

A Study on Mullā Sadrā's innovations in practical philosophy (*Hikmat-e Amali*) and its consequences in man's status

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Abstract

In this article, Mulla Sadra's theories on practical philosophy are compared with those of Aristotle, Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Subrawardi, revealing Mulla Sadra's radical innovations in the matter in respects to their widely revered views. Muslim philosophers such as Al-Farabi and, after him, Ibn Sina, regarded action and will as secondary and subordinate. By introducing this problem, the author is not to claim that they paid no attention to practical issues or to the value of man's acts; but it is meant to say that, like Aristotle, they deemed thought to be principal and thus the will subordinate to it. Despite opposition of Ash'ari scholars in general and Ghazali in particular and somehow jurists and mystics, such a view was followed until the time of Subrawardi and Ibn Arabi. At this time, Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina's views on the matter were criticized and a new path was taken on the issue of the priority of thought to practice and priority of thought to will.

However, Mulla Sadra presented the most innovative view on this issue on the basis of an inclusive view on existence as well as on man in theoretical and practical realms. On this basis, Mulla Sadra rejected both the views of

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
[تاریخ دریافت: ۱۳۹۰/۶/۶؛ تاریخ تأیید: ۱۳۹۰/۱۰/۵]

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(رضا اکبریان، محسن امامی نائینی)

Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina who considered God to be an Agent-by-foreknowledge so that he may deem God's knowledge to be sufficient to realize it, and Subrawardi's theory according to which God's agency was agency-by-agreement, so that His active knowledge may suffice for the realization of action. For him, nor knowledge is primary and essential neither will and action are secondary and subordinate. Basing himself on such a view, Mulla Sadra proceeds to discuss the relation between speculative and practical philosophy and provides ideas that are fully different from those of previous philosophers on the issues of practical philosophy and political philosophy, as well as concerning the qualities of the first ruler of the polis. The aim of this article is to present an account of Mulla Sadra's ideas concerning the relation between theory and practice, and to demonstrate its philosophical implications in the field of political thinking as compared to the present situation.

Keywords: *practical philosophy, Aristotle's division of knowledge, theory and practice, thought and will, rationality and spirituality, right and obligation, unreal perceptions*



پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی
پرتال جامع علوم انسانی

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Introduction

Philosophy essentially aims at perfecting the soul, either the faculty of theoretical intellect or either the faculty of practical intellect, and in turn, the perfection of the soul aims at attaining happiness. Such saying is not specific to Mulla Sadra. Following Greek philosophers, other Muslim philosophers had the same opinion. However, the important point of difference between them concerns the relation between theoretical philosophy and the practical one and whether speculative thought is prior or practice; thought prior to will or whether there is no priority at all.

Such an account of the relationship between theoretical philosophy and the practical one in the Transcendent Philosophy and such an expectation from the Transcendent philosopher have, of course, other implications as well; and this entails that philosophy, in addition to having an influence in the purification of man's soul and the exaltation of his spirit, also has a social and political dimension, and that learning philosophy will help man to apply the different aspects of religion in his individual and social life. It is here where the philosopher appears as a Saint and God's friend, and in this light he will be able to occupy a slightly lower position than that of the prophets and great friends of God. In this way, Transcendent Philosophy finds a unique and harmonious expression as an inclusive doctrine which is based on rationality, spirituality, as well as a value and legal system based on Shari'a; and in spite of the spiritual, religious and philosophical abyss in the West, it assumes a particular importance.

Aristotle defines God as the "Thought of thought". In other words, according to him, God's activity is an activity of thinking-of course "thinking" about Himself. Since He does not know the world, then He is not the creator and protector of beings. Because He is the ultimate cause, Aristotelian God is considered to be the origin of the world's motion. He moves the world, i.e. through a sequence of movers or subordinate "intellects", He elaborates the form of the material structure of the world; in other words, He inspires them to love Him as the aim of the world. Nevertheless, Aristotle explicitly opposes the idea of a created world; he considers the world to be uncreated and pre-eternal. Evidently, according to such an idea, Aristotelian God has nothing to do with the world; thus no doctrine may be attributed him concerning Divine providence and foreknowledge of the world.

Naturally, people of religion do not accept this Aristotelian doctrine; for in all religions, God is deemed the Creator of the world; and that is why Muslims and the followers of other Divine religions reject the doctrine of

eternity of the world and its uncreated-ness. Concerning this issue, Kindi goes to oppose Aristotle in a particular way: on the one hand he deems God as the Creator, Protector, and Administrator of the world (Kindi, 1950, p. 162), and on the other he rejects the doctrine of infinity and eternity of the world (ibid, p. 207).

Concerning that God has knowledge of His Essence, Al-Farabi is unanimous with Aristotle. Like for Aristotle, Al-Farabi holds that the First is intelligible by the Essence, for He doesn't need any intermediate to perceive His own Essence, and He intellects His Essence since pre-eternity and forever (Al-Farabi, 1990, p. 31 onward). Unlike Aristotle who denies God's knowledge of other than Him, Al-Farabi thinks that God knows the whole world of being. In his various books, he has called God the "Administrator of all beings and a Creator whose mercy encompasses all things". For example in the book *Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle (al-Jam' bayn ra'y al-hakimayni)* he has said explicitly that no particle of the world may fall out of His knowledge, and all that is in the world has been ordered in the best way and upon full consistence¹.

1 Relation between thought and will in Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina: a relation deeply rooted in their conception of God and His relation to His creation

Al-Farabi considers God's knowledge of the best order of being to be necessary in order to realize it (Al-Farabi, 1968, p. 106). In his books, he states that God is the Administrator of all beings and created the world with order, rules, and full certainty (Al-Farabi, 1328, p. 67; ibid, 1405, p. 91) and that all things are encompassed by his Mercy. Aristotle's idea of God is that He is pure form and pure necessity which is not preceded by possibility, and He is in the single state and no faculty, capacity, change, and development for Him may be imagined. In this, Al-Farabi agrees with Aristotle. The difference between his thought and that of Aristotle is that for Aristotle, the Necessary has not any influence in the realization of the possible, while Al-Farabi applies the qualificative "Necessary" for God - the Creator, the Maker. To explain the relation between the one and the many as well as between unity and plurality as well as the provision of the unity of the One, Al-Farabi appeals to the doctrine of emanation (ibid, 1405, pp. 53-4). According to him, because of His knowledge of His own Essence, from the Necessary One other one being emerges and this emanated being is the First Intellect. Al-Farabi explains emanation rationally; he says God intellects His own Essence and the world emerges from His knowledge of His own Essence. Al-Farabi says: "The world emerges from Him, because

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He knows His own Essence; thus His knowledge is the cause of the world's being" (ibid, 1990, p. 17; 1371, p. 127).

This theory is not peculiar to Al-Farabi. In Ibn Sina's philosophy as well, a solution for this problem has been searched through the combination of God's pure simplicity with the idea that God knows things through His knowledge of Himself. God is the Knowing is because He is free from matter, and He is pure Intellect in which the Knower and the known are the same; God's knowledge of His Essence encompasses, in fact, His knowledge of other things as well; for, inevitably, in His knowledge of His Essence, He knows other beings that emerged from Him (Ibn Sina, 1364, p. 274; 1983, pp. 402-3, 1404, p. 127). Ibn Sina argues that, though God cannot have sense perception, He knows everything and even particulars altogether (ibid, 1983, p. 589; 1364, pp. 247-8; 1404, pp. 66-7; 1400, 24-9, 251). Though this doctrine is fully innovative and based on the fact that sense perception is not the only way to know particulars, Ghazali has criticized it (Ghazali, 1993, problem 13).

Similarly, Ibn Sina's view concerning attributes such as will and creation is not inconsistent with religious teachings; for, according to Ibn Sina, God is not only the knowing emanation of the world from Him, but He is also content with this and wills it; for him, God's will is not perfect unless because of the necessity of the emanation of the world. Knowledge of the best order of existence is the same as will, for this knowledge is required by His Essence (Ibn Sina, 1404, pp. 116-7, 153). Creation, for Ibn Sina, is the same as the Creator's knowledge of His Essence, and it is this knowledge of the Essence which brings all things into being. Since the Necessary Being is pure Intellect, thus His First Emanated being has to be of the kind of intellect and since the latter is not purely simple, from it originates plurality (ibid, 1400, p. 255).

To prove oneness in creator-ness and negate that God - the Exalted - has any partner in creation and administration of the world, Ibn Sina regards creation as not being restricted to direct and immediate creation; he thinks that by the First Intellect, sequence of the Intellects begins and comes to an end with the Tenth Intellect which is the Giver of forms and Administrator of the world of generation and corruption and called "Gabriel" by Muslim philosophers. This name is applied to the Tenth Intellect, for this Intellect shapes or gives forms to the matter of this world, i.e. corporeal matter and human intellect. Emanation of immaterial intellect from the Absolute Being or the Creator's Essence was posed to perfect Aristotle's imperfect and untenable doctrine concerning God according to which there was no transmission from God (the One Being) to the world (plural being). According to Ibn Sina, God is Wise; but His wisdom is not a wisdom

acquired through knowledge of things other than of His Essence; but wisdom emerged from God's knowledge of His Essence and His knowledge of the best order of being through knowledge of causes (Ibid, 1404, p. 66). Like Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina thinks of God as an Agent-through-mercy, who knows that all beings and all things are under His administration and will, a will which is the same as God's knowledge of the best order of being.

That is why we have already said that Ibn Sina and Al-Farabi believe in priority of thought to will and theory to practice, and regard will as something secondary and subordinate to knowledge. By this we do not mean to claim that they have paid no attention to practical issues or the value of man's actions; but we mean to say that, like Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina maintains that emanation of all beings from God is a result of His knowledge of this all, and this knowledge is the same as God's Essence.

2 The opposition of Ash'ari, and in particular of Ghazali to Mu'tazalis

In spite of the opposition of Ash'ari mutakallims, and in particular of Ghazali and to some extent jurists and mystics, this continued until Suhrawardi's time. Ash'aris, including Ghazali, opposed to Mu'tazalis on the one hand and Peripatetics on the other. Ghazali deems God's will as being absolute, and is of the opinion that God has knowledge of the world, and His knowledge is in this very willing. For Ibn Sina and Al-Farabi, God is, above all, thought or intellect; but according to Ghazali He is, first of all, will; a will which is the cause of creation. In his *Tafahot al-falasifah* (Incoherence of the Philosophers), he says the First Origin is the Knower, the Purposer, and the Powerful. He does what He wills, and He commands what is encompassed by His providence; and whenever He wills He creates similar and dissimilar things.

Thus, the absolute reality is will. Heavens and whatsoever is in them and the earth and whatsoever is in it are His immediate acts, which are brought into being by His fiat "Be!". God- the Exalted- has created the world by His own will and will forgive it because of His own will and one day His will shall be to annihilate it. For the Peripatetics, the world is a subject of God's will, for it is a subject of His knowledge; but according to Ghazali, God has knowledge of the world because it is a subject of His will, and His knowledge is in this very willing. That is why in this book, Ghazali attacks Ibn Sina and Al-Farabi for denying God's will, they have been unable to prove both Divine attributes and His knowledge. According to Ghazali, Ibn Sina and Al-Farabi, who regard God as intelligible-by-essence and believe

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that He is free from all Essential attributes including will, have to accept that God's knowledge of the best order of being is the same as His will toward the best order of being².

3 Suhrawardi's vision of the relation between thought and will

After the above debate between philosophers and Mu'tazalis on the one hand and Ash'aris and Ghazali on the other, it is Suhrawardi's turn to come to the scene. It is now that Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina's ideas concerning both the Truth's agency and God's knowledge of other than Him as well as the priority of theory to practice or priority of thought to will are opposed. As we see in this passage, Suhrawardi regards unhidden-ness for the perceiver's essence as a basis of knowledge and perception and sees this as the most perfect definition in this regard. Just in the same way that this is clearly true for man's perception of his essence and self-consciousness, it is true for the rational soul's perception and knowledge of other things. What is out of the rational soul, though it may be known and perceived, is known accidentally and we may call it "the known" only because it coincides with the known-by-essence. This is true for imagination and the perceptual form of imagination as well; i.e. in the same way that the faculty of imagination is present to the rational soul, the perceptual form of imagination as well is present to it; thus, concerning the perceptual form of imagination, the condition for the soul's perception is presence rather than its (the perceptual form of imagination's) being substantiated for the soul.

This is one of the fundamental issues and it may be regarded as the basis of many other ones. Suhrawardi appeals to this issue and puts an end to the philosophers' problem concerning God's knowledge of beings. He is of the opinion that God is Genuine and Simple Being, and all things are present to Him. In other words, it can be said that relation of things' being to the Truth is like the relation of perceptual forms to the rational soul; i.e. in the same way that the rational soul encompasses its own perceptual forms and perceives them by presence, the Essence of the Truth - the Blessed, the Exalted - as well has sovereign encompassment over them, and things' being, for Him, is the same as their presence.

It is here that Suhrawardi proceeds to oppose to Peripatetics concerning the quality of God's knowledge of things and rejects their idea concerning the proof of imprinted forms. Ibn Sina believes that scientific forms of possible things are imprinted in the Essence of the Truth-the Blessed, the Exalted-collectively and through mental acquisition. Thus, God's knowledge of beings, for him, is agential knowledge and the origin of acts. That is why he and his followers regard the Truth's agency towards beings as agency-by-

foreknowledge. Mu'tazalis as well regard the unchanging essences as the criterion of God's knowledge of beings in pre-eternity. They believe that the essences of things, before they come into being, are unchanging. To notice that establishment of the essence without some sort of existence is impossible is a clear hint to the fact that this idea is absurd.

Many great Sufis such as Muhyii al-Din Ibn Arabi and his followers advocate the idea that the criterion of God's knowledge of pre-eternal beings is not other than immutable essences. This group is of the opinion that all beings, before they appear in the objective world, had been immutable in the world of the Lordly knowledge.

The difference between this idea and that of Mu'tazalis is that Sufis do not believe in objective fixity of things before their coming into objective being; but they consider fixity of things in pre-eternity as some sort of scientific fixity which is fixed in the station of the Lordly knowledge so that one can say that immutable essences of things are fixed in the Lord's knowledge in the mode of Lordly fixity. At the same time, Mu'tazalis consider some sort of objective fixity for the essences of things before objective realization and external being.

Unlike what is expected from the above, Suhrawardi denies any knowledge prior to action. For him, the criterion for the Truth's knowing things is their objective presence for God. He regards the great scene of the actual facts and the world of things in relation to the Being of the Truth-the Blessed, the Exalted- as something like the vast plan of mind to the rational soul, and denies any reification and intermediacy of form in this regard. That is, in the same way that there is nothing in the vast scope of the mind unless it is known-by-essence for the rational soul, in the world of facts and things there is nothing unless it is perfectly apparent for the Necessary Being. Thus, God's knowledge of things does not require the intermediacy of scientific forms, in the same way that man's knowledge of the mental forms saved in the tablet of his mind requires intermediacy of no other form. Relying on what he has said in this regard, this philosopher has adopted a particular position concerning the Truth's agency and posed an innovative doctrine. He is of the opinion that the Truth's agency in relation to things is of the kind of agency-by-agreement and His detailed knowledge of His own acts is the same as His actions. Concerning agent-by-agreement, Muslim philosophers have considered no difference between actions of an agent and agent's detailed knowledge of his own actions.

This current influenced many philosophers until the period of Shi'i philosophers and mystics in the circles of Shiraz and Isfahan with Mulla Sadra at their head. Mulla Sadra, who has an encompassing look in theoretical and practical aspects at being and man, neither regards God-like

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Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina-as agent-by-foreknowledge so that he may deem God's knowledge of the best order of being sufficient to realize it, nor does -like Suhrawardi-he believe that God's agency is agency-by-agreement, and His active knowledge is sufficient to realize it. For him, neither knowledge is primary and essential-as Ash'aris maintained-nor will and act are secondary and subordinate-as Mu'tazalis said. Such an opinion is based on the fact that Mulla Sadra proceeds to discuss relationship between speculative and practical philosophies, and presents ideas fully different from those of previous philosophers in the issues of practical philosophy, political philosophy, and qualities of the first ruler of *polis*.

4 Theory and practice in Mulla Sadra's philosophy: a deep relation between the acquisition of knowledge and the purification of the soul

In Mulla Sadra's school, practical philosophy, influenced by many factors, has gone in certain direction. It is true that Shi'i teachings may be seen in previous philosophers' ideas and more than anyone else, Khwajah and his followers as well as other masters of interpretation and great mystically-minded Shi'i exegetes worked on such an important issue, but the main tasks were done by philosophers of the circles of Shiraz and Isfahan with Mulla Sadra at their head. In rational issues of *Asfar* and other works of Mulla Sadra, Shi'i teachings play a great role. Though he was familiar with Mu'tazali *kalam* and knew mystical tradition, Mulla Sadra did not move away from philosophical-mystical thought which was based on Shi'i teachings. Against Ash'aris and Mu'tazalis, Shi'is are the only group who, advocating an inclusive thought, pay full attention to man's constructive role in individual and social responsibilities without this leading to humanism.

Mulla Sadra's opinion is different from that of those who proceeded to discuss government and politics from a theological viewpoint and discuss mainly theological issues concerning the principles of prophet-hood, *Imamah*, and just rule of prophets and God's friends. He is looking for a philosophical and inclusive understanding of the reality of God, world, and man in his individual and social life. Thus, when he criticizes Ibn Sina for his incapability to understand some statements of existence and considers that this incapability stems from his concern with apparent sciences and acceptance of governmental positions, he is in fact underlining that to attain philosophical sciences, attempt and purification of the soul are required. Such a conception of philosophy in the sense of an attempt to discover the reality of things and the combination of knowledge of truths with the purification and perfection of man's being has continued until today, wherever there has been a tradition of Islamic philosophy and now, it is

manifest in the philosophical school of Mulla Sadra.

Inspired by Shi'i teachings as well as the sayings of mystics and philosophers of the circles of Shiraz and Isfahan, Mulla Sadra proved the existence of another kind of agent who has detailed knowledge of actions in the position of the essence of agent, and this is the same as his collective knowledge of his own essence, i.e. agent-through-manifestation, and he regarded Divine agency of this kind; and to prove it, he sought help from the principles of Transcendent Philosophy in general, gradation and the fact that the Being who grants existence has all perfections of His effects in particular. In such an agent, the general meaning of will which is "to love" and "to prefer" may be regarded as being true, without this leading to the idea that will is the same as knowledge of the best order of being.

For Mulla Sadra, that the Truth - the Exalted - knows all things in detail is because of His being pure Intellect, simple reality, and possessing all dignities and perfections. The outcome of this idea is that since the Truth - the Exalted - is simple in all aspects; and being, power, will, and free will are merely for Him and He has all perfections purely, then He has in the highest degree whatever perfection may be imagined in the world. Indeed, this is based on simplicity and Oneness of the Being of the Truth; for, mere and pure being has no difference in its essence and so it accepts no more the station of mind, external world, or this or that quality; and in this case cognitive existence is not other than objective existence and within it, the existent and the known are a single and one reality. Then, as a matter of fact, things' knowledge of the Truth and other than Truth is through the Truth, and this entails that the Truth - the Exalted - is known by His own Essence, i.e. without intermediate, and all things are known through the intermediacy of the Truth³. The Truth's-the Exalted- knowledge of His Essence and of things is not through mental forms; and here the known itself with its external being and objective reality is present and observable for the Knower.

Mulla Sadra poses this both in the station of the Truth's Essence and in the station of acts. This is based on the necessity of purity and absoluteness of being which has perfect encompassment to all things. According to this, the Truth - the Glorified, the Exalted -, because of the absoluteness of His Essence, encompasses whatever limited being which may be imagined, and the reality of that limited being, with no veil comes to His realm of Majesty; and knowledge is not other than the presence of something for some other thing, and thus, any thing is, per se, known for Him and not through tools of perception and acquisition of scientific forms. This requires, of course, truth and essence of all attributes to be established for the Truth- the Glorified-; and non-existential restrictions, limitations, and contingent

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characteristics to be negated of Him. The Truth- the Glorified-knows but not through tools of science, sees but not with eyes, hears but not with ears, wills but not through intellectual wish, encompasses but not through physical encompassment, He is in all things but not through combination; and He is far from all things but not because of distance; for, all these perfections require limitations and He has no limitation in His Essence. Neither like Suhrawardi, Mulla Sadra reduces knowledge to hearing, seeing, and observation, nor like Ibn Sina and Al-Farabi does he reduce hearing and seeing to knowledge. Both knowledge in the station of Essence as well as act and will are explained philosophically.

What may eventually follow from such discussion concerning God's knowledge of particulars is that all these changes seen in the world, while they depend on the Truth - the Blessed, the Exalted - will not result in change in His realm of Holiness; for change is limitation, and there limitation is not admitted. Thus, all these beings realized because of change and governed by rules of motion, are fixed in their relation to the Truth- the Exalted, and are changing in their own station of existence. What granted by Him is fixed; but comparing some of them with some others results in the idea of change. For example, if we say that God created that event today and brought that thing into being yesterday, today and yesterday are containers of the creation of them, and not some restrictions for creation by the Truth - the Glorified -; for restriction is for creature and not for the Creator. Thus, in fact, what emanated from His realm of Mercy is permanent making of a certain thing in which no discrimination and difference are admitted; and differences and particularities are in the side of creature.

5 Mulla Sadra's practical philosophy: a deep interaction between the attainment of individual, social and Divine goals

Mulla Sadra analyzes his practical philosophy within such a frame in which will and act are, like knowledge and thought, of importance. Based on substantial motion which is, in turn, based on the priority of existence to quiddity, Mulla Sadra deems practical philosophy as a selected and rational solution and attempt based on men's natural and innate pleas which are adopted to improve selves and social life as well as to attain happiness and Divine goals. For him, man is the one who builds his own nature and his society by his will and attempt, and moving from individual soul which is based on man's free will and choice, proceeds to individual and social perfection.

According to him, such an idea cannot be possible without accepting

another fundamental principle. That principle is that man is an all-comprehensive engendered being, in the sense that among all beings in the world, only man is able to make a link between the world of matter and the world beyond matter. In fact, man is a bed for, and subject of, a motion from infinite potentiality to infinite actuality. Thus, in the scope of man's existence, various modes of being from the lowest level to the highest one are realizable. From the world of matter and the world of Ideas to the threshold of the Truth and annihilation in the Truth and then survival by the Truth.

In this way, in his works, Mulla Sadra places practical philosophy at a much higher station and that is the station of purification and mystical attempts. For him, the mystic is the one who turns away from worldly life and its pleasures, and cares for worships, from prayer to fast and the like. It is such a person whose soul is directed to the Holy realm of Grandeur and permanently receives its lights. The mystic seeks the First Truth, not any other thing than Him. He prefers nothing to knowledge of Him. His servitude is only for Him, for it is only He Who deserves to be worshipped. When the contamination of the proximity of body is removed from him and he is free from concerns, the mystic enters pure and clean world of holiness and happiness, and is imprinted by the highest perfection; and the highest pleasure i.e. the intuition of the Truth, is obtained for him⁴.

In this way, the first station is will and determination so that, either because of demonstrative certainty or principles of faith he may become interested into holding the firm cable and proceed to the world of holiness. The next station is abstinence in which the commanding soul becomes obedient to the angelic soul. After stations of will and abstinence, it is the turn of a station which comes into light for a while and then fades away. Once the mystic proceeds in the stage of abstinence, this state becomes a state of tranquility. In the next stages, he goes beyond this and his concern is no more restricted to his wants; and in this stage he will ascend from this false and absurd world to the world of truth, and achieve the station of proximity, and in this stage he will be a truth-reflecting mirror in front of the Truth, and the happiness of attainment will come down to him, and he will be happy because of seeing himself in the Divine mirror. In this way, he has a look at the Truth, and at the same time a look at himself. But, gradually, because of the perfection of the soul, he will become absent to himself, and will see only and only the presence of the Truth, and this is the same as attainment to the Truth in which there is no trace of selfhood, property and "I", and whatever there may be is Him and only Him⁵. He who wishes to understand these stations has to experience them and replace hearing by seeing.

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Such an explanation of the relation between speculative philosophy and practical philosophy in Transcendent Philosophy and such an expectation from the Transcendent philosopher have, of course, other outcomes as well; that is philosophy, in addition to being of influence in the purification of the soul and the exaltation of man's spirit which causes man to keep away from sins, will take a moral and practical taint, and this will help man to learn how to be qualified by the Divine morals and attain the realm of religion in his individual and social life. It is here where philosopher will find the image of a saint and God's friend and is able to, under the light of religious teachings, to sit in a level immediately lower than that of prophets and God's great friends. Wayfaring and perpetual care of the Transcendent philosopher will ensure this conducts. The first three journeys of *al-Asfar al-arba'ah* (The Four Journeys) pave the way to attain the stage of leadership. After going successfully beyond these three stages, the fourth stage, which is verily leadership of people, will come.

According to Mulla Sadra, after finding the knowledge of God, acting in His way, attaining perfection, and vanishing in the Truth, man is able to enter the realm of social and political life and proceed to improve state of affairs; for a man who has returned from such a journey deserves the title of "Allah's viceregent" and the leadership of society⁶. He regards improvement of the society as possible only if man improves himself and this is what in which the modern man has no interest. Today, man wishes to improve all things, even God's principles sent down by God to improve humanity; but he is in no way to improve himself. It is this great danger which today threatens the world, i.e. to surrender to wishes and desires under the excuse that one has to be new-fashioned. The message of religion, of course, has to be communicated in each and every age according to the language of that age; and according to the Holy Quran, one has to speak with each and every nation in their language; but to state an eternal truth in a new way is one thing and changing that truth according to wishes of an age is quite another thing. In the present situation, Divine religions and in particular Islam and philosophies based on it have a very important, and at the same time crucial, task. Religious and cultural heritage, heavenly traditions, as well as values based on them should be both kept and communicated to the today's world. Contemporary man needs philosophies which are based on religious teachings.

One of the fundamental principles of Mulla Sadra's practical philosophy is that, contrary to what Sufis thought, he does not proceed to separate invisible and visible worlds, reason and desire, world and other-world, intelligible and sensible, and religion and politics. Mulla Sadra deems each of the two modes as being related to one of the stations of man's life, which is

of importance in its proper place; that is why he adds immediately that to care for the world, which is man's sensual mode, is a necessary goal. Though blaming the world from the viewpoint of mystical insight, he stipulates that in man's life, the world is a necessary thing. Thus, he believes in the personal unity of man's reality and considers that he has various levels and modes each of which are a necessary thing in its proper place. He interprets the world as a station for those proceeding toward God, and man as a traveler who has to pass many stations to attain his real desired thing. Thus, the world is linked to the other-world in this aspect and man's perfection makes a sense in terms of the two modes of world and other-world. Mulla Sadra does not separate the path of religion and philosophy from the way of administration of individual and social life. Emphasizing that the mode of world is a place to perform all God's rules and the world is a field for the other-world, because of a rational necessity, he deems administration, politics, and improvement of the state of affairs as being necessary. Mulla Sadra deems administration of the state of affairs in a way that leads to improve people's religion and world as being conditioned by the fact that all people have to contribute in their societies' policies. For him, the favored policy is the one relying on Divine rules and commands, which enable people to improve themselves and their societies. Mere teaching and learning are not sufficient. To establish a good and just order, people have to purify their souls and exalt their spirits. They have to both tried for their own development, scientific and rational progress and seek to strengthen their wills and practices. They have to both become familiar with justice and realized justice in their beings and their societies so that their practice and belief may coincide and their various personal aspects may be united⁷.

Recently, some Western philosophers have maintained that knowledge and practice are separated from each other and posed this as a doctrine. If they mean to describe the decline of philosophy, corruption of reason and prevailing moralities, they are right. Also, if they regard knowledge as being merely restricted to studies based on methodologies of modern science, they are right to say that no morality will stem from physics and chemistry; but that Hume and his successors claimed that they had discovered some confusion in their predecessors' ideas is a false claim; the only thing which may be said is that since Hume replaces ideas of all philosophers by his own conception of knowledge, then he sees some confusion in their ideas. But the introduction of these issues is related not only to the crisis of morality but also to the decline and corruption of thought encountered by today's man.

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Mulla Sadra regards correct thinking and fruitful knowledge, in addition to good morality, purification of the soul and exaltation of the spirit, as necessary conditions for people of *polis*. He believes that the head of *polis* has to be in the station of God's viceregent, deserve leadership of people, and also has to be sent by God. Such a person has attained a station wherein he encompasses all three rational, soulish and sensual modes. That is why he deserves to be God's viceregent and an inclusive manifestation of Divine names. But since prophet speaks in people's language and uses analogies, and since people prefer power to influence on bodies and nations to the world to true sciences, theoretical virtues of the prophet would remain hidden for them and even for some people of knowledge in religious sciences⁸. According to Mulla Sadra such a person is necessary for society's leadership so that in the world, which is a place of evils and corruptions, he may lead human beings and cause them to be improved and guided... (Mulla Sadra, 1372, p. 273.).

Such a man in journey from the Truth to the creature is a very exceptional one who has the station of perfection in terms of natural and innate aspects as well as voluntary configurations. He has enjoyed Divine graces, has become an interface of the world of command and the world of creation, is acceptant of the Truth and the creature; he has a look at the Truth and a look at the creature. He is both God's vice regent and leader of human beings. In addition to be perfect in the true sciences through revelatory graces, such a man, who is a manifestation of religion and politics, has to be perfect in issues concerning religious statements and politics and be confirmed by apparent miracles. If not, he cannot be an intermediate between the Truth and the creature, and he is not even able to be an intermediate between the creature and the Truth (ibid, p. 348).

From these, origin and conditions to deserve the station of Muslims' leader and Imam from Mulla Sadra's viewpoint are quite clear. To be established and externally realized, his leadership needs social background and acceptance. Lacking spiritual perfections, revelatory graces, and religious politics is so important for Mulla Sadra that, according to him, he who lacks them does not deserve to assume political leadership in democratic systems. Such a rule is not inconsistent with people' rule over their own fate; for, in fact, it is human beings who administrate and organize their individual and social life and, based on this, improve their society so that the society may not fall in anarchy, and may follow its developmental course.

6 The importance of Mulla Sadra's practical philosophy in the present time: restoring the full meaning of reason and the real aim of man's life

Thus, Mulla Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy as an inclusive doctrine in which rationality, spirituality, value and legal system based on *Shari'ah*, find a single and harmonious expression, shows off its power against spiritual, religious, and philosophical abyss in the West. For the first time in the history, instead of conceding that man's life in this world is a mere transient period and his being before the attainment of the other world, the Western man forgot the latter world, and instead of considering himself as a traveler in this world, he regarded himself as a fully earthy and worldly being, and deemed his exalted aspect and heavenly reality as some poetical illusion or something secondary and subordinate; and in this spirit, he proceeded to capture the nature and oppress others. Economic-political situation as well as victory of natural sciences caused modern man to see, with the help of technical reason which is based on prevailing philosophies in the West, the world as a merely material reality and neglect the spiritual aspect of the nature and man himself.

Thus, divine philosophy reached a hopeless situation in the course of some centuries and retreated some step in each stage. Particularly because in this period, real mysticism and philosophy vanished and religion turned into some mere feelings, and philosophy had no trace of theosophy in its true meaning. But, since what is true may not be denied, man's need to spiritual and supra-natural things appeared in various movements in the West, but since these movements lacked a strong philosophical and mystical background, they did not manage to resist materialism⁹.

The present century is a period which religious faith has faded away and people have inclined to materialism and material values; thus, there is a ready context to propagate Eastern religions and philosophies. Such a situation shows man's eternal need to wisdom and belief in God. Intellectual and spiritual decline as well as the collapse of moral, social organization in the West is such a fast process that a deep void has been made in the spiritual life. Many Westerners have proceeded to search for the truth of the Eastern religions, and in the scientific circles as well interests in such things have increased.

When Russell blamed philosophers, from Plato to William James, that in stating their ideas, they had been influenced by their interest in refinement of morality, he did not notice that his saying stemmed from disbelief in refinement of morality and was opposed to it. He and the like take the term "philosophy" as a tool to establish the West's existence and think that all

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thinkers have thought to achieve their daily goals. If he and the like did not consider their logic as the climax of reason and if they listened to their hearts not to speak of what they did not know, we have no debate with them. This low level of reason has been realized in the present time. But this is not the climax of reason; of course, there are some who consider the present situation of the West as the perfection of man's being; they deem this logic as the perfect level of reason as well; but, if so, they have been clearly surrendered to indemonstrable things and we can explicitly say that no group follows indemonstrable things and surrenders the existing situation as they do, though all their lives have been spent looking for abstract concepts, quasi-logic, and quasi-philosophy.

Anyway, in the frame of such a logic, problems of philosophy cannot be solved and by this help no other problem than those of daily life can be solved. In such logics, to discuss reality of problems as well as the nature of the world are prohibited and thus, they are, even if not directly, in the service of establishing the existing situation. For example, according to this logic and those who are busy with it, whatever other than daily affairs and modern scientific studies is meaningless; i.e. man has to play his role in a scene whose limits have been determined by the logic of apparent world.

In the present time, a man who, according to his innate characteristics, had sought for the spiritual world, and had been in direct touch with this world through religion, revelation, mysticism, and intuition, has now focused on the transient shadow of this world which is the same as flowing material world; and since he has turned away from the sun, he denies its existence. According to Mulla Sadra, man, though he is always changing in terms of his corporeal conditions and goes through various stations of existence by substantial motion, in his relation to the context of reality and in his essence and reality would not change. He is born, lives for a while, and then dies. Despite his conception of himself and his surrounding changes, his own situation in the world of existence between two realities which are his beginning and end, will not change.

Here Mulla Sadra considers development and growth as essential and substantial, rather than superficial. He proves that man, in his depth, travels in some direction, and this travel is the same as his coming into being. For him, man is a particular being who, to appear and emerge, needs material background; but his survival is independent from matter and material conditions. At first, he appears as body, and then, through an internal, essential development¹⁰, and going through all existential stages, he finally becomes free from matter and potentiality, and attains immortality¹¹, (Mulla Sadra, 1981, pp. 152, 347). He thinks of man as a being who does not essentially change and the depth of his spirit faces an infinite reality, and he

is doomed to seek for this in his transient period of life. The people of appearance, however, have fallen in an illusion which not only causes them to be negligent of the stability and immortality of the spiritual world but also veils the order and firm stability of the nature and material world for them.

This, i.e. the opposition to superficiality, is not specific to Mulla Sadra's philosophy and philosophy in Islamic period, but philosophy is, in its essence, inconsistent with superficiality. But in the present time, there have been some philosophies emerged that justify the West's superficiality¹². Why has philosophy turned into superficiality? To reply this question, and more importantly to understand the West's superficiality and to oppose it, philosophy and philosophical research are necessary.

Sometimes, some people think that the new superficiality of the West, its logic and methodology, which are apparently neutral, have nothing to do with creeds and will not harm religiosity. Some groups even think that these are scientific and logical issues which have to be learned, and religion will be strengthened by them; but they are negligent of the fact that such logics belong to a world wherein knowledge and reason are judged by desires; and these desires are not, of course, individual, social, carnal desires, but they are such that whatever cannot be seen by corporeal eyes and is not confirmed by the computing reason is not worthy to be noticed. Those who become accustomed with such "logics" will look at the world and human beings through a glass of superficiality, and superficiality will become the same as their reason and understanding.

It should be specially noticed that one of the characteristics of philosophical thinking in Islamic era is to search for an eternal and absolute thing beyond the relative and transient world. It is true that Mulla Sadra speaks of change and development under the light of substantial motion, but this does not mean that he does not accept eternal truths and stop to believe in the possibility of such truths. He does not accept that all things are in change and there are no fixed values and criteria and that consequently, all things are relative and in accord with their times. That is why in his practical philosophy, he accepts stability and survival of moral values of human societies.

The other point which we have to mention is that when Mulla Sadra speaks of reason, he does not mean a mere psychic faculty, but rather a reason in which perfection seeks help from another place and helps psychic faculties. Such reason should not be confused with concept(s) of reason in the philosophy of the modern age. One of the misunderstandings in history is that ambiguous and even similar terms are sometimes considered as synonyms, and for example, wherever and in any book the term "reason"

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has been used; its meaning is regarded to be absolute and is interpreted according to this meaning. A reason described by European empiricists, positivists, and modern logicians is a technical one and if some of them regard it as being unable to understand general issues and unable to judge in practical affairs, they are right. In other words, in their thinking and in interactions surrounding them, there is no trace of what called "reason" by their predecessors, and modern European logics only includes daily statements and scientific-experimental propositions. While being a sign of selfishness, this is a confirmation of weakness as well. Anyway, when man sees only his immediate surrounding and imprisons himself within the limitations of selfishness, he will not attain freedom and greatness.

Kant says that he limited reason to make room for religion. What is certain is that no room was made for religion by his philosophical attempt; but rather another form of reason which is reason of technology appeared and overcame everyone and everything. "Reason of technology" as well is not of one and the same form, and its most prevalent form is an illusive-quantitative system which will, eventually, face reason of philosophy, and with it all other forms of reason will be negated.

In the history of Islamic era, philosophy is in an intimate connection with Islamic culture. There is no imperfection in the essence of Islam, and in one sense from it have originated culture, literature, science, and spiritual philosophy, and its history has come to its climax. But this is only the surface of the issue. Each and every history is a manifestation of a name, and a name prevails in it. But Islam is a manifestation of the all-comprehensive Name, and even if it is veiled, it will not come to end. The period in which we live is the period of Islam's estrangement. Now, *Qibla* of most Islamic states is the West, and the history of West has become a history for all nations; i.e. all people of the world are going in a path determined by the West. A path which results are westernization, determination of deformed western rules and values as criteria, separation of religion and politics, and practical interpretations of the western theoretical principles to become fully dependent on the West.

The point is that reason and logic defended by some great figures of the present time and modern logicians in general is a short-sighted reason limited within technology which is not applied except on propositions of the modern science and daily words of people of the street. The philosophy of the Islamic era cannot (and should not) be judged according to modern logic, but rather the philosophy of Islamic era has another logic and it is by the latter logic that philosophical issues may be studied. Whatever is confirmed or negated, of course, is confirmed or negated by reason, and in the Holy Quran derivatives of the term "reason" or the term itself have

been used. But can one apply reason and argument in their philosophical meanings on the Quranic reason?

It is true that great figures such as Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina have proved *Tawhid*, prophecy, and resurrection through a technical and philosophical language. But if we are to enlist great *Muwahhids*, we will recall those who have never spoken philosophically, and never used common philosophical proofs to prove their own issues. From these it becomes clear that, religion in its essence is not in need of philosophy. And if it was so, the Scriptures would be sent down in the language of philosophy and those like Kumayl ibn Ziyad Nakha'i, Maytham Tayyar, and Uways Qarani would be philosophers. If philosophical reason claims that it is able to know the essence of religion, it is not right in its claim. But this does not mean to belittle reason and study of the nature of things.

Conclusion

From this brief, it became clear that as a Shi'i philosopher who has an encompassing look at being and man in their theoretical and practical dimensions and presents a doctrine fully other than those of previous philosophers concerning the relationship between theory and practice, Mulla Sadra establishes a new system to explain his own philosophical ideas in the light of which rationality, spirituality, value and legal system based on *Shari'ah* find a single and harmonious expression. Within the frame of such system, he proceeds to analyze his own practical philosophy and shows that practical philosophy is a selective and rational attempt undertaken and based on an inclusive look at the world and man in order to improve one's self, collective life, and to attain happiness as well as Divine goals. This practical philosophy presented by Mulla Sadra is not a mere philosophical system, free from mysticism, morality, and religion; and it is fully other than practical systems of pure Greek philosophers, i.e. it believes in morality, religious and mystical morality, and as we know, he has posed prophecy and resurrection, which are in full relation to practical philosophy, in theology. For, according to him, practical philosophy is acquired by the guidance of prophets and in the light of their teachings so that each and every one may be rewarded in the world and in particular in the other-world in proportion to his purification of the soul and improvement of individual and social life. Not only he considers practical philosophy to be necessary for this, but he also emphasizes that man needs religion. He always insists that prophets and Imams are leader of human beings and man has to improve and perfect himself and his society by religion, which originates from the Origin of Perfection.

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Notes

1. In this way, on the one hand, Al-Farabi proves God's unity and simplicity and on the other he accepts the principle that God has knowledge of other than His Essence and all things, whether small or large. In his *Fusus al-hikam*, Al-Farabi appeals to the holy verse "Not a leaf falleth but He knoweth it". His words are as follows: "The First's knowledge is essentially indivisible.

2. The most controversial aspect of the issue of Divine knowledge from Muslim philosophers and theologians is, perhaps, the denial of God's knowledge of particulars. Philosophers such as Ibn Sina who concedes that God has knowledge of things lower than His Essence are of the opinion that His knowledge is a universal one, i.e. unlike knowledge of particulars it does not change because of limitations of place and time. Thus, God has knowledge of an event such as eclipse, before and after its happening in an atemporal manner and a priori through causes which eventually will lead to eclipse. In this way, He has knowledge of a particular individual absolutely, i.e. independent from conditions of time and place; for particular or accidental qualities or spatial and temporal substantiations, which make an individual distinct from another, are subject of sense perception of which God is free. Ghazali as well believes that God is independent from conditions of place and time; nevertheless he does not deny the relation between Divine knowledge and particulars subject to such conditions. Developments required by the mode of such knowledge do not require development or change in the knower's essence, but rather change in his relation to the known which is permanently changing. Ghazali, *Tafahot al-falasifah* (Incoherence of the Philosophers), p. 232 onward.

3. In *Asfar*, Mulla Sadra maintains that solution of this problem is his own, he says: "and solution of this problem was obtained by some of the Poor...", see *al-Asfar al-arba'ah*, vol. 3, p. 401

4. According to Mulla Sadra, veils depriving most people from perceiving and acquiring such knowledge and joy result from three things. The first is ignorance of the soul which is man's truth, and belief in the other-world, knowledge of revivification of bodies and spirits are based on hearty knowledge of which most people are ignorant. The second is love for glory, property and desire for desires and other animal wants of the soul which includes all loves for the world; and the third is temptations of the commanding soul as well as deceptions of Satan who makes evil to appear as good and good to appear as evil (Mulla Sadra, *Risalab sih asl*, ed. Dr. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Tehran University Press, 1340/1961, pp. 13-32).

5. In his *Ixir al-'arifin*, Mulla Sadra discusses such issues. For him, practical faculty has four stages: *Shari'ah* or rules of the Divine religions sent down to guide man, purification of the soul from evils, enlightenment of the soul by spiritual virtues and knowledge, and finally annihilation of the soul in God (Mulla Sadra, *Rasa'il, Ixir al-'arifin*, p. 295).

6. To deserve by these to be Allah's viceregent and people's head (Mulla Sadra, *al-Mabda' wa'l ma'ad*, edited and annotated by Seyyed Jalaeddin Ashtiyani, Society of Philosophy Press, 1354/1975, p. 480).

7. In most of his books and essays, including *Ara-yi abl-i madinah Fadilah* and *Siasat al-madaniyah*, at first Al-Farabi explains correct philosophical ideas in brief and then he comes to explain Utopia (virtuous city) and impious city. He thinks that virtuous city will be realized if people have correct ideas and creeds. For Al-Farabi, city (*polis*) corresponds the order of world and the both orders (that of *polis* and that of the world) should be known theoretically. Without such knowledge, it is not possible to attain the order of virtuous city. In other words, virtuous policy is that of those leaders who are well-grounded in knowledge, teach their nations, and take them to their proper places. Otherwise, city will not be virtuous one, nor people of the city can have virtuous deeds.

8. Al-Farabi considered philosophy the same as the ideas of the people of virtuous city and believed that the head of the city should be the one who takes his knowledge from the source of revelation. In fact, the head of Al-Farabi's virtuous city is the prophet, and, for him, philosophy is the same as religion. Al-Farabi is looking for a rational system, and depicts an overview of a city which head is the most knowing and the most intelligent one who seeks help from the Active Intellect, and his intelligence helps all parts and members of the city.

9. The present century is a period which religious faith has faded away and people have inclined to materialism and material values; thus, there is a ready context to propagate Eastern religions and philosophies. Such a situation shows man's eternal need to wisdom and belief in God. Intellectual and spiritual decline as well as the collapse of moral, social organization in the West is such a fast process that a deep void has been made in the spiritual life. Many Westerners have proceeded to search for the truth of the Eastern religions, and in the scientific circles as well interests in such things have increased.

10. Though based on his principle of the corporeality of the origination of the soul and its spirituality over the course of time, Mulla Sadra emphasizes the essential aspect of the soul's development, he does not neglect the issue of the hidden agent and involvement of the world of intellects. For him substantial motion is of two aspects: change and stability. Each and every

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form has two faces: one to the higher world and the other to the world of nature. The first one is the face of stability, and the second is that of perpetual renewal (Mulla Sadra, *al-Rasa'il, al-Waridat al-qalbiyah fi ma'rafat al-rububiyah*, Qum, Maktab al-Mustafawiyah, pp. 306-7).

11. Concerning man's immortality, Mulla Sadra goes altogether away from Peripatetics. Aristotle considered the Universal Intellect to be immortal. Ibn Sina and Al-Farabi generalized this to include the rational part of man's soul. Following some mystics, Mulla Sadra considers some sort of immortality for the faculty of imagination as well; he shows that the soul, after separation from body and undergoing sufferings will finally attain the Truth (*al-Rasa'il, Risalah fi hashr*, pp. 341-358).

12. As a matter of fact, there are two kinds of philosophy in the West: the first, philosophies which are expressions of the essence, interactions, and policies of the West on which depend the West's power. Philosophies of philosophers such as Descartes, Nietzsche, Kant, and Hegel are of this kind. The other is of the kind of philosophies that, though having a common origin with the first one, have nothing to do with the essence of the West. In such philosophies, either existing and prevailing ideologies in the West are defended or all what is presented by them is entirely illusive, abstractive points or quasi-logical games which lead to increase in negligence. The latter kind which is in fact logic or "theology" of the rules, interactions, relations, imperialist policies, and humanist quasi-religion of the West is masked by lies and deceptions.

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