and reform modalities, and, in addition, Medvedev has a more democratic character than others (White Flower, 237: 2011). Waves of American activities (from the establishment of US military databases and military forces to the expansion of Western security institutions and colored revolutions) have challenged the vital interests of Russia in this region. The 2008 Ossetian war should be the culmination of US-Russian opposition in this region. But it seems Russia's hands in the region have become more open since last summer, after the new Moscow-Washington interactions, and despite the persistence of some controversies, the general trend of affairs is not against the interests of Russia.

Moscow has always expected Washington to recognize Russia's security and economic system in the region. The European region is the second priority of Russian foreign policy, and the country's most threatened security are still in the area. The spread of NATO to the east and the issue of the US missile shield in Czech and Poland are the most important manifestation of this threat (Karami, 84 : 2011).

After the end of Cold war, the rise of Carter- Reagan's military equipment to break the Russian economy became a priority for Western politics. Ten years later, Clinton intended to increase military spending from \$ 274 billion to \$ 331 billion, and heavily invested in missile defense. In February 1999, in a speech on the American intention to raise its military capability, he said: "it does not matter to us who lives in this or that region of Bosnia, or who owns a tape in the Horn of Africa, or some pieces of land are burned around the Jordan river; just security is important to us and wherever our interests are in danger, we must defend ourselves (Selfa, 1999). Russia recalls the devastating military attacks of the Finns, Swedes, Poles, French, and Germans from far away. In the 1970s, it reached a strategic alliance with the United States. This situation, however, did not last too long, and Washington and its allies, in the field of non-nuclear warfare, with the revolution in conventional military technology, provided the technologies of the Third War of intelligence (Cyber) and tested in Kuwait crisis (1991), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003). (Karami, 193: 2010).

Forth. Function of Putinism in New Russia

Putin's economic program was simple: GDP growth and has doubled in ten years. Putin's practical action as president, strengthening government institutions and creating economic regulations, such as tax tariffs, reducing social obligations, regulating infrastructure monopoly tariffs, encouraging immigration from the former Soviet republics to Russia to carry out work, freeing private property land, opening the doors of economy to global competition, changes in pensions, and other reforms.

With these interpretations, Putin's strategy, especially in the second term, was preserve and strengthen his government and se-

ize energy resources as private capital in the monopoly of the state, which managed to bring the country's economy to the level of the economy of some developed Western European countries, such as Italy and France (Nikonov, 2015 :391). Putin's pragmatic approach can be followed in colored revolutions. President's discourse becomes more intense. He plays this role in the Baltic States Accession to NATO and the European Union. Putin's pragmatism can be seen in the "color revolutions" (Georgia at the end of 2003 and Ukraine in the late 2004) (Mordovets, 2015).

Over the past 10 years, despite the superficial innovations, there has been a terrible detergent of modernization of the economy. Russia produces not only less than before, but also far behind the Soviet era. This is a normal situation for a peripheral capitalism (Kagarlinsky,111, 2009). Following the numerous failures of neoliberalism and the complete rejection of the ideology of the Russian elite in the 1990s, advancing this path requires the regime to change the tone. Instead of rhetoric about the "common European home" and "return to global civilization", people were called patriotism and "revival of state power". However, in practice, all slogans of the regime were nothing more than a cover for the continued looting of the country by local oligarchies and transnational corporations. Putin's regime totally ignored the criticisms of Western human rights organizations and this was the only major difference between Putin and Yeltsin's foreign policy. This continued disregard for the international norms of human rights defends was a true manifestation of Putin's "defense of sovereignty".

Meanwhile, Western leaders after a mild criticism of the Russian leader for genocide in Chechenya, announced their support for

the Kremlin's new authorities. The reason was simple: the economic policy of the Russian authorities was still in line with the interests of the western capitals. In addition, the Russian authorities practically abounded their claims against NATO's expansionist policy (Kagarlynsky, 2009 : 436).

Some economic analysts consider Russia to be a third world superpower, and that is right because 70% of Russian exports are raw materials and energy, and this is a third world country feature. So along with economic corruption and the government's oligarchy, we are faced with the economic dependence on the export of raw materials and energy, as well as an economic system in need of foreign technology, under sanctions and international pressure to curb foreign investment and destabilize economic conditions within Russia. These are the most important economic problems of the new era, and Putin's government has tried to prevent further sanctions through negotiations and find a solution to put an end to the sanctions. Internally, there are plans for modernization and industrialization, too. Although they have not succeeded so far, and sanctions have made the conditions worse, the government hopes partly resolve the economic needs of Russia and resolve these problems through relations with Eastern countries, especially China, India, Iran, and etc., Karami, *Template Discourse Dialogue*, No.8). Another presented criticism of Putin is about the Sochi Olympics. Putin launched Sochi Winter Games in 2014 to increase Russia's prestige and showcase his authority in the world, which costs higher than the Beijing Olympics, which was considered the most expensive game. According to official statistics, China allocated \$43 billion to the 2008 Olympic Games, but Putin spent \$50 billion on the Sochi Olympic Games.

Indeed, Sochi's Olympic was an unprecedented scam, brought by the representatives of the Putin government and Oligarchies close to him (Nemtsow, 2013).

In general, Putin subjected the Kremlin to economic sovereignty. Indeed, the economic base of Putinism is rent-seeking. As a result, economic rule can hardly be a political threat to Putin's system. Corruption, which tied up severely into Putinism and reached its worst during the history of Russia, is at the peak of the paralysis of important economic and social institutions. But Russian scholar Kagarlynsky believes that Russia's current economic model takes the form of a mixed economy that incorporates democratic elements of capitalism, government governance, and democratic socialism. That is, the Soviet prosthetics and the collapse of communism are among the consequences of the general crisis of state-oriented economic models. On the other hand, it should be acknowledged that keeping Russia on the brink of global systems as a supplier of raw materials and the market of consumer products (central) is one of the push incentives on the part of the powerful West. Russia's foreign policy has changed dramatically since Vladimir Putin and his entourage formally won power in the Kremlin with the victory of the December 2000 presidential election. The focus of the decision-making center in this field and its manifestation in the formation of a small group of central decision makers with security and information records in the presidency is one of the main manifestations of this transformation. "Stability" and "security" are two important characteristics of this transformation in Putin's foreign policy, an achievement that Russia did not have in the Yeltsin presidency. The security men succeeded in penetrating the core of the decision-making process of foreign policy,

which was adopted in accordance with the Russian Constitution of 1993, that is the presidential institution, and its influence on other major centers of power such as the National Security Council, the Ministry of Defense, the State Department, as well as cartels and large oil and gas companies such as Lukoil, Yukos and Gazprom. The result is the coordination of interests, policies, and orientation of the institutions mentioned in the Kremlin's policy in the realm of international politics (Kiani, 2006: 165).

Some writers exaggeratedly praised Putin's performance.

Vyacheslav Nikonov, in 'Russian Matrix' says: "under condition of poverty, massive crime and terrorism, people are waiting for the leadership to restore order and security to the country. Putin, in the first term of his presidency, decides to prioritize Russia's survival. He continues the path of Sergei Witte (the first Russian prime minister) who started the reform process a hundred years ago. Putin deals with banking and financial reform, strengthening the military and law enforcement agencies, and controlling state-owned industries. He develops civil society for the Russian identity, and in the international arena, he has respectful behavior. During his two presidential term, he managed to make Russia's economy the fifth largest economy in the world and promote Russia from the situation it was in (Sukhnev, 2014 :9). Despite the crisis in Ukraine, the sanctions, the isolation of the country, the collapse of the ruble, the decline in oil prices, the rise in prices for goods and food, but the president is still very popular, and this reminds us of a religious leader. Sectarianism like the Protestant sect (Fedor. Krasheninnikov, 2014 :1).

The success of the consolidation of a new Russian identity uniquely depends on two factors: leadership and ideology. What makes

the new Russian identity possible is the cooperation of these two agents at the same time. Moreover, contrary to what some people think Putin is escaping ideology, he needs an ideology to act and to create a new Russian identity. Nevertheless, Putin is a pragmatic individual and on the other hand, is realistic, meaning that he knows the necessities and requirements of the political and economic community of Russia and the international environment (White Flower, 233: 2011). Two decades after the collapse of communism, the work of Russia and even more sovereign states on democracy and the move towards democratization, has not been a move forward, and the transition process is not well advanced, and even many of these countries in many cases move backward and have fallen back and forth.

The reason for this is the continuation of the same views of the Cold War as a bipolar view and a one-dimensional definition of the political environment. Freedom of expression, alternative sources of information, independent societies, the existence of an independent civil society, free market economics and the rule of law are among the features of a pluralist society. But in countries like Russia, we are witnessing the re-establishment of the concept of a central government and the return of historical concepts such as Feudalism (White Flower, 235: 2011).

Conclusion

Russian - dominated democracy has nothing to do with the model of Western democracies, since Russia's economic, political, and cultural structures are fundamentally different from western society. Russia over the course of history, due to its large geography and the invasion of its neighbors from all sides and domination of the Mongols over the course of two centuries, always needed to

have a refuge that can be derived from two elements: Orthodox religion and the existence of powerful states, as those bombers pointed out. The emergence of this need stems from the vacuum of democratic movements and civil institutions that arose in the heavens of a tyrannical tsar, powerful leadership, such as Stalin and authoritarian president, such as Putin. Russia is a country that has been in the communist system for about seventy years, and with its socialist system of governance, it is now governed by the state capitalist system.

By focusing on the discussion of domestic issues, including the collapse and subsequent conditions, the economic problems, the Chechen war, and the effectiveness of the Yeltsin government, we find that the Putin government has succeeded to a large extent in arranging conditions and securing the country. On the other hand, international pressures a western interventions through the expansion of NATO or the European Union, the strengthening of color revolutions by the west has caused a sense of humiliation on the part of the Russian people from so-called democratic countries. Putin has been able to receive Russian national identity and, as a result, has become popular with the Russian people. The Russian people who were dissatisfied with Yeltsin's weak performance, as well as the economic system of the market and the Russian westernization process, provide Putin with all-embracing support.

Rising oil prices in the global markets allowed Putin to rebuild and economic reforms. He won successes in the Chechen war, cooperation with the west in countering terrorism after the 9/11 attacks and the Sochi Olympic Games in 2007. But after stabilizing the situation and consolidating the country, he has several presidential steps with total authority, and the reliance on oil and gas wealth, he has

added to his ambitious and is sitting on power. The main reason of being the lone challenger of him in various areas of the country is the inadequacy of the elements of democracy in these fields. According to the constitution, in 1993, Russia was approved as a democratic state, and as the main elements of this system are political parties, the only party that plays the leading role in the country is Putin (United Russia). The single-party rule in its own nature has a corporatist character and creates a variety of government affiliated unions to gain its legitimacy. Finally, we see that in Russia's Pseudo-democratic rule, major democratic structures are seen but not fully institutionalized. One of the most important criticisms of Putin's rules is about the oligarchy of his government, as well as the mafia gangs that grew rapidly during his time. The transformation of structures from the socialist system to the capitalist system during the Putin era has been very hasty, and in other words, modernization has been quick and inclusive. We observed the process of the formation of the phenomenon of Putinism in the internal problems and crisis, as well as foreign events and issues, and on the other hand, by studying the life of Putin and his personality, we can conclude that Putin, with its unique characteristics, succeeded in lifting its full authority, and then by using this position, he could pursue its ambitions.

The most important element in the ideology of Putinism is nationalism with anti-Westernism.

Putinism gets meaning with public capitalism, which has successfully diminished inefficiency and corruption, but it has a parliamentary body that its opposition parties do not actually oppose, and the press has freedom and do not accept the criticism. No suitable substitute for Putinism can now be imagined. In the future, the people of Russia

may go under another name than Putinism, but the point is that the main lines will remain, since the authority from the tsar era to this day has been produced in various forms. Unless civil society is gradually formed in Russian society and democracy is present in all fields.

Internal substrates

Yeltsin's inefficiency	Collapse of the Soviet Union
Cultural and social problems	Economic problems

External factors

The crisis of Ukraine and the Crimea	Colored revolutions
International pressures	Bosnia and Kosovo crisis

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